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INTRODUCTION 
I 
I 
The specific forms of dependency in the Commonwealth Caribbean in any 
given historical period have been shaped by the characteristics of the 
international system and of the region's role within it. The early roots 
of economic, political and social structure of underdevelopment of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean are located in Britain's cultivation of the region 
as sugar plantations. During that time, the region existed primarily as a 
provider of raw materials and agricultural commodities. Thus dependency 
during the colonial period and during much of the twentieth century became 
orientated to the export of primary products under the control of foreign 
capital. 
The conditions which shape the Caribbean dependency today are quite 
different. The international system today is characterized by the multi-
national corporations. These corporations are orientated toward expansion 
of markets, toward guaranteeing sources of raw materials and other inputs, 
profit maximization and the establishment of monopoly positions. The 
degree of foreign control in the principal economic sectors is increasing; 
and more generally, Commonwealth Caribbean's integration into the orbit 
of the North Atlantic Community is becomming more complete, despite 
constitutional independence. 
These characteristics of the international system and the functioning 
of the Commonwealth Caribbean within it, impose definite limitations on the 
possibilities for the region's development. Moreover, the development 
policies that have been undertaken by the governments of the territories 
have only reinforced the dependency of the region. This is quite evident 
// 
in the economic policies of the governments in the promotion of metropolitan 
investments by offering tax holidays (five to ten years), exemption from 
import duties on equipment and raw materials, and other concessions. 
The underdevelopment of the Commonwealth Caribbean is also perpetuated 
by the concept which postulates the proposition that, being poor, the region 
lacks investment capital and therefore, find it difficult or impossible to 
develop and thereby escape its poverty. Therefore the developed countries 
should diffuse capital and technology to the region, thereby promoting its 
economic development. Consequently, the leaders of the territories have 
embraced this proposition conceived by the "developed" nations and are busy 
"begging for financial aid, trade preferences, or opportunities for 
emigration. "i 
Since the 1960 1 s, West Indian leaders have had to develop a wider 
investment and trade contacts with other capital importing countries and 
multilateral institutions, partly as a result of the four larger territories 
gaining their independence. Therefore, a wider choice of action, perhaps 
more important it was due to Britain's growing interest in the European 
Economic Community which culminated in its entry into this community in 
1971. Britain's new outlook created from the outset,uncertainties among the 
West Indian territories. Consequently, the governments of the territories 
began to look toward Canada for financial assistance, trade preference and 
other kinds of economic links. At the same time, according to one report, 
"there were signs that Ottawa is awakening to the Caribbean as a potential 
sphere of Canadian interest. 112 
1 Alister McIntyre, Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies, New World 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, 1966, p.165. 
2 Editorial, MacLean's, Sphere of Influence in the Sun, Vol. 80, No.2, 
Feb. 1967, p. 4. 
In 1966, Canada took part in two Commissions, one with Caribbean 
participation (Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Conference in Ottawa) and 
the other (Tripartite Economic Survey) which according to one critic "neither 
included West Indians in direct participation nor sought to set up any proper 
liaison. 113 These two Commissions were to decide Canada's policy towards 
the Commonwealth Caribbean. Canada, realizing the economic potential of the 
region, concluded that in the Leeward and Windward Islands tourism is the 
likely key growth industry in these Islands and recommended that official 
development assistance focus on the provision of infrastructure for private 
investment in tourism. This is the basic rationale for CIDA 1 s4present 
"concentration in the sectors of air transport, water resources, and education 
with lesser emphasis on agricult,;e. ,.5 
In short, the strategy is designed to modernize public utilities and 
infrastructure as a conditioning factor, so as to be more receptive for 
foreign investment. The two Conferences like others before them were merely 
keeping up with the traditional and continuing process of underdevelopment 
in the region which has been serviced by a long range of misguided institutions 
and activities. This study is concerned with Canadian aid to the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. Its purpose and scope will be to show that the diffusion of capital 
3Havelock Brewster,Canada and the West Indies:Some Issues in INterna 
tional Economic Realations ,Journal of Canadian Studies ,Vol. 2 ,No· 3, 
August 1967 p. 27·~ ·· · · · · · 
·----~----,- ---· 
4An Agency responsible for the administration of Canada's official program 
of development assistance. Known until mid-1968 as External Aid Office, 
CIDA reports to Parliament through the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs. 
5Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Respecting Canadian 
Relations with the Caribbean Area, First Session,-Twenty-eight Parliament, 
1968-1969 Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1970, p.27. 
6 from Canada to the territories has created little development. Canadian 
foreign aid has become a major instrument of Canadian foreign policy in the 
region. It is the primary instrument relied upon to promote and protect 
Canadian interests. Consequently, the economic assistance programs have 
come to serve and to reflect the full range of Canada's interests in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean which in many crucial respects are not compatible 
with the economic·development of the recipient countries. 
This study is developed in four· stages. Chapter l outlines a general 
insight of the nature of foreign aid. This chapter sets the stage, by 
discussing the concept of development as perceived by developed countries. 
It also deals with bilateral and multilateral aid and their rationale as 
conceived by donor countries. 
Chapter II provides an overview of the present political economy of 
the Commonwealth ciiribbean; It is concerned with showing how the crucial 
sectors of the economy, however conditioned or aggravated by international 
factors, manifest,.,-, the structural dependency of the region. 
Chapter III deals with Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Relations. 
Specifically, it is concerned with aid as perceived by Canada as an instrument 
6 
According to William Demas, development means not only economic growth, but 
economic growth generated from within a country as well as growth which 
results in economic diversification in the sense of the creation of more 
interdependence or "linkages" between the different industries, and activities 
within a given country. These are the minimum requirements of any technically 
objective definition of economic development - economic independence and a 
diversified interrelated structure of production. A satisfactory level of 
employment a fairly equal distribution of income, and the greatest possible 
participation by the people of the country in the Economy: William Demas, 
The Political Economy of the English Speaking Caribbean, A Summary View 
l970, p. 8-9. 
for development of the region. This chapter also discusses the political 
impact of Canadian assistance on the territories and the relevance of this 
assistance to Canadian investment. 
Chapter IV provides a summary of Canadian aid to the region and 
offers some recommendations. 
THE NATURE OF FOREIGN AID - AN INSIGHT 
The Different Kinds of Aid 
Hans Morgenthau, in trying to create what he calls "an intelligble 
1. 
theory of foreign aid," states that "the first prerequisite for the 
development of a viable foreign aid policy is the recognition of the diversity 
of policies that go by that name'.'. He goes on to state that six types of 
foreign aid exist. They have common features which is transfer of money, 
goods and services from one nation to another. They are as follows: 
Humanitarian Aid, which aims at supplying relief to populations victimized 
by cataclysms, floods, famines and epidemics. This aid is per se nonpolitical, 
although it may create conditions facilitating political actions. 
Secondly, there is Subsistence Foreign Aid. This type of aid is extended 
to fill budgetary needs of governments such as those of Jordon and Niger, 
which do not have the resources at their disposal for the maintenance of a 
minimal public service. The primary aim in the final analysis, is to prevent 
political chaos and maintain the status quo, without increasing the viability 
of the beneficiary government. Aid for subsistence loses efficiency whenever 
the recipeint government is confronted by considerable political opposition. 
Bribery accounts for the third type of aid. After a brief review of 
the evolution of bribery, Morgenthau suggests, that foreign aid serves today, 
in many cases as a mask for bribery. He points out that, "much of what goes 
by the name of foreign aid today is in the nature of bribes. The transfer 
of money and services from one government to another performs here, the 
function.of a price paid by the former to the latter for political services 
rendered or to be rendered by the latter to the former". 
Fourthly, there is Military Aid. This is the traditional type of foreign 
aid in any system of alliance. At the present time Morgenthau notes, it 
serves to mask other types of aid. The United States aid to Yugoslavia is a 
case in point. The purpose is not so much military as political. "It seeks 
political advantage in exchange for military aid. It obligates by implication, 
the recipient toward the giver. The latter expects the former to abstain 
from a political course which might put in jeopardy the continuation of 
military aid". In short, military aid in that respect would be masked bribery. 
The delivery of jet planes to underdeveloped countries serves to impart 
prestige to the recipient government rather than to achieve proper military 
purposes. Finally, "as bribery appears today in the guise of aid for economic 
development, so does aid for economic development appear in the guise of 
military assistance". 
Prestige is the fifth kind of Aid. It has in common with modern bribes 
the fact that its true purpose also is concealed by the ostensible purpose 
of economic development or military aid. The unprofitable or idle steel 
mill, the highway without traffic and leading nowhere, the airlines operating 
with foreign personnel and at a loss, but under the flag of the recipient 
country. Such aid is granted to governments engaged in projects of "conspicious 
industrialization" that is, projects that function as symbols of progress 
rather than investments satisfying any objective economic needs of the country. 
Finally, there is Aid for Economic Development. In analyzing the 
problem of foreign aid for development, Morgenthau points out four correlations 
generally held by aid donors. The first is that between injection of capital 
and technology and economic development. The author calls attention to 
I 
2. 
physical, social and human limitations of certain countries that would render 
them inaccessible to the process of economic development. "To put it bluntly" 
as he points out, "as there are bums and beggars, so there are bums and 
beggar nations". They may be the recipients of charity, but short of 
miraculous transformation of their collective intelligence and character, 
what they receive from the outside is not likely to be used for economic 
development. Secondly, he argues that economic interests exist in the under-
developed countries that prevent resources destined for economic development 
from being applied for that purpose. The hegemonic groups in several of these 
countries are interested in the maintenance of the status quo. Thus, foreign 
aid "is more likely to accentuate unsolved political and social problems 
than bring .them closer to solutions". For this reason, in order that aid be 
efficient it is indispensable that, parallel to its granting, there be made 
political reforms or economic reforms with political consequences. The 
"promotion of drastic social change although it may create conditions for 
an uncontrollable revolution," which can generate political consequences 
unfavourable to the donor. 
The third "false correlation" would be that between aid for economic 
development and the development of democratic instutions. The most probable 
hypothesis, Morgenthau argues, is that the moral intellectual prerequisites 
that are essential to economic development would not be distributed throughout 
the nation, but rather that they will be concentrated within a small minority. 
Hence, release of the process depends on the impositions of the will of a 
minority over the will of a nation as a whole. 
3. 
Finally, he refers to the co-existence of a relationship between economic 
development and a peaceful foreign policy, and recalls the example of the 
Soviet Union which could engage in an expansionist foreign policy only after 
it had overcome the barrier of underdevelopment. 
In concluding, Morgenthau reasons that foreign aid will be "efficient" 
only to the extent of the possibility of identifying concrete situations 
with the categories described and of granting aid that is adequate for the 
purpose a:illled at, subject to criteria governing the global foreign policy 
of the donor country. A clear evaluation should also be made of the consequences 
of the simultaneous granting of several types of aid. Thus, bribes given to 
hegemonic groups, as well as aid for prestige and aid for subsistence, tend 
to strengthen the political and economic status quo of the recipient country; 
military aid will tend to influence the structures of political power and may 
have economic consequences such as aggravation of inflationary pressure; 
economic aid, on the contrary will tend to provoke modification in the status 
quo and consequently, it may annul the effects aimed at by other types of aid.1 
The foregoing was a brief analysis of the different types of aid from 
4. 
donor countries, specifically, the United States. However, this study as 
indicated in the Introduction, will confine itself to only one type of aid 
Economic Aid for Development. Furthermore, as we also observe, it is specifically 
concerned with Canadian aid to the developing Commonwealth Caribbean countries 
which would be analyzed within the Western Conceptual Framework of Development. 
1 
Hans 
Aid? 
Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid" reprinted from Why Foriegn 
Robert A. Goldwin, edt. Rand McNally, Chicago 1963, p.70-89. 
Western Conceptual Framework of Economic Development 
According to Andre Gunder Frank in his essay, Underdevelopment or 
Revolution, theories of development produced for the underdeveloped countries 
by developed countries "are found to be empirically invalid when confronted 
with reality, theoretically inadequate in terms of its own classical social 
scientific standards and policy-wise ineffective for pursuing its supposed 
intentions of promoting the development of the underdeveloped. countries". 2 
Briefly, the conceptual approach of a Western nation to underdevelopment 
and its consequent prescriptions for development can be classified under 
three main headings; 
(l) the ideal typical index theory, 
(2) the diffusionist theory and 
(3) the psychological approach. 
5. 
The first theory sets up supposedly typical characteristics of development 
and argues that development consists of abandoning these characteristics and 
adopting those of developed countries. The ?ssumption underlying this approach 
is that underdevelopment "is an original historical state which may be 
characterized by indices of traditionalism and that, therefore, development 
consists of abandoning these characteristics and adopting those of the 
developed countries". 3 
Walt W. Rostow, in developing his celebrated theory of the stages of 
economic growth, conceives development as a phenomenon occuring along a 
continuum and characterized by ideal-typical types ranging from the traditional 
society to the age of high mass consumption society. 4 More important, however, 
2 
Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Modern 
Readers, New York, 1970, p. 21. 
3 
4 
Ibid, p. 24. 
W.W. Ro stow, The Stages of Economic Gr01<th, A Non-Communist Manifesto, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1964, p. 128-130. 
is the assumption that underdevelopment is an original state. Implied in the 
assumption is the belief that "developed" societies have progressed along this 
continuum from underdevelopment to development. On the contrary, this is not 
necessarily the case. The United States was never underdeveloped, it was 
undeveloped. Conversely, it is questionable that the Inca, Maya and Aztec 
civilizations of pre-columbian Latin America were underdeveloped in economic,. 
social or political terms. 
Rostow's stages and thesis are incorrect, primarily because they do not 
correspond at all to the historical and present-day reality of the under-
developed countries whose development they are supposed to guide. According 
to Andre Frank, "it stands to reason that any serious attempt to construct 
theory and.policy for the development of the now underdeveloped countries 
has to be based on the examination of the experience of the underdeveloped 
countries themselves - that is, on the study of their history and of the 
world historical process which has made these countries underdeveloped". 5 
The second mode concerns itself with how these typical characte,istics 
of the first mode are supposedly diffused from the developed to the under-
developed ones. The theoretical approach to the study of development 
postulates the view that while some nations are unfortunately backward or 
primitive, they can evolve in the direction of the modern or developed nations, 
if they adopt acceptable behaviour and modern goals. They too can develop 
if the diffusion of certain cultural patterns, values attitudes and generous 
aid transfers of capital and technology take place. 6 
5 
Andre Gunder Frank, p.41. 
6 
Ibid, p.48. 
6. 
The diffusion is seen to spread from the metropolis of the advanced 
capitalist countries out to the national capitals of the underdeveloped ones, 
and from these in turn out to their provincial capitals and finally, to the 
peripheral hinterlands. According to this concept, since development consist 
of and is promoted by diffusion and acculturation, underdevelopment remains 
because of internal obstacles or resistance to diffusion. However, we are 
7. 
told by Ernesto Lachau that "it is incorrect to consider contemporary under-
development as a simple reflection of the economic, political, cultural and 
social structures of the underdeveloped country itself. On the contrary, 
underdevelopment is in a large part the historical product of relations between 
the underdeveloped satellite and the present developed countries. These 
relations were, moreover an essential part of the structure and evolution of 
the capitali9t system on a world scale".7 
According to Gunder Frank, the theorist makes no inquiry into the nature 
of underdevelopment and how it is caused. In effect, "the diffusionist theory 
does not suggest to the peoples of the underdeveloped world that they inquire 
into and remove the cause of underdevelopment; instead they advise them to wait 
and welcome the diffusion of capital and technology from the outside 11 • 8 The 
advocates of this concept tend to view foreign aid merely as a self-sufficient 
technical enterprise to be achieved with the tools and judged by the standards 
of pure economics. The misconception is based on the economic development of 
the now developed countries. According to Hans Morgenthau, it has been asserted 
that since Western economic development from the first industrial revolution 
onwards, has been due to the formation of capital and technical know-how, the 
7Ernesto Laclau,(h) Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America, New Left 
Review, No.67, May-June, 1971, p.20. 
8 
Gunder Frank, p.48. 
developed countries have tended to assume that these two factors would by 
themselves provide the impetus for the economic development of the under-
developed-.nations of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America. 
8. 
This conviction has been powerfully supported by the illuminating success 
of the Marshall Plan,9 the political origins and motivations of which were 
easily forgotten in. its justification as a strictly economic measure for the 
provision of capital and technological know-how. Yet, it is not always 
recognized that this success was made possible only by the fact that, in contrast 
to the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin Amer.ica, 
the recipients of Marshall aid were among the leading industrial nations of 
. 10 the world whose economic systems were but temporary in disarray. 
9 
According to H. Arnold, the United States planning for the post-war period 
was based on the assumption that a short period of U.S. grant assistance 
would be followed by the fairly rapid restoration of international balance, 
with the international Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank) 
facilitating private investment and making long term loans, and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) easing temporary balance of payments difficulties. These 
hopes of a short transition period to "normality" were confounded, however, 
and the economic·situation in Western Europe began to grow serious. Therefore, 
in 1947, Secretary of State, George Marshall proposed the European recovery 
programme. It was significant that Marshall stated that the U.S. economic 
aid must not be on a pi'ecema1: basis ·as va-rious ,crises developed :but must -bee 
based on a regional plan drawn up by the European countries themselves. u.s .. 
. aid must "provide a cure rather than a mere palliative". The Marshall Plan, 
known officially as European Recovery Programme came into effect in 1948, it 
was basically a grant programme with a cost ceiling ($17,000 million) a time 
limit (four years and a· definite objective,reconstruction). The U.S. motive 
w,i.s an obvious one - as George Marshall put it, "without the return of normal 
economic health in the world there can be no political stability and no assured 
peace" H.J.P. Arnold, Aid for Development; A Political and Economic Study, 
Dufour Edition, U.S.A. 1966,. p.38. 
10 
Hans Morgenthau, p. 78. 
The theory dictates that underdevelopment is primarily the result of 
lack of material benefits, namely, capital and technology. It also regards 
underdevelopment as a "kind of deficiency disease which can be taken care of 
11 through the infusion of capital and technological know-how". In short, the 
9. 
diffusionist concept concedes the contention that being poor or backward, the 
underdeveloped countries lack capital, and as a result, find it impossible to 
develop and finally alleviate their poverty. Therefore, the developed countries 
should diffuse capital, so as to promote the. economic development of the under-
developed countries. 
Empirical Validity of Conceptual Approach 
The empirical validity of this theory is ~uestionable on the basis of 
aggregate flow of funds being provided by the developed countries to the 
developing countries. In Table 1.1, a bird's eye view of the pattern of 
financial flow is given which is divided into three categories.12 Table 1.1 
shows that total resources outflow from the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) countries13 (Soviet Union and Eastern Europe not included) to developing 
11 
Ibid, p.79 
12 
1. Official Development Assistance, consist of funds made 
governments on concessional terms primarily to promote 
development and welfare of developing countries. 
available by 
. . 
economic 
2. Official flows, comprising official· export credits, some of which 
may have concessional elements, and net purchases by governments of 
bonds, loans and participatings of multilateral agencies. 
3. Private flows, including direct investment, portfolio investments, and 
private export credits with maturities of longer than one year. 
13 
The DAC countries are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland. 
NET FLOW 10F FINANCIAL RESOURCES FROM DAC COUNTRIES, 1960-1970 
NET DISBURSEMENTS 
1960. 1961 196·2 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Million U.S. Dollars 
1968 1969 1970 
I. Official Development Assistance 4,665 5,197 5,442 5,770 5,957 5,916 6,001 6,552 6,316 6,610 6,808 
3,692 3,991 4,020 3,940 3,806 3,714 3,701 3,578 3,344 3,250 3,298 
II. 
III. 
1. Bilateral grants and grant-like 
flows 
2. Bilateral loans at concessional 
tenns 
3. Contributions to multilateral 
institutions 
Other Official Flows 
1. Bilateral 
2. Multilateral 
Private Flows 
1. Direct Investment 
2, Bilateral portfolio 
3, Mulitlateral portfolio3 
4. Export credits 4 
439 
534 
300 
233 
67 
3,150 
1,767 
633 
204 
546 
685 
521 
946 
716 
230 
3,106 
1,829 
614 
90 
573 
911 1,463 1,746 1,854 1,966 2,238 2,289 2,312 2,386 
511 
542 
527 
15 
2,453 
1,495 
147 
239 
572 
367 
245 
284 
3 
2,557 
1,603 
327 
33 
660 
405 
··41 
34 
7 
3,729 
1,572 
837 
461 
859 
348 
283 
278 
5 
4,121 
2,468 
655 
247 
751 
334 
430 
377 
53 
3,959 
2,179 
480 
175 
1,124 
736 
507 
488 
19 
4,381 
2·,105 
800 
469 
1,007 
683 1,047 1,124 
731 
741 
10 
6,380 
3,045 
972 
767 
1,596 
582 
597 
15 
6,478 
2,804 
1,277 
419 
1,978 
1,159 
886 
273 
7,5752 
3,408 
809 
343 
2,174 
IV. Grants by private voluntary agencies 
Total Net Flow 
.. 840 
8,115 9,249 8,437 8,572 9,645 10,320 10,390 11,440 13,427 13,670 15,542 2 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Gross disbursements minus amortization receipts on earlier lending. 
Including grants by private voluntary agencies on the same basis for other years, total private flows 
(Item III) would read 6,735 and the figure for total net flow would read 14,701. 
Thes~ funds ·of private origin are mingled with those under L3, and 11.2 and other funds from non-DAC 
sources, in programmes governed by criteria similar to those applied in bilateral official development 
assistance programmes. 
4. Measured by some countries as change in outstanding amounts guaranteed, by others as change in outstanding 
amounts due on disbursed credits. Interest is included in the sums recorded as outstanding, so that the 
net flow tends to be overstated if gross new guarantees are rising and vice versa. 
Source: OECD, Development Assistance, 1971, Table 11.1. 
countries and multilateral agencies, rose from $l3.4 billion to $l5.5 billion 
between l968 and l970. 
ll. 
The table also reveals the proportion of grants and grant-like. flows has 
dwindled while that of loans had increased. 14 Thus, "interest and loan repayments 
by poor countries amounted to U,S. $l,574 million in l968; in l963 they had 
been U.S. $796 million'1 .l5 The United States net private investment increased 
by some $350 million, for a net total of $7 billion in l970, reaching a record 
high of $78 billion of total investment flow-to the rest of the world.l6 
14 
According to E.K. Hawkins, the essence of a grant is that it leaves no 
liability behind it for repayment. When resources are obtained on a loan 
basis there is such a liability for repayment and for the servicing of the 
debt. Such funds have a price in the form of interest or dividends and 
must therefore be employed within the recipient economy in such a way as 
to yield more than the cost. When debts are contracted between nationals 
of a particular country or between individual entities of that country a 
similar situation arises and the obligation to pay interest and amortize 
the debt is always a serious consideration. At the same time there is no 
transfer problem involved, in the sense that it arises once debts are 
contracted between countries. The recipient country, or the borrowing 
country in this case, needs both to raise the necessary money to pay 
interest and to authorize the debt but it also needs to be able to transfer 
those funds to the creditor country in a form acceptable to the latter. In 
most cases·the creditor country will not be.prepared to accept payment in 
the form of the currency of the borrowing country. The borrower must-. so 
arrange his economic affairs that he can acquire the necessary foreign exchange 
to pay the interest and amortization. It is mainly for this reason that 
developing countries have found the debt problem to be an increasingly acute 
one. E.K. Hawkins, The Principles of Develo-pment Aid, Penguin Books, Manchester, 
l970, p.55. 
l5 
Harold Caustin, "International Development Policies", Development in a Divided 
World, edited by Dudley Seers and Leonard Joy, Penguin Books, Great Britain, 
l970, p.323. 
16 
U.S.A. Foreign Policy in 197l, A Report of the Secretary of State, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., l972, p.212. 
12. 
Statistics are not available to show the actual profit involved in the 
aid aspect of investments. Citing the U.S. private flow as an example, Andre 
G. Frank, states that between 1950 and 1965, the total flow of capital on 
investment account from the U.S. to the rest of the world was $23.9 billion, 
while the corresponding return flow from profits was $37.0 billion or a net 
inflow into the United States of $13.1 billion. Of this total, $14.9 billion 
flowed from the United States to Europe and Canada while $11.4 billion flowed 
in the opposite direction, for a net outflow from the United States of $3.5 
billion. Yet, between the United States and all other countries, the situation 
is reversed; $9.0 billion of investment flowed to these countries while $25.6 
billion income flowed out of them, for a net inflow from the poor to the rich 
of $16.6 billion.17 
Despite this constant interaction, little development has taken place. 
All this points to the fact that it is not difussion of capital which is 
necessary for the development of the underdeveloped countries. Frank points 
out that "the metropolitan investment in and control of the crucial sectors 
of the economy have failed to develop the underdeveloped countries, but has 
instead interposed a whole series of obstacles to their development. 1118 Another 
author, K. Griffin, making the same observation states that "the greater is 
the capital inflow from abroad the lower is the rate of gro,.th of the receiving 
country. There is absolutely no support for the orthodox view that foreign 
aid accelerates the rate of growth11 .19 On the contrary, during the economic 
17 
Andre Gunder Frank; p.49. 
18 
Ibid, p.52. 
19 
K. Griffin, Underdevelopment in Spanish America, Allan and Unwin, London, 
1969, p.121. 
l3. 
depression of the world capitalists system, the dominant nations are preoccupied 
with internal problems, turn inward, and that the consequent weakening of the 
links to the dependent nations afford the latter the opportunity for autonomous 
capitalist development. This supports Frank's argument that the spurts of 
development in Latin America are the result of temporary isolation from the 
metropolis, not from contact or close relationships. Frank argues further 
that the return of stagnation or underdevelopment coincides with the re-establish-
20 
ment of dependency. 
The diffusion of technology likewise has not helped the economic development 
of the underdeveloped countries. Because it has been concentrated in certain 
sectors of the economy, namely where foreign enterprises have vested interest, 
the technology the underdeveloped country receives through foreign subsidiaries 
has resulted in foreign domination of their economies. The underdeveloped 
countries can be said to be in a perpetual state of technological colonialism, 
wholly dependent for scientific innovations on the subsidiaries of foreign 
industries. 
According to A. Frank, the problem of technology and its diffusion arises 
out of the same monopoly structure of the economic system of the world. He 
goes on to observe that during the course of the historical development of the 
capitalist system on these levels, the developed countries have always diffused 
out to their satellite colonial dependencies the technology whose employment 
in the colonial and now underdeveloped countries has served the interest of the 
metropolis; and the metropolis has always suppressed technology in the now 
underdeveloped countries which conflicted with the interest of the metropolis and 
20 
Andre Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Monthly Review 
Press, New York and London, l969, p.170-2l3. 
21 its own development. 
Frank observes that some of the facts of technological diffusion which 
sharply contrast with most of the diffusionist faith were recently analyzed 
in News Week under the title The U.S. Business Stake in Euxope. 
"to knowledgeable Europeans, in fact, the technical lead of the big 
U.S. companies is the most disturbing facet of the dollar invasion .. In 
future, a French study committee recently concluded, competition over 
prices will give way to competition in innovations, and the pace will 
be so hot that only firms of international size - that is, American ones, 
chiefly - will survive .•.. Euxopean industries will function more and 
more under foreign licensing agreements; they will become subsidiaries 
of U.S. parent companies, which will sell them their know-how and manage 
Euxope's production ... French politicians and publications of the right, 
left, and center have been accusing the U.S. of economic colonization, 
satellization, and vassalization ..• A company Chairman in Brussels, sums 
up, "we are becoming pawns manipulated by U.S. giants" ... An Olivetti 
Executive discussing alternatives to the GE (General Electric) deal ... 
declared "but even if we had merged with Machines Bull in France and 
Siemens in Germany (which later signed a licensing agreement with RCA 
(Newsweek), we still would have been dwarfed and eventually put out of 
business by the U.S. Giants .... Research costs are too high. The 
transatlantic technological gap is a fact of life •.•. We studied a European 
14. 
22 
solution very carefully .... There is no Euxopean solution to these problems". 
21 
Andre Frank, p.53-54. 
22 
Andre Frank, p.54 - 55. 
Frank obs.erves that, "if these strong and developed European economies cannot 
find a European solution to the real developmental problem posed by the 
technological gap, what hope do the weak and underdeveloped economies caught 
in the same system have to find a solution 11 • 23 
In short, the diffusionist theory examines the problems of development, 
as if there were no causal connection between the predicament of the under-
developed nations and the prosperity of the·developed nations. The theorists 
do not question the world wide market and the structure of dependency which 
is basically a system of control over underdeveloped nations. The theory 
proposes changes that are relatively trifling and do not threaten the governing 
system. As a result, the order and stability which is based on present power 
relationship remains the acknowledged deity. The theory is the product of the 
system. It defends, diagnoses and prescribes from within lacking a sense of 
the broader realities of history, Thus, 
23 
"the advocates forget that it is impossible to bring about a deliberate 
and purposeful change in the present without knowing how this present 
state came about. We cannot successfully fight any phenomenon without 
knowing its roots. Descriptions, surveys or even preference graphs 
may be useful in assessing the measure of the phenomenon in question, but 
they do not tell us anything about its causes and so, in consequence, 
they are unsuitable for any practical policy of change. Substituting any 
descr~ption of the surface phenomena of underdevelopment for a theory of 
underdevelopment is totally unacceptable. Only a historical explanation 
24 
a historically verifiable theory is good enough. 
Ibid, p.55. 
24 
Tamas Szentes, The Political Economy Of Underdevelopment, Akademiai Kiado, 
Bnila.ne-st. 1Q7]_. n.17. 
l'. 
As a policy of economic development the theory has proven to be ineffective. 
Underdevelopment is not "rooted in providence, inferior personality traits, or 
traditional values 11 • 25 Rather, it exists because the underdeveloped countries 
have been the object of systematic subjugation by the developed countries. For 
centuries, the underdeveloped countries have been in constant contact with the 
developed countries. Yet, despite this contact or because of it, development 
has not taken place. It can be asserted then "diffusionism is inherently 
. ,,26 ineffective as a policy of economic development and cultural change .-
The third mode complements the ideal-typical and the diffusionist mode 
in that it demonstrates how the ideal-typical characteristics are diffused 
and are to be acculturated by the underdeveloped countries. Since this argument 
is really an extension of the point of view of the first two modes, it is 
best discussed in conjunction with them. 
CHANNELS OF AID 
Bilateral Aid 
At present by far the greater part of all economic aid is provided 
bilaterally, on a government-to-government basis. In 1967, bilateral aid 
f 9 % f f 
. t 27 
accounted or almost 0, o all o ficial development assis ance. Financial 
aid to the developing countries comes overwhelmingly from DAC countries. The 
United States is the largest individual source of the aid, in absolute terms, 
providing 37% of the combined DAC net flow in 1970, (excluding grants by 
private voluntary agencies), against 34% in 1969. The next largest is Japan. 
With an increase of 44% in its net flow, Japan moved from fourth place in 
1969, to second in 1970, surpassing France and Germany. Table J..·.2 gives a 
25 
Denis Goulet, p.9. 
26 
Ibid, p.66. 
2tester B.' Pearson, Partners in Develonment, Report 
International Development, Praeger Publishers, New 
of the Commission on 
York, 1969, p.209. 
16 
l7. 
complete breakdown of the performance of DAC countries. 
In the international strategy, all DAC countries have accepted the 
objective that "each economically advanced country should endeavour to provide ... 
annually to developing countries financial resource transfers of a minimun net 
amount of l% of its G.N.P."28 Six DAC countries, (Australia, France, _the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) provided total net flows to 
developing countries exceeding l% of their GNP in l970. Denmark, Germany and 
Italy, which passed this figure in l969, fell below it in 1970. Other DAC 
Members which raised their net flows very considerably in amount and as a share 
of GNP in 1970, were Canada and the Netherlands and also Australia, which 
reached the 1 percent target for the first time. The Netherlands had a net 
resource flow of 1.44 percent of GNP, one of the highest outflows from a DAC 
Member on record. (See Table 1.3 for more details). 
The geographic distribution of aid made available by different countries 
reveals widely different patterns. According to Keith Spicer, 
28 
"every bilateral aid programme, however large is politically 
selective in its distribution. Choice of recipients may rest on many 
factors, all more or less related to maximizing the donor's influence. 
In Canada's policy thi_s goal has suggested concentrating on three 
areas; the Commonwealth, the French speaking world, and more recently 
Latin America. Each area reflects a popular Canadian outlook, and 
each presents advantages and objects rooted in international politics". 29 
OECD, Development Assistance 1971 Review, Paris, 1971, p.47. 
29 
Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy, 
University of Toronto Press 1966, p.53. 
TABLE 1.2 
THE TOTAL NET FLOW OF OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
FROM DAC MEMBERS TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND MULTILATERAL AGENCIES 
;I.960 - 1970 
Net Disbursements Millions of U.S. Dollars 
' 
Countries 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 -1966 1967 1968 
Australia 59 71 74 97 119 145 150 194 206 
Austria 6 20 31 6 21 47 49 48 74 
Belgium 182 164 118 175 164 221 178 164 243 
Canada 145 87 110 131 142 169 267 272 308 
. Denmark 38 33 15 10 32 15 21 25 83 
France 1,325 1,406 1,395 1,242 1,361 1,299 1,320 1,341 1,720 
Germany 628 847 609 621 706 735 788 1,145 1,664 
Italy 298 258 390 321 237 266 632 287 550 
Japan 246 381 286 267 290 486 625 798 1,049 
Netherlands 239 200 114 134 118 239 254 228 276 
Norway 10 27 7 21 23 38 17 30 59 
Portugal 37 44 41 51 62 30 40 79 48 
Sweden 47 52 37 53 67 73 108 121 129 
Switzerland 157 211 161 203 110 192 110 136 241 
United Kingdom 881 899 744 721 919 1,032 911 803 761 
United States 3,818 4,549 4,305 4,519. 5,274 5,333 4,920 5,769 6,017 
Total DAC 
'8,115 9,249 8,437 Countries 8,572 9,645 10,320 10,390 11,440 13,427 
1. Excluding grants by private voluntary agencies 
2. Including grants by private voluntary agencies 
Source OECD, Development Assistance, 1971 
1969 19701 
232 369 
81 92 
257 294 
364 579 
151 94 
1,710 1,806 
2,028 1,409 
848 720 
1,263 1,821 
369 451 
75 63 
98 64 
212 204 
119 126 
1,146 1,216 
4,716 5,393 
13,670 14,701 
,1970 2 
385 
96 
309 
626 
97 
1,808 
1,487 
725 
1,824 
457 
67 
65 
229 
137 
1,259 
5,971 
15, 5l12 
f-' 
0:, 
Countries 1960 
Australia 0.38 
Austria 0.09 
Belgium 1.59 
. Canada 0.37 
Denmark 0.64 
France 2.15 
Germany 0.87 
Italy 0.85 
Japan 0.57 
Netherlands 2.11 
Norway 0.23 
Portugal 1.46 
Sweden 0.36 
Switzerland 1.83 
United Kingdom 1.22 
United States 0. 75 
Total DAC Countries O. 89 
1. At market prices. 
·~ABLE 1.3 
TOTAL FLOWS AND NATIONAL PRODUCT 
THE NET FLOW OF TOTAL OFFICIATI AND PRIVATE FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES IN RELATION TO GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT~,1960-1970 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
0.44 0.43 0 .51 0.57 0.64 o. 63 o. 74 
p.30 0.43 0.08 0.25 0.51 0.49 0.44 
1.35 0.91 1.24 1.04 1.29 0.97 o. 84. 
0.23 0.28 0.31 0.31 0 .33 0.47 0.45 
0.50 0.20 0.13 0.35 0.15 0.19 0.20 
2.10 1.86 1.48 1.46 1.30 1.22 1.15 
1,.02 0.68 0.65 0.67 o. 64 o. 64 0,92 
0.66 0.89 0.64 0.43 0.45 0.99 0.41 
0.71 0.49 0.40 0.36 0.55 0.62 0.67 
1.61 0.85 0.92 0.69 1.24 1.22 0.99 
0.55 0.13 0.37 0,36 0.55 0.22 0.36 
1.63 1.41 1.65 1.83 0.81 0.97 1. 74 
0.36 0.24 0.32 0.36 0.35 0.48 a.so 
2.19 1.51 1. 74 0.86 1.38 0.73 0.85 
1.17 0.92 0.84 0.99 1.03 0.85 0.73 
0.86 0.76 0.75 0.82 o. 77 0.65 0. 71 
0.95 0.80 0.76 0.79 o. 77 0.71 0.74 
2. Including grants by private voluntary agencies. 
1968 1969 
0.73 0,74 
0.65 0.65 
1.17 1.12 
0.46 a.so 
0.67 1.08 
1.35 1.22 
1.23 1.32 
0.73 1.03 
o. 74 0.76 
1.09 1.31 
0.65 o. 77 
0.96 1. 75 
a.so 0,75 
1.41 0.64 
0.74 1.04 
o. 68· a.so 
0.80 0.75 
1970 
1.08 
0.65 
1.17 
o. 72 
0.60 
1.24 
0.76 
0.78 
0,93 
1.44 
0.56 
1.01 
0.65 
0.61 
1.00 
0.55 
o. 74 
19702 
1.12 
0.67 
1.23 
o. 77 
0.62 
1.24 
0.80 
0.78 
0.93 
1.46 
0.59 
1.02 
0.73 
0.67 
1.04 
0.61 
0.78 
f-' 
\D 
Similarily, the United States bilateral aid "is designed primarily to 
promote the United States national security, and foreign policy in selected 
t . ,. 30 coun r1es . The Act for International Development sets forth three basic 
criteria which largely determines the volume and content of United States 
economic assistance in any particular country. Those are of political 
importance to the United States, the country's size, population, strategic 
location and resources; the existence of stability and conservatism; and 
finally, the leaders must have a pro-western orientation and a relatively 
high level of administrative competence so as to absorb external resources 
3l for growth. 
The aid of the United Kingdom on the other hand is considerably con-
centrated in British Commonwealth countries and former colonies in Africa, 
Asia and the Caribbean while that of France is even more concentrated in 
associated countries, mostly in Africa. Thus, a particular group of under-
developed countries receives relatively more substained and substantial aid 
than others. This is reflected in countries distribution for l960-l966 and 
l968-l970, in Table l.4. Among the principal donors, the aid of the United 
States is most widely spread around the world. Canada and West Germany also 
reveal a relatively wide geographic spread to their aid. Britain continues 
to concentrate in Africa and Asia, while France is conspicously concentrated 
in Africa and to a certain extent in Latin America. Japan's aid, for geo-
political reasons, goes primarily to countries in Asia. 
30 
Uner· Kirder, The Structure of United Nations Economic-Aid to Underdeveloped 
Countries, Martinus Nijoff, The Hague l966, p.3l5, 
3l 
Ibid, p.3l4. 
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Australia 
Austria 
Belgi"um 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Port1;1gal 
Sweden 
Switzer lan4 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Bilateral Total 
IBRD 
IFC 
IDA 
IDB 
AfDB 
AsDB 
EEC 
UN 
Multilateral Total 
TOTAL 
1960-66 1968-70 1960-66 
0.01 0.33 
3.56 0.94 1.27 
o. 75 1.13 · 75.78 
0.02 11.82 5.85 
0.10 0,29 d.62 
5.89 32.86 636.10 
39.98 89.45 59.57 
26.56 16.97 38.18 
0.05 60.76 0.35 
0.29 3.49 0.-73 
0.17 0.52 0.62 
38;06 
a.so o.49 3.58 
1,41 0.54 0.93 
26.27 25.12 193,84 
313.56 92.00 444.31 
419 .09 336.40 1,500.~0 
18.96 51.82 52.10 
1.40 5.24 2.67 
1.74 10.50 0.57 
0.52 
6,13 34.70 59.18 
5.34 16.13 55.53 
33.57 118.90 168.91 
452,66 455,30 i.,669.11 
TABLE 1,4. 
TOTAL OFFICIAL BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NET FLOWS 
BY REGIQN, 1960-1966 AND 1968-1970 
1968-70 1960-66 1968-70 1960-66 1968-70 1960-66 
-1.15 O,vJ 18.39 ~o. /l 62.87 
1.56 1.64 0.52 4.27 6.65 
72,41 ._o. 73 6.87 0.10 6. 78 
36.09 · 15.39 12.60 -63.10 154.48 0:01 
.14.12 0.26 2.90 1.24 7.60 
519.90 98.19 165,57 15.59 74.13 22.47 
117.36 32.19 61.22 -199.50 .216.21 
53.60. 0.32 6.30 3.30 42.90 
20.38 3.82 37.62 131.41 573.48 
8.60 13.75 40.38 ·i6.74 5·s.02 
8.60 0.01 0,11 1.6.2 4.32 
46.29 0.52 
"24.51 . 0.02 0.69 4.61 20.36 
6.44 0.97 . 0,63 0.81 6.16 
139,79 27.80 31.56 137 ,81 144,72 8.08 
275.67 544.64 . 639.00 1;869.67 1,858.67 11.63 
1,346.54 739.10 984.43 2,468.~5 3,208.18 105.07 
. 13.62 115. 77 . 161.98 71.63 68.27 
. 9.82 5.19" 13 .38 3,01 16,60 
56.77 9.40 a1.n 124_.88 
9.09 147.96 0,83 
8.32 22.87 
125.17 2.87 7.07 0.59 · 10.37 3.01 
125.46 22.72 55,85 76.28 135.42 0.45 
322.5? 143 .06 395;64 232. 72 331.77 0.76 
1,669.11 882.16. 1,380.08 2,701.27 3,539 ;95 105·.83 
Source: OECD, Develoi:ment Assistance Review, 197~, Paris 1971, 
I 
1968-70 1960-66 1968-70 1960-66 1968-7( 
127-. b/ 0.46 0.67 82.06 166. 25 
0.0.36 1. 67 11.09 11.34 0.72 1.14 78.07 88.33 
0.01 3.20 7.00 87.56 222.0C 
0.85 3.44 3.06 28. 35 37.83 19.90 37 .03 798 .13 858.33 
41.91 26.59 373.15 510. 83 l.60 2.18 69.32 109.35 0.22 0.24 34.07 135. 87 726.54 
4.28 23 .67 35.79 131.H 0.12 P.19 2."54 13. 74 
9.85 38.58 56.14 
0.90 7.15 9.61 53. 2( 0.02 1.27 1.64 5.38 15.43 17. 63 . 9.54 21.65 403.34 380. 54 
44.66 102.68 100.00 3,286.38 3,010.0C 
228.06 188.01 277.91 5,419.92 6,381.52 
0.25 258. 46 295. 94 
12.87 45 .01 0.33 82.38 201. Sf 
9 .09 147. 6~ 
5,3; 0,15 22. 7] 
2.16 1.06 4.43 70.14 183. 9( 
l.80 18.82 ~8.82 184.14 352. 7f 
4,69 19.87. 22.54 598.89 1,196.1: 
232.75 207.08 300.46 6,018.81 7,577.61 
The table also reveals that, since 1960, there has been a greater 
geographic dispersion of aid. This dispersion has occurred through an increase 
in the volume of aid dispersed through multilateral agencies as well as in 
the bilateral aid policies of individual donors. The aid of the multilateral 
agencies,·being less subject to special political factors, is widely dispersed. 
Individual donors, especially those whose aid has been relatively concentrated 
geographically are extending their assistance to more and more countries. The 
United Kingdom and France have been steadily moving beyond the Commonwealth 
22. 
aid Francophone area. As a result, aid recipients are dealing with an increasing 
number of donors. Several rationale have dominated the bilateral activities. 
These rationale have been mainly political. Sometimes, it has been good politics 
which has been the dominant reason; for example, "the desire to promote the 
economic development of the less developed countries and to raise their standard 
of living of the people of those countries. But in most cases it was selfish 
political motivations which were in the forefront 11 • 32 
Over the past years an increase in justification and rationalization has 
taken place ·in the donor countries. Professor Irving L. Horwitz citing 
American foreign aid programme as an example, capsulized it very vividly when 
he stated that the justification and rationalization for aid differs in each 
period thus, 
32 
"in the 1940 1 s, its primary purpose was European recovery along capitalist 
democratic lines, hence a world safe for capitalism. In the 1950's 
foreign aid for a world safe for democracy or at least safe from Soviet 
Uner Kirder, p.313 
23. 
expansionism. In the 1960 1 s foreign aid was tied to the task of economic 
development specifically to making Development Decade successful. In the 
1970's aid programmes are increasingly showing signs of being linked to 
an improved human and physical environment. In every period it is 
probably correct to say that such foreign aid was often linked to the 
needs of what is euphemistically termed the cosmopolitan center of the 
client nations than to their colonized periphery 11 • 33 
Despite these rationalizations, one of the main reasons for giving 
economic assistance bilaterally is 
the recipient countries to buy the 
because "it creates purchasing 
34 goods of the donor country". 
power in 
In other 
words, virtually all bilateral aid is tied to the donor's national exports. 
From the donor's point of view, this seems to guarantee that the commercial 
benefits of assistance come back to them instead of going to another nation. 
According to Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, 
33 
"assistance to less developed nations serves Canada's interests in 
some other and more immediate respects. It is an important and 
integral part of the general conduct of Canada's external relations 
particularly with the developing countries. It provides an initial 
source of financing for export of Canadian goods and services to the 
less developed nations and provides Canadians with the kind of 
knowledge and experience which help support the expansion of Canadian 
commercial interests overseas. Successful economic development in 
the less developed countries will assist in the expansion of world 
Irving Louis Horwitz, What U.S. Policy for Latin America? Current, No.135. 
Dec. 1971, p.43. 
34 
Uner Kirdar, p.315. 
trade as a whole and provide a growing market for Canadian goods 
and services". 35 
24 
The increased use of suppliers credits and other methods to stimulate 
exports has promoted aid-tying. In recent years, especially on the part 
of the United States, aid tying has been extensively broadened because of 
balance-of-payment difficulties. The object of U.S. tying restrictions "is 
to curtail sharply the expenditure of aid proceeds by recipient countries on 
the export goods of the other more advanced countries. The reason behind 
this is that when the exports of these countries increased, they would be 
likely to accumulate additional foreign exchange reserves at the expense of 
the U.S. rather than to increase their imports from this country. It would 
be clear therefore, that aid tying on balance-of-payment grounds is a 
reflection of the inadequacy of the working of the international financial 
mechanism of adjustment for the restoration of payments equilibrium among 
the more advanced countries 11 • 36 
Conversely, many of the advantages of aid-tying to the donors are 
disadvantages to the recipient countries. The most onerous combination is 
the tying of aid both to specific projects and to purchases in the donor 
country. Under this combination the competitive possibilities are limited 
to a narrow range of goods. The tying of aid to procurement from donor 
country suppliers or in other ways limiting a poor country's use of financial 
aid usually means higher prices, less suitable equipment and commercial 
intervention. A recognition of such drawbacks is implied in the Report of 
the Commission on International Development, urging donor countries to reduce 
35 
Mitchell Sharp, International Development, Foreign Policy for Canadians, 
Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1970, p.10. 
36 
Robert J.!. Stern, International Financial Issues in Foreign Economic Assistance 
to the Less Developed Countries, Economic Development and Structural Change 
edited by I.G. Stewart, Edinburgh University Press, l969, p.5l. 
· · 37 progressively the scale of tying. However, "=gent balance of payment 
considerations and commercial interest have combined to frustrate ·.any freeing 
of aid and tying is in fac{ increasing". 38 
Furthermore, "recipient countries consider that there is a definite 
presumption that aid tying is an ineffective policy. This situation is not 
especially serious where the donor country can supply a broad range of goods 
at or close to .rorld market prices. But the disadvantages will become more 
substantial as the donor country narrows its range of available goods, becomes. 
less competitive internationally and tolerates explicit or implicit collusion 
by domestic producers in setting prices for aid financed goods. The disadvantages 
to the recipient will vary also depending on its availability of other external 
resoUTces besides the tied aid. The more limited these other resources, the 
greater will be the reliance of the recipient on tied aid and the greater 
therefore the possibility that this aid may not accord well with the recipient's 
needs and development priorities". 39 
The political implication of such aid is .that, it further limits the 
autonomy of recipient countries economic policy-makers. This has meant that 
donor countries have played (and are still playing) a predominant role in 
matters of recipients trade, economic development and foreign relations. 
According to Dudley Seers, this political relationship may well obstruct 
rather than stimulate development. "The most important developmental 
implications of aid are not so much the resources it provides as what is in 
the total 'package' of which it is an integral part. This may include, to 
37 
Pearson Report, p.173-175-
38 
Harold Caustin, Aid-Development in a Divided World, edited by Dudley Seers 
and Leonard Joy, Pelican Books, Great Britain 1971, p.318-319. 
39 
Robert M. Stern, p.52. 
26. 
recapitulate,trade arrangements discriminating in favour of the donor, the 
spread of attitudes, technique and tastes which are inappropriate for poor 
countries, the establishment of military bases, a stronger position for certain 
ministers, or a ceiling on the expansion of social services". 40 
Mulitlateral Aid 
Since the Second World War, many international and regional financial 
agencies, both publicly and privately sponsored have been created to aid 
underdeveloped areas by making loans both to governments and to private 
enterprise. The largest is the World Bank or International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, (IBRD) which started before the end of World 
War II in response to the malfunctioning of the International payments 
machinery .. During that same period, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
was created. Its primary purpose is facilitating the development of the 
productive resources of all its members .. rt also gives assistance to its 
members by making resources available to them in order to enable them to 
correct maladjustment in their balance-of-payment difficulties. 
Another such agency is the International Development Association (IDA), 
a World Bank affiliate established in 1960 to meet the needs of a growing 
number of underdeveloped countries whose constant balance-of-payments deficits 
make it difficult for them to pay interest on their borrowed funds. The 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), another World Bank affiliate, is 
primarily responsible for providing credits to promote industrial development, 
including technical and financial appraisal and the supervision of industrial 
40 
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and mining projects. Besides these multilateral agencies, there is also the 
United Nations with its specialized agencies, providing important sources of 
technical assistance in their particular fields - agriculture, health education, 
science and culture. The United Nations agency most related to aid is the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The funds for UNDP are provided 
by the member nations of the United Nations for technical assistance to 
developing countries in preparation of development schemes. 
Of the multilateral institutions; the most important are the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the European Economic Community, 41 
and the Alliance for Progress in conjunction with the Organization of .American 
States. More recently, the field of financing has seen the formation of 
41 
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regional development banks. The first bank set up in 1959 was the Inter-
American Development Bank followed by the African Development Bank (1964), 
the Asian Development Bank (1966), an East African Development Bank (1968), 
the Andean Development Bank (1968) and a Caribbean Development·Bank (1968). 
Thus far, the record shows a high agency "birth rate with no death". The only 
instance of decrease has been the merger of the United Nations Special Fund. 
"The result of the proliferation of international organizations is a 
28. 
bewildering array of agencies to which a developing country may turn for assistance, 
a confusion of advice concerning appropriate priorities which it might adopt, 
and a difficult problem of choice for the rich countries in deciding how to 
allocate their assistance among them". 42 
The need for any further expansion of multilateral institutions is 
difficult to visualize, except perhaps on environmental issues. Proposals 
for new agencies, it is assumed are based on the hope that the flow of funds 
will increase if there are more agencies. What will certainly increase is the 
dependence of the developing countries on muitilateral agencies. In general, 
multilateral agencies depend upon government support of the developed countries, 
and the financial control rests with these governments. However, some agencies 
may raise funds directly from the public, as IBRD bond issues, and UNICEF 
Christmas cards, but in the last analysis they are channels· of national funds, 
public or private, which come largely from rich countries. Robert E. Asher 
states critically that "the multilateral effort is sometimes only the wagging 
tail of a bilateral dog. Sometimes, it is the dog, but with a bilateral tail 
42 
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1968, p.445. 
and more bark than bite .. occasionally it reveals itself as a pedigreed 
43 throughbred". 
From the standpoint of therecipient countries multilateral aid has 
29. 
several advantages. One is that aid is untied to purchases from specific 
countries. Another advantage is that recipient countries are less susceptible 
to the shifting moods of national and international policies. A third advantage 
is that this kind of aid is more acceptable to national price and finally, more 
· 44 
stable in regard to quantum and terms. In short, the wide support in 
developing countries for multilateral aid rests on political, economical and 
institutional grounds. In this connection, it is usually argued, that multi-
lateral programmes are "non-political" in character and creates less threat 
than bilateral aid to the sovereignty of the recipient country, because they 
concentrate on development objectives rather than having various national 
interests in mind. However, we are reminded by Robert Asher that "it is 
hard to think of any national action in international affairs that is not 
political" •45 
Economically, the most obvious advantage .to recipient countries is the 
fact that multilateral aid is generally untied with respect to the source. 
However, some observers have pointed out that the general practice of multi-
lateral aid agencies of tying their loans and grants to specific projects 
rather than providing financial support for development programmes also 
constitutes a serious limitation to the effectiveness of aid comparable to 
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the tying of aid to purchases in specific countries or to specific col1llllodities". 46 
Table 1.4 shows the total official bilateral and multilateral net flow and 
also by region. According to the table, multilateral aid rose from $598,89 
million in 1960-1966 to a record high of $1,196.12 million in 1968-1970, while 
bilateral aid rose from $5,415,92 million to $6,381.52 million during the same 
period. Of all the institutions, the World Bank is by far the :targest:single 
dispenser of aid to the developing countries with loan volumes for 1971 reaching 
a record high of $3 billion up from $1. 6 billion the previous year and $1. 4 
billion for 1968-1969. International Development Agency loans expanded even 
more rapidly, rising to $606 million in 1971, compared with $303 million in 
1968-1969. 
Nevertheless, despite the increase in multilateral institutions, multi-
lateral funds still lag behind bilateral flows. Consequently, many inter-
national critics have stated that, "the share of resources channeled through 
the multilateral financing institutions should be increased to the fullest 
extent possible. The World Bank should be converted into a development bank 
for the exclusive use of the developing countries". 47 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN AID 
Foreign aid can be a form of political control, but· the term influence 
better describes the contemporary relationship between donor and recipient. 
Whether we employ the term intervention or influence, the giving of economic 
assistance creates a relationship between nations that is as much political 
as economic in nature. Further, the nature of the influence exercised within 
46 
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that political relationship reflects primarily the interest and goals qf 
the donor and not the recipient. 48 - Thus, 
"economic aid :from the powerful to the powerless countries, is an 
instrument of power politics. How much a country lends to another 
will not be deter:mined by its needs, or its potential, or its past 
economic performance,_ good or bad, or its virtue, but by the benefit 
- 49 it yields in terms of political support". 
The reasons for the limited impact of foreign aid programmes on the 
development of the underdeveloped countries·lie_first in the motives that 
have governed foreign aid programmes since they were initiated. Secondly, 
as Theresa Hayter points out, Western conceptual·framework of development. 
does,·not ta-ke sufficient-·account of. s·ome_ of· th<a. m_ajor-- characteristics_ of .the 
less developed countries, such as, 
"the concentration of growth in a few small areas, the extremely 
unequal distribution of income, the existence of a great deal of 
unemployment, the difficulty of promoting agricultural changes when 
people are on the edge of subsistence, the very high rate of population 
increase, the dominance of foreign firms, the high dependence of the 
economy on the export sector, and in general, the difficulty of 
r_egarding developing countries as homogeneous units,· able to regulate 
their problems independently of external inf·luences.". 50 
The problem with aid is that it is orientated toward the promotion and 
maintenance of influence and control. For essentially, the result of aid 
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programmes has been to make the need for more aid inevitable; that is, instead 
of assisting the developing countries toward greater economic development and 
independence, aid has·in fact increased dependency upon the developing countries. 
Aligned with this dependency however, is the decision making process which 
does not come from the recipient country, but rather from the donor country, 
which ends up allocating resources where it best suit their needs and interest. 
The gross effect of such policy is increasing foreign control over the most 
dynamic and strategic industrial sectors. In this process, it is. the donor 
country that bends the recipient country to its needs, and in so doing deeply 
influences the political process of the recipient country. 
The political manifestation whereby the donor country acts to shape the 
politics of.the recipient country is central to the argument. The selection 
of particular projects for particular purposes largely determines the needs 
and interests of the donor country. It also determines the technology to be 
used, supplies and capital goods required and professional skills used. 
Recipient countries have negligible influence in formulating policy. When they 
go through the motion of deciding policy, the substance of their decisions· 
often reflect foreign interests rather than national interests. It is the 
donor countries who engageQ in systematic and comprehensive planning of 
projects. The donor country also determines the basic goals· and objectives of 
the assistance. Decisions to increase, continue or terminate aid are all 
in the realm of the donor country. Recipient countries on the other hand 
make decisions about implementations of projects. These decisions are made 
with the confines set by the policy guides and financial resources through 
which the donor country determines the present and future allocation of 
resources for developmental projects as a whole. 
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According to the foregoing it is reasonable to argue that recipient 
countries have little political influence on the nature of foreign.aid. Their 
importance are measured and governed in the final analysis by the interest of 
the donor countries. William Demas 1)oints out that, 
"such heavy reliance on overseas funds means that the government 
of the small country has to present the right "image" to the foreign 
investor, which may further reduce the possibility of the country 
pursuing even slightly unorthodox policies in order to mobilize domestic 
financial resources. The economy becomes open in much more than a 
technical sense and economic policies considered "sound" by the foreign 
investor are pursued, irrespective of their real merits or their adequacy 
to the given situation" .51 
In addition to funds, the many programmes of aid have brought a flood 
of "experts" from developed countries into advisory and administrative positions 
in practically every sector of developing societies. This does not suggest 
that·donor countries control administration in developing countries, but only 
that their presence implies some degree of influence. Besides reinforcing 
the dependency, the types of development policies perceived by the developed 
countries for .the underdeveloped nations can hardly meet the needs of the 
societies; rather they impede development. Enlightened self-interest leads 
( ) 
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them developed countries to utter lofty pronouncements about a more 
equitable sharing among individuals and nations of the benefits of progress". 52 
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The growing shift from bilateral to multilateral aid is obvious. This 
reduces the possibility of "discriminatory selection of recipients for reasons 
unrelated to development needs and performance; the appearance of charity and 
interventionism, the spreading of aid too thinly to cover large numbers of 
projects and programmes 11 • 53 The main reason however, is that bilateral aid 
reinforces the dominant position etjjoyed by donor countries over the recipient 
countries. Greater awareness of this drawback has ~uite understandably led 
major bilateral donors, including Canada to resort to the growing trend of 
multilateralism. In conferences and official documents, spokesmen from 
developing countries are repeatedly told that these drawbacks will be removed, 
that a truely international effort on the basis of need and performance will 
character.ize future transfers. 
The Pearson Report for instance recommends, 
"that aid-providers increase grants and capital subscriptions for 
multilateral development aid programmes'to a minimum of 20 percent of 
the total flow of official development assistance by 1975" , 54 
The Canadian Foreign Policy Review advocates, 
"a modest increase in our contributions to multilateral agencies 
to say 25 percent of Olli' total aid.budget".55 
It is doubtful whether the heraided· new trend to multilateralism will 
greatly reduce the predominant role played by bilateral .aid. Moreover, 
much of the "multilateral" aid projected in the future is simply bilateral 
aid in disguise because, these supposedly multilateral institutions are 
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effectively controlled by the chief bilateral donors and serve as "fronts" to 
perpetuate their interests. Multilateral aid then as presently conceived does 
not reduce the dependence of the underdeveloped countries.- As one author 
points out "these institutions only help to finance technological obsolesence 
in these countries :bather than social and economic development".56 
Many critics have made interesting observations concerning the nature of 
aid .. Among them Theresa Hayter states that ,aid; 
56 
"in its proper form in so·far as it is effective, it can help to create 
and sustain, within Third World countries, a class which is dependent on 
the continued existence of aid and foreign private investment and which 
therefore becomes an ally of imperialism. It can also be used directly 
as a bribe to secure the adoption of measures favourable to the providers 
of aid and unfavourable to its recipients; it can be used, deliberately 
or otherwise, for projects which improverish the mass of the population; 
and it usually adds to the burden of debt carried by the countries 
receiving it, and hence to their dependence. In its general role as 
preserver of the capitalist system, aid can act in more indirect and 
complex ways than as a mere bribe or concession to sweeten the pill of 
exploitation. It can be_ used in an attempt to build up social and 
economic systems considered to be durable and resistant to revolutionary 
change. At times its provision has been made conditional on certain 
reforms being adopted within Third World countries particularly in the 
spheres of taxation, education, even land reform, which it is hoped, 
will defuse potential revolutionary situations 11 • 57 
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While the author argues that aid can be used to defuse potential 
revolutionary situations, on the contrary, such aid can also have the opposite 
effect. Aid provided on such conditions, if it_ is successful, is expected 
ultimately to promote increased stability. Long-run economic and social 
progress is no answer to immediate revolutionary situations. Although this 
form of aid may imp.eve (not guarantee) the economic development of the 
developing countries, such aid however, cannot address immediate social, 
economic and political crisis. Therefore, reforms undertaken by developed 
countries merely to curb revolution, will only result in the polarizat,:Lon, 
of revolutionary forces in the Third World. 
It is inevitable that, great and new measures of extraordinary dimensions 
must be taken. The peoples of Third World must enjoy the benefits of full 
integration into the political and economic life of their nations. Industry, 
schools, modern agriculture, villages as well as cities must be made to serve 
the interests of the developing countries. ·rn short, if the underdeveloped 
countries are to develop, "the structure of dependence must change on the 
international national and local levels. This structural change, however, 
cannot be brought about by diffusion. On the contrary, the structure of the 
system itself on all these levels determines the amount, nature, direction 
and conseq_uences of the past and present diffusion - a diffusion which has so 
far produced development only for the few,and underdevelopment for the many 
and by all indications, will continue to do so. Conseq_uently, the structure 
of this system has to change in order to permit development for all and to 
permit diffusion to contribute to that development". 58 
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CHAPTER II 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
The Embryo of Underdevelopment: A Historical Overview-
The Commonwealth Caribbean from the very beginning of its colonial 
existence, has been in· a perpetual state of dependency. The early roots of 
the economic political and social structures of underdevelopment, are located 
in Britain's cultivation of the islands as sugar plantatio·ns. This history 
of underdevelopment can be broken down into three period~:-
1. Two hundred years of colonization (1623-1834) during which time 
the London based merchants, a colonial plantocracy, and slaves 
utilized the industrial revolution of Qreat Britain. 
2. One hundred years of Crown Colony rule (1835-1940) when the post-
emancipation Africans and indentured Indians suffered under harsh 
working conditions. 
3. The contemporary period :(1944-to present) when the development 
of trade union movements and universal suffrage resulted in 
constitutional advancement without any concomitant change in the 
traditional amalgam of white capital and.. black labour- that--,. 
benefit·most exclusively the North Atlantic economies. 59 
The British colonialist.first settled in St. Kitts and Barbados, where 
they cultivated tobacco with little success. Later, it was discovered that 
sugar, a scarce product in the European market, could be grown to perfection 
virtually anywhere at sea level in the region. The change from,tobacco to 
sugar was an economic revolution which drastically changed the outlook in· 
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the Caribbean. The degree of interest of Britain and other European countries 
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in these colonies was determined by the a.mount of wealth to be derived from 
them. By the middle of the 17th century, it was clear that European coloni-
zation of the Caribbean had come to stay, and that a profitable crop had been 
chosen for production. 
European nations fought endlessly for the islands which were considered 
more valuable than larger colonies elsewhere. The most dramatic example of 
European rivalry in the Caribbean was the controversy "a,t the Peace Treaty 
of 1763, as to whether Britain should restore to France, Canada or Guadeloupe, 
both conquered during the war. The mere equation of the two areas provokes 
derision today. Yet, the foreign offices ·of the two Governments were seriously 
agitated over the issue, and in England, at least, it gave rise to a violent 
pamphlet warfare. Eventually, Britain restored Guadeloupe· and retained Canada; 
But this decision did not mean that Guadeloupe:;. in the eyes of the British 
Government, was less valuable than Canada. In fact, prec·isely the opposite 
was the case. Choiseul, the Foreign Minister of France, prided himself on 
a successful diplomatic coup by which he had retained a valuable sugar island ... 
and given up a vast territory which many Frenchmen derided, as Goltaire did, 
11 tT 60 
as a few acres of snow. 
Despite the continuous see-saw struggle in the Caribbean by the European 
powers, the sugar industry continued to boom. In order to secure the markets 
and profits however, a large supply of cheap labour was required. Consequently, 
Africans were imported as slaves. As a result, certain territories became 
African labour camps run by Europeans fbr the latter's benefit. Within "the 
space of a decade, this peasant stronghold was transformed into the advanced 
60 
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bastion of the plantation economy". 
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So profitable was the slave trade 
that it "transformed Liverpool from a fishing village into a great centre 
of international commerce". 
62 
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Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago succintly points 
out:-
"the slave trade was central to the triangular trade. It was, in 
the words of one British merchantilist, 'the spring and parent whence 
the others flow' the first principle and foundation of all the rest; 
echoed another, the mainspring of the machine which sets every wheel 
in motion. The slave trade kept the wheels of metropolitan industry 
turning; it stimulated navigation and shipbuilding and employed seamen; 
it raised fishing villages into flourishing cities; it gave sustenance 
to new industries based on the processing of colonial raw materials; 
it yielded large profits which were ploughed back into metropolitan 
industry; and finally, it gave rise to an unprecedented commerce in 
the West Indies and made the Caribbean territories among the most 
valuable colonies the world has ever known 11 • 63
Slave labour was not enough, however, to ensure a high rate of profit 
return for the island planters. Competition from "newly acquired colonies, 
especially from India, abated the West Indian profit margin, so much so that 
the planters sought protection in the form of tarrifs from the British 
Government. In time, loans were also required to expand the acreage planted 
in sugar. For both these needs - increases in tariffs and capital - the 
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West Indian planters sought out London merchants who could act as lobbyists 
and financiers. By performing both these functions, the London investors and 
merchants inevitably assumed complete control of the colonial sugar industry, 
including eventually all financing, shipping and marketing. In short, the 
focus of economic control gradually shifted from the Caribbean colonies to 
. 64 
the brokerage houses of London". 
The dynamics of protectionism and the mercantilist system rendered the 
West Indies totally dependent upon metropolitan interests, "a dependency 
that has established the adverse economic patterns which persist, in more 
subtle forms, until today. First, intra-island and intra-regional ·.commercial 
exchange was, in effect, prohibited because the only lines of trade allowed 
to develop were those between the individual plantations and the mother 
country. Second, as a result of metropolitan interests and balkanization, 
only a single-crop economy was encouraged - and diversification discouraged -
since industrial goods and other commodities were imported from, and were a 
source of profits to the mother country. Third, the plantations produced 
sugar in a raw, muscavado form only, further processing being reserved for 
metropolitan industries. Fourth, capital was not accumulated in the Caribbean, 
but rather in London where the merchants or absentee-owners were ·compensated 
for their investments. Nor was this capital reinvested in the colonies but 
in metropolitan industrial developments. Fifth, as a result of protectionism 
and slavery, the island economies became increasingly inflexible. Little or 
no structural transformation or innovation occurred within the sugar industry, 
since, if markets expanded, more slaves were imported and more crops cultivated. 
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If markets contracted, rationing 
cut costs and overhead". 65 
for the slaves and other devices were used 
to 
The Eighteenth Century was the time when the British West Indian islands 
came to be called "the jewel in England's crown 11 • 66 However, during the 
Nineteenth Century, the importance of the Caribbean area to Britain began its 
long decline. This was primarily because "the British Parliament abolished 
slavery and emancipated the slaves in the colonies, and "iegislat·e·d against 
the protective tariffs granted the British colonies in the Caribbean 11 • 67 Such 
parliamentary action was not, however, primarily the result of humanitarian 
sentiment in Great Britain. The establishment and development of "the 
Caribbean slave system was basically the result of the importance of that 
system to the economy of the metropolitan governments. Conversely, the abolition 
of the slave system was basically the result of the fact that the system had 
lost its former importance in the Nineteenth Century to the metropolitan 
economy11 • 68 
Thus, British manufacturers, labour unions and politicians lobbied for 
the development of free trade and free labor because they were convinced that 
protectionism and slavery prevented the expansion of Britain's markets and 
trade' with other European powers. Economists and intellectual·s such as Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo argued convincingly, that the free trade of laissez-· 
faire would assist England's industrial development, and that expanded markets 
would be good for manufacturers and labourers alike! 69 
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Meanwhile in the :colon:tes .. , changes which crune about as the result of 
laissez-faire left the islands economies in a deteriorating state. Despite 
the abolition of slavery, "there was little difference between the servile 
conditions of slavery and the oppressive treadmill of tenant labour that 
persisted after 1846, a system in which black population remained on the 
plantation and worked in payment for estate-owned housing and commodities 
brought in estate-controlled shops". 70 In terms of political rights, the 
black West Indian was no better off than he had been in the pre-abolition 
society. Because "British Nineteenth Century democracy was thus tainted by 
a racial limitation. Self-government was 'only applicable to colonists of 
the English race 11 • 71 
The Colonial Office viewed itself as the main instrument for instructing 
the people in parlirunentary democracy, and as arbitrator between the interests 
of the old plantocracy and the needs of the newly emancipated population. 
Meanwhile, there was great debate runong the British intellectuals of the day 
concerning the fate of the blacks. Thomas Carlyle, in his Occastional Discourse 
on the Nigger Question, argued for a return to slavery. His "vision of a 
society was one in which the wisest man was at the top and the Demerara Nigger 
at the bottom11 • 72 Anthony Trollope challenged the application of' parliamentary 
democracy in the West Indies. He argued "the Negro was a servile race, fitted 
by nature for the hardest physical work, and apparently at present fitted 
for little use 11 • 73. Jrunes Anthoney Froude, a disciple of Carlyle argued that 
black rule in the West Indies would be a total failure, because they were 
"children and not yet disobedient children; they were conscious of their own 
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defects, responsive to a guiding hand, and would attach themselves to a 
rational white employer with at least as much fidelity as a spanial". Froude 
goes on, "an English Governor-General will be found presiding over a black 
council, delivering the speeches made for him by a black Prime Minister, and 
how long could this endure? No English gentleman would consent to occupy so 
absurd a situation". 74 
However, "the Colonial Office assumed the responsibility for the application 
of parliamentary democracy in the territories. This period, lasting a hundred 
years (1836-1940), was, officially a time of preparation toward the day when, 
sufficiently groomed, the people of the Caribbean would be able to assume the 
responsibilities of self-government 11 • 75 The period of 1920's and 1930's was 
the precursor of the later West Indies nationalist movements. The Crown Colony 
Government came under increasingly heavy attack because of the formation of 
the legislature which consisted of prominent planters, merchants and professionals 
nominated by the Governor. While demands for total political independence were 
yet to be heard, there was growing agitation for increased self-government. 
The decade of the 1930's was the period when modern political history of 
the region began. This was the period when the price of sugar fell and resulted 
in massive unemployment, food shortages, and discontent of the people was given 
voice by "new labour to a series of constitutional advances which got underway 
in the mid-1940's 11 • 76 Periodic strikes and demonstration in many instances 
manifested themselves in the form of violence. The discontent was a systematic 
attack on the social, economic and political systems which had permeated over 
three hundred years of political colonialism. 
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The disturbances led the Colonial Office in August 1938 to appoint a 
Royal Connnission, to investigate the social and economic conditions in all 
the territories. Briefly, some of the main findings of the Connnission were 
that there was a great demand for better living conditions; the West Indian 
communities were ill-equipped to withstand the economic depression found in 
the Region; the labouring population never had the opportunity to save or 
establish themselves as economically independent; massive unemployment; deplorable 
housing conditions; .rapid growth in the population, education falls far short 
of any satisfactory standard and the lack of the economy to meet the needs 
of the population".77 
The Committee went on to recommend "the establishment of a West Indian 
Welfare Fund to be financed by an annual grant of fl ,000 .00 from the Imperial -
Exchequer for a period of twenty years, and of a special organization to 
administer this fund under the charge of a Comptroller. The object of the 
Fund, according to the Committee, should be to finance schemes for the general 
improvement of education, the health services, housing and slum clearance, 
the creation of labour departments, the provision of social welfare facilities 
and land settlement, apart from the cost of purchase of land 11 • 78 
Professor Havelock Brewster of the University of the West Indies in 
analyzing the Report points out that:-
"it is easy to see that the hard years of depression in the thirties 
had made the population at large restless and exasperated enough to 
77 
West India Royal Connnission Report, London 1945, p. 422-25. 
78 
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contemplate extreme solutions, and given the presence of an articulate 
leadership class to pose the issue as they were, the tension would mount 
and the society explode into open conflict. This is precisely what 
happened in 1938, The failure of the economy to adjust had brought the 
society to the brink of complete breakdown". 79 Ire gpes pn to s~y that, 
their implicit recommendations for seeking a solution by way of increased 
imperial assistance stand.out in marked contradiction to the logical inferences 
from their analysis. In any event, the point is that onee again the West 
Indian economy had found itself at a juncture where it was clear that the 
sugar economy held only the seeds of dependence and social conflict.80 
The Commission did not lay any basic foundation in restructuring the 
political economy of the society. However, following the Second World War 
the Commis.sion was followeff:by a slow process of economic adjustment as that 
which followed Emancipation. At the same time, it hastened the process of 
political democracy. Startin'g with Jamaica in 1944, all the colonies had 
by the 1950 1 s achieved universal adult suffrage and were being prepared for 
self-government. The final stage of political independence has been reached 
by Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana and Barbados while the other territories have 
attained associated statehood with Britain, by which full internal power 
rests with the island's gQvernment, Britain retaining authority in regard 
~ f d f · ff · 81 to ue ense an oreign a airs. 
Ironically, constitutional change has not altered in any significant 
way the economic dependency of the Caribbean. Havelock Brewster notes that:-
"this acceleration of the process of political democratization has 
79 
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has made the imbalance between the economic and political relations 
greater than ever. For although there have been some developments 
in mining and industry, these have been achieved within the framework_ 
of an economic organization similar to that of the original sugar 
. ' 
economy-pioneer manufacturing and large corporation mining. The 
traditional relations are clothed in modern forms but the mass of the 
population stand in similar relation to the owners and managers as 
did the wage labourers of the Nineteenth Century. The people remain 
deprived of contr·o1". 82 
In essence, the economy of the region today remains what it was immediately 
. after Emancipation. Where in the Nineteenth Century it was a question of 
large plantations and small peasant holdings, it is now a two-sector eeonomy 
with a modern high-productivity, high wage, highly capital intensive sector 
and a traditional, low productivity low wage, labour-intensive sector. In 
short, "in the late 1960 1 s, the giant international corporation of the Twentieth 
Century had replaced the small merchant firm of the Eighteenth Century controlling 
most of the sugar industry as the principal influence on the economies of the 
English-speaking Caribbean and the main decision making entity on the allocation 
of resources and on investment". 83 
Dependency Of The Commonwealth Caribbean 
According to William G. Demas, Secretary General of CARIFTA - "in order 
to understand the present economic situation in the Caribbean, we must begin 
by examining the distinction between growth and development. The important 
point to be grasped here is that neither growth nor development can be defined 
82 
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in "value-free" technical terms. In the first place, economic growth (in the 
conventional sense of an increase in the per capita production of goods and 
services in a country) can be measured only if we make certain assumptions 
about income distribution. The "weights" to be attached to the different 
goods and services making up the national product or incol!le .depend on relative 
prices and these relative prices are linked to the distribution of income. 
"Secondly, and more fundamentally, development means not only economic growth 
but economic growth generated from within the country as well as growth which 
results in economic diversification in the sense of the creation of more 
interdependence or industry linkages and activities in the country. Consequently, 
genuine economic growth should be measured in terms of a satisfactory level 
of employment, a fairly equal distribution of income and the greatest possible 
·11 84 participation by the people of the country in the economy . 
The territories in the Commonwealth Caribbean are often regarded as being 
at an intermediate stage of economic development, largely because the level 
of per capita income range between $200 (U.S.) to $600 (U.S.). "This may be 
taken to mean that the peoples of the Commonwealth Caribbean are better off 
than some of their counterparts in other developing regions. But their quest 
for higher living standards is no less intensive than it is elsewhete1.185 In 
the words of William Demas, "despite such economic growth, development has 
not followed. Social problems, such as urban poverty, unemployment, inadequate 
educational facilities and inequality of income distribution have been aggravated 
86 
rather :.than resolved". 
As the result of such conditions, Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad 
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and Tobago notes that, the region is the most unstable areas in our unstable 
world. The Prime Minister goes on further by saying, "the reasons for such 
instability are the following: political and economic fragmentation, constitutional 
diversity; economic, psychological, cultural and in some cases political "" 
dependence; large-scale unemployment and underdevelopment; economic uncertainty; 
unresolved racial tension; potential religious conflict, "the restlessness of 
youth; and an all-pervading fear of the United States".87 
Why, despite this rapid economic growth, the region remains the "most 
unstable" in the world? Professor Arthur Lewis, a distinguished economist, 
"in defining economic growth, puts the subject in perspective by stating that 
"it is possible that output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people 
may becoming poorer". " He goes on to say, that economic growth specifically 
relate to economic goods and services, and economic output, in the old 
fashioned meaning of economics and not to some concept as welfare, satisfaction 
or happiness 11 • 88 
What comes out quite clear in the definition, is that when one talks about 
economic growth, it does not follow that social welfare, redistribution of 
income and resources, to the benefit of the population is taking place, 
(especially in the developing countries). Development then shouJ.d not be 
confused, as it often is, with economic growth measured in annual increases 
of per capita national income or product. Growth without development is"-a 
frequent experience in the past and present history of the Collilllonwealth 
Caribbean. This is especially the case in times of raw material export booms 
generated by metropolitan demand; a satellite country's growth becomes manifested 
87 
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both in the product it exports and in its productive capacity but, far from 
generating or even permitting the structural transformation necessary for 
development, this growth results in the development of underdevelopment and 
further·dependency on metropolitan countries .. 
A report prepared by the United Nations for the Carifta Territories 
states that:-
"the Caribbean economies are dependent structurally not only in the 
sense that a few primary exports. going to even a fewer countries 
contribute significantly to their national incomes, but· also in that. 
they greatly rely on foreign capital inflows for the financing (of 
relatively high rates) of gross capital formation. This average rate 
of gros·s capital formation for the area as a whole is currently 
estimated at 26% a year. Of this portion the amount financed by 
foreign sources, including reinvestment of profits by foreign firms 
operating in the area but excluding depreciation allocations, was as 
high as 30%. If depreciation allocations were included, as they should 
be, the dependence on foreign capital would rise very much higher. For 
Trinidad and Tobago for instance, the corresponding ratios for 1968 are 
estimated to be 23% and 62% respectively. This relatively high dependence 
on foreign funds is due largely to the structural characteristics of the 
economies, especially on those territories dependent on mineral extrac-
tion and refining 11'~ 89 
According to the foregoing description of development, we find the-present 
89 
Report on Harmonization of Fiscal Incentives to Industries in the Carifta 
Territories, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Office 
for the Caribbean E/CN. 12/845 1969, p. 5. 
90 Commonwealth Caribbean suffer from perpetual dependency, although in 
recent years there have been reputable rates of economic.gro,rth and increases 
in per capita national income. Rates of economic growth have been over the 
decade of the 1960 1 s about 5% per annum in the dependent territories and 
this is conventionally speaking, a "good economic performance". 91 
In the independent te~ritories (Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Barbados) ·the manufacturing sectors have made some progress. As Table 
2.1 shows, Trinidad and Tobago registered the highest rate of manufacture 
50. 
in gross domestic product, rising from $108. 2 mil.lion in 1966 to $313 .8 mill.ion 
in 1970. The table also reveals that, the growth rate of manufacturing, at 
current prices fell from 18.9 to 12.7 between 1968 and 1969, and to slightly 
more than 7% in 1970. (See Appendix 1 for the economic activity of the other 
sectors of the economy). However, the above economic growth has not benefitted 
90 
According to Theotonia Dos Santos, dependency is a situation in which•. 
a certain group of countries have their economy conditioned by the 
development and expansion of another economy to which the former is 
subject. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies 
and between these and world trade assumes the form of dependence when 
some countries, (the dominant) can expand and give impu.l:.se to their own 
development, while other countries (the dependent) can only develop as a 
reflection of this expansion. This can have positive and/or negative 
effects on their immediate development. In all cases, the basic situation 
of dependence leads to a global situation in dependent countries that 
situates them in backwardness and under the exploitation of the dominant 
countries. The dominant countries have a technological, commercial capital 
resource, and social-political predominance over the dependent countries 
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of the domestically produced surplus. 
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Barbados 
Guyana 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Jamaica 
Leeward & 
Windward Islands 
TABLE 2.1 
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN MANUFACTURING COMPONENT 
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Millions of Eastern Caribbean Percentage of Total 
Dollars 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
17.3 18.6 21.0 22.8 24.8 10.2 9.8 9.7 9.8 9.5 
Millions of Gurana Dollars 
42.4 46.7 49.7 53.0 55,2 1 12.2 12.3 12.1 11.9 11.6 
Millions of Trinidad Dollars 
108.2 218.6 260.0 293,0 313.8 18.5 18.9 
Millions of Jamaica Dollars 
99.2 115.2 121.1 128.7 15.4 15 .. 3 . 14 .6 14.1 
Millions of Eastern Caribbean 
Dollars 
8.7 10.3 4.3 4.7 
Annual Growth Rates 
1966 1967 1968 1969 
6.8 7.5 12.9 8.6 
o.8 10.1 6.4 6.6 
18.9 12.7 
3.2 8.7 10.0 
Source: Economic Survey of Latin America 1970 
United Nations, 1972, 
> 
1970 
8.8 
4.2 
7.1 
9.0 
Vl 
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the economic development of the region because it has been mainly confined 
to those sectors of the economy which are controlled by multinational 
corporations. One consequence of this concentration has been unemployment 
in an already intolerable situation. In the case of the manufacturing sector 
where progress is noticeable the impact has not been substantial in terms of 
contribution to the Commonwealth Caribbean economy. This is because; 
"the industries are highly capital-intensive, activities employing 
a relatively small amount of manpower;.hence their rapid expansion 
has done little or nothing to solve the serious unemployment problem 
affecting the labour force, and secondly; 'they produce mainly for 
the domestic market, substituting for items previously imported". 92 
The process of import-substitution industrialization which has occurred 
or is beginning to occur in a number of Commonwealth Caribbean countries does 
not, then, necessarily entail a reduction of dependence upon the international 
system. The economics of the region remain highly dependent upon foreign 
trade. Exports and imports in Caribbean countries represent proportions of 
gross product that are higher than in the advanced industrial countries, and 
the territories are consequently highly subject to patterns of international 
commerce over which they have very little control. National manufacture of 
previously imported finished-products often involves the importation of raw 
materials and intermediate parts and always requires the importation of the 
machinery and equipment necessary· to establish production • 93 To go along 
with the import-substitution industrialization all governments in the region 
92 
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provide fiscal incentives, such as tax holidays, accelerated depreciation on 
capital invested and exemptions from import duties for overseas purchases of 
raw materials and capital equipment. 
John H. Lang, Ass.istant Commercial Secretary of the Canadian High 
Commission, Kingston, writes:- "the industriai Incentive Law provides for a 
10 year exemption, 15 years_ in special cases, from income tax to qualified 
industries that set up manufacturing facilities in Jamaica. It also provides 
relief from customs duties and tonnage on machinery and equipment". 94 The 
author continues by reminding his audience, "keeping in mind that pioneer 
industries are protected from foreign competition, profits are al111ost assured". 95 
Another writer, J.M. Claude Lavoie, Assistant Commercial Secretary, Port of 
Spain, states, "it is evident that the Eastern Caribbean islands are looking 
for investors. They welcome prospective ones with open arms but under their 
own conditions" •96 The conditions or incentives offered to investors are well 
documented by the Assistant Commercial Secretary in Chart 2.1. As the result 
of such incentives, the gro,rth of the industrial sector has assumed some 
importance. Equally true is its scant contribution to the economy, especially 
in the number of people employed in relation to the amount of capital invested. 
Moreover, because of the lack of economic integration, "individual- territories 
all vie with one another to attract metropolitan firms to establish branches 
and subsidiaries in the region. In so vying they pursue competitive rather 
than cooperative strategies of economic development 11 • 97 
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TYPE 
Tax Holiday 
Accelerated 
depreciation 
Capital Allowances 
Carryover of Losses 
Tax exemption 
on dividends 
Duty-free entry 
of original material 
and equipment 
Drm<>back 
Local Participation 
Mandatory 
CHART 2.l 
INCENTIVES OFFERED TO INVESTORS 
APPLIES IN 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Monsterrat, St. 
Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago 
Barbados, Monsterrat, St.Lucia 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Barbados, Grenada, Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Monsterrat, St. Kitts/ 
Nevis, St. Vincent, Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica 
Grenada, St, Kitts/Nevis 
St. Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Monsterrat, St. Kitts/ 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Angtigua, Barbados, Dominica 
Grenada, Monsterrat, St. Kitts/ 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, 
Trinidad & Tobago 
St. Kitts/Nevis 
TYPE 
Availability of local 
funds 
Possible casinos 
Restrictions on employing 
foreign management 
Restrictions on employing 
foreign labor 
Designated areas for 
development 
Import restrictions on 
food for hotels 
Restrictions on origin 
of capital 
Alien licence required 
Source: Foreign Trade, Vol. l32, No .11, l968 ," 
APPLIES IN 
Barbados, Grenada, St. 
Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St, Vincent, Trinidad 
& Tobago 
Dominica, St. Kitts/Nevis 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, 
, Grenada, Monsterrat, St. 
Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St, Vincent, Trinidad & 
T~a~ 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica 
Grenada, Monsterrat, St.Kitts/ 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
Trinidad & Tobago 
St, Kitts/Nevis, St. Vincent, 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, 
Grenada, Monsterrat, 
Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago 
D·ominica 
Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, 
Monsterrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, 
St. Lucia, Trinidad & 
Tobago. 
I 
! 
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Despite this unprecendented set of favourable circumstances, unemployment 
continued to be a chronic problem in all of these territories. Current unemploy~ 
ment ranges between 12% and 20% and the average rate of growth of population 
is estimated at 3% for the area as a whole. With population growing at such 
a high rate and the existing levels of unemployment already high by any standard, 
not only has the problem of providing full productive employment become a serious 
economic issue, but also it has acquired a great measure of urgency in view of 
its soc.ial implications. A number of factors contribute to this growing 
unemployment; rapid growth of population and hence to the labour force; the 
use of inappropriate capital-intensive technology in the new manufacturing 
..... ·.· 
industrialization) and mechanization and retrenchment· i·n·: ~lei.er· indi:rstries, 
such as sugar and oil; the steady drift from the agricultural and the rural 
areas to the towns, partly caused by the growing disparities in earnings 
between agriculture and the "modern" sectors of manufacturing mining and tourism. 98 
The agricultural sector has generally developed slowly in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. Where it has developed rapidly, the growth was caused by the 
development of export products, namely, sugar, bananas and citrus. The slow 
growth of the domestic agricultural sector has acted as a powerful deterrent 
to balanced economic development. Moreover, the structural framework in 
which agricultural activities develop and the pattern.of income distribution 
prevalent in that sector have damaged the domestic sector. The expansion of 
sugar, citrus and banana.production has been largely dependent upon marketing 
arrangements which the Commonwealth Caribbean enjoyed in the United Kingdom. 
Because of the preferential shelter, the external sector has been steady, 
while on the other hand, production for the .domestic market has tended to stagnate 
and deteriorate. As a result "imports of food have been steadily increasing since 
98 
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the Second World War and the growth of production in this sector has just barely 
kept pace with the growth of population". 99 Despite the aforementioned structural 
defects and the relative stagnation of production, agriculture continues to be 
the chief economic activity for the Commonwealth Caribbean. Its contribution to 
G.D.P. in some of the territories far exceeds any other economic activity (See 
Appendix 1). Moreover over 75% of the economically active population is dependent 
on agricultural activities both commercial and subsistence.100 
99 
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Guyana: Sugar represents nearly 30% of G.N.P. and over 30% of domestic exports. 
Over 10% of the work force is employed in the sugar production. In addition 
it provides a major source of income for over 4,000 cane farmers. Rice is 
Guyana's second and largest agricultural produce, approximately 45,000 live 
by rice farming and approximately I/4 of the population are employed either 
directly or indirectly in the industry. Rice contributes 6% of Guyana's 
gross domestic product and 55% of its total rice production is exported. 
:-J~aica: The share of ~Dga~_-i,;. Jtµiiai~a·~ Q.}i:p;"is now only 6% and. exports 
• Of bauxite and 'aiilmf±;a, are 'more 'tfuri'twfce as Valuable.'>Sugar nevertheless. , C 
remains the.most important agricultural activity and accounts for over 20% 
of total exports. Even more important, it employs 50,000 people (including 
farmers) on 10% of the island's whole work force. 
· Trinidad: :S11gar::accounts for·8% of ·the. value ·of ·export, c.but -employs ·no less 
than 12% of the work force. 
Barbados: Agriculture accounts for 25% of the G.N.P. and provides work for 
20% of the working population, and accounts for 85% of its exports. 
Windward & Leeward Islands: Over 90% of exports are derived from sugar and 
bananas. (St. Lucia export share accounts for over 85%, St. Kitts dependency 
on sugar is even greater, representing over 95% of exports and employing 
about half the people. 
Source: New Commonwealth and World Development, 1970, Review of The Commonwealth, 
No. 12, 1970. p. 51. '.I 
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The weaknesses of the agricultural sector are to a considerable extent 
the result of the post - 1950 government. developmental policies and the 
conception of development itself. The new sectors - tourism and manufacturing 
paid relatively high wage rates and attracted people from the land. More 
generally, industrial and hotel development were given priority over agricultural 
development and the kind of branch-plant and "luxury" tourism promoted prevented 
a search for local inputs, including food for the tourists.101 , In other words, 
the exodus of the displaced poor from agriculture into Commonwealth Caribbean 
urban areas has been a case of horizontal mobility from one situation of poverty 
to another and not of vertical mobility from peasant to industrial and productive 
worker. In both absolute and relative terms, unemployment, underemploym_ent and 
unproductive employment are steadily increasing in the region, as is dependency 
of the system as a whole. 
In many of the territories, tourism has been growing rapidly, particularly 
in Jamaica, Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands. Like the concentration 
upon growing of sugar, one can observe a similar situation with the tourist 
industry. Reflecting the pattern of the key sectors of the economies in the 
region, the tourist facilities are also foreign-controlled. In the Eastern 
Caribbean, which are highly dependent on the tourist industry, the domination 
of foreign control is almost complete. In St. Lucia, for example, "eleven of 
• 11 102 
the fifteen hotels are owned by North Atlantic interests . The concentration 
0 
on tourism in the small territories, is partly the result of another foriegn 
sponsored commission. This is the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern 
101 
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Caribbean which was jointly undertaken by the United States, Canada and Britain. 
The survey concluded that tourism is the key growth industry in these islands 
and recorr,mended that official development assistance focus on the provision of 
infrastructure for private investment. Like other commissions before, "it. 
was merely keeping up with the traditional and continuing process of under-
development in the r.egion, which has been serviced by a whole range of misguided 
institutions and activities" .103 
In the larger territories, as the result of the Canada-Commonwealth 
Caribbean Conference in Ottawa, 1966, Canada promised to make available over 
$75 million to invest in basic infrastructure, public utilities, transportation 
and education (in Chapter 3 this subject will be dealt with in greater detail). 
Clearly, the strategy is designed to modernize public utilities and infrastructure, 
as a conditioning factor so as to be more receptive to the growing investment 
from the North Atlantic c!ommunity. Consequently, governments in the region 
have given top priority to the tourist industry, in their quest for economic 
development. In Antigua, Barbados and Jamaica, the gross expenditure of 
tourist amounted to $18 million in 1967; $54 million in 1968 and $178 million 
in 1968 respectively. While these figures look very impressive, Demas states 
:that, "they are misleading because of its contribution to the economy" .104 · To 
be sure, not all expenditures by tourists benefit the Commonwealth Caribbean 
economies because the bulk of the tourist food and other purchases are imported. 
The Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Respecting Canadian 
Relations with the Caribbean Area, succinctly pointed out "the major problem· 
has been that too little of the economic benefit of tourism accrued to the 
103 
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104 
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local societies. Prevalent foreign ownership has resulted in a large outflow 
of repatriated profits. Almost all of the industry's material requirements· 
have normally been imported, providing no stimulus whatever to local industries. 
The import bill has usually included machinery, construction.mat':rials, furni-
shings and most consumables including even fresh fruits and vegetables".l05 
The Committee went further by stating that "if the tourist industry is to 
have any broad and lasting impact, many more of its material requirements 
from consumable to construction materials must be procured locally, rather·:. 
than ·imported (as is· now the general rule) .. While this will improve mainly 
local government action in encouraging local production and purchasing and in 
educating tourist about local products, Canada could assist significantly by 
directing more of its assistance to production related to tourism, and by 
adopting cooperative policies in other fields".l0 6 
Another major characteristic of the region's economic activity is the 
extent of the high dependency on the international commodity trade for the 
production, and the importation of a wide variety of domestic goods which 
they require. As the result of this international dependency intra-regional 
trade has been very low. In l967, "total share of intra-regional trade among 
CARIFTA countries was only 6% as compared with 20% with the U.K. and 35% with 
the U .S.A. 11l07 Professor Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson state that "the 
reason for this lopsided intra-regional trade is due primarily to the 
operations of the international corporations which have the effect of integrating 
each country more closely into the metropolis rather than with other countries 
105 
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Relations with the Caribbean Area: p. 46. 
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in the region. It is also due to the centuries - old rivalry among countries, 
which makes them compete for metropolitan investment (and tourism) in their 
o,m individual countries rather than seek to cooperate with one another 
through common policies and joint development of resources'_' . 108 
An analysis of the Commonwealth Caribbean economies would not be complete 
without a commentary upon .the position of the multinational corporation vis-a-
vis Caribbean integration. West Indian economist Lloyd Best in his analysis 
of the role of the multinational corporation in the Caribbean pointed out: 
108 
11 
••• perhaps the most important characteristic. of the regional 
economies is that they are dominated by a series of international 
corporations. Moreover .these corporations form parts of wider inter-
national systems of resource allocation. This is true of the mining 
corporations, the sugar companies, the hotel chains, the banking, hire,; 
purchase and insurance houses,the advertising companies, the newspapers 
and the television and radio stations ... in so far as there is harmonization 
among these concerns, it is for the most part achieved within the context 
of the metropolitan economies where they are based, and not in the peripheral 
economies of the countries where the companies actually operate. Moreover, 
the policies of the corporations are determined by their parent companies 
operating somewhere in the northern hemisphere and not by the local need 
to integrate industries and to increase interdependence between different 
sectors of the economy. The colonized nation is therefore, hardly more 
than a locus of production made up of a number of fragments held tenuously 
Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson, Corporate v. Caribbean Integration, New World, 
Readings in the Political Economy of the Caribbean, 1971, p. 94. 
together largely by government controls - themselves often borrowed 
from elsewhere. In other words, it is to be appreciated that it seems 
to be inherent in the structure of the international corporations which 
operate in the r.egion that the Caribbean economies remain fragmented and 
unintegrated. It is not merely a g_uestion of the flow of go.ods, th,;mgh. 
it is important; it is principally that the corporations are the channels 
through which metropolitan technology and forms of organization are 
introduced into the economy with little reference to the overall domestic 
factor market". l 09 
·z. These corporations operate under an imperative to grow. They seek to 
assure sources of raw material supplies abroad, to promote exports, to open 
investment opportunities abroad, to maximise profit and to guarantee the 
security of existing investments. Since the main concern of the multinational 
corporations is profits and economic hegemony; any economic development that 
takes place in the region is incidental to their activities. Clearly, the 
structure of the multinational corporation with its vertically integrated 
links with the metropolis inhibits the growth of industrial interdependence 
within the national and regional economies. Norman Girvan referring to 
the effects of multinational firms in the Caribbean bauxite industry, states 
that "the bauxite reserves under their control are utilized for their own 
growth and development of the Caribbean countries. nllO 
Political and Social Dependency Reinforced 
The dependency situation is not strictly an economic matter. Rather it 
also shapes the social and political aspects of the society. At the root of 
l09 
Lloyd Best, Size and Survival, Readings in the Political Economy of the 
Caribbean, New World, 197l, p. 32. 
110 
Norman Girvan, Why We Need to Nationalize Bauxite, and How, Readings in the 
Political Economy of the Caribbean, New World, l97l, p; 219. 
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this dependency is the multinational corporation whose main concern is the 
increase of profits of the company as a whole, and not to preserve the interests 
of the country in which the plant is located. Here the governments of the 
region with their economies dominated by these corporations find themselves 
largely incapable of independent action or initiative. Under these conditions 
the Commonwealth Caribbean governments respond primarily to the needs of the 
foreign corporations, rather than national needs. In this environment, the 
national economies cannot grow on their own initiative. That is to say, they 
cannot grow on the basis of governments development plans. They can grow only 
by decisions undertaken by the externally located head offices of the multi-
national firms. 
However, this dependency can result perhaps more in an identity of 
interests than a conflict of interests between multinational corporations and 
national governments and various vested interests groups. This is because 
the principal factor in the development and perpetuation of dependency of. the 
region was (and is) the identity of interest between the national ruling 
class and the economic structure of the dominant nation(s). National businessmen 
grew up with and benefited from their nation's dependency situation. Today, 
influential national businessmen still continue to confine much of _their business 
activities to the export or activities complementary to the foreign capital, 
and they are engaged in non-competitive relationships with foreign investors. 
Contemporary society is characterized by a highly stratified class 
system. In this system, the power elite that rules over the improvished majority 
of the population includes two main sectors. First, the principal foreign 
elements are European and North Americans, who o,m and control the major 
62. 
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commercial and industrial components of the region. The important role of 
the foreign sector is conditioning the social economic and political structure 
of the region. Consequently, the foreign elements do not operate independently, 
but within the framework of a set of modern international institutions and 
among power groups whose interests are interrelated with those -of the corporations. 
Thus aside from the economic control of the key sectors of the economy by 
these institutions and corporations, they also affect the political decisions 
concerning development. 
The second important sector is that of the domestic national class. This 
sector is composed of large absentee land holders, politicians, civil servants; 
lawyers, insurance and bank managers; import and export monopolists and. sim1lar 
types who have established a profitable alliance with foreign operators. The 
key point about the domestic sector is its polarization into those classes 
with jobs, income status and participation in society as against those classes 
either without employment or in jobs of meagre wages. Among the classes 
that together form a marginal mass, are the unemployed and underemployed workers, 
and service workers. Along the continuum of the scale are the best paid of 
the stable working class, the entrenched middle-class and the owners of hugh 
estates. 
The dependence of the Commonwealth Caribbean elites on external factors 
reflects their internal weakness, their inability to mobilize domestic human 
and material resources. At the same time, to attempt to mobilize these internal 
resources for national development would engender various conflicts with both 
private and public interests. Moreover, a really effective mobilization 
would cut into the privileged positions of established social groups. 
64. 
Over the past decade the major territories have been granted constitutional 
independence. Yet the economic dependency in these countries has not been 
altered in any significant way. As Dr. Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago vividly pointed out, 
"the history of the Caribbean has failed to confer either power or 
dignity on the disp_osed. The manipulation of the economy, society 
and culture by external forces over the last four and a half centuries 
has undoubtedly contributed to a certain degree of material prosperity 
among many sections of the population (more so in Trinidad and Tobago, 
because of oil) but it has not conferred upon the masses the power of 
self-determination or dignity. They have no economic power; there is 
a largely borrowed culture and set of values; they need to have greater 
pride in themselves; they think of themselves not as a Nation, but as 
an Island still in the colonial period from which the only form of 
escape is emigration to the ghettos of the United States of America 
with the recent addition of the incipient ghettos in the United Kingdom 
111 
and Canada" . 
Foreign control of the key sectors of the economies persist. The new 
authority "deliberately assume the role of house-slave, as it were to 
t l ·t b . 112 me ropo i an usiness. The development policies which have been undertaken 
by the governments of the region have only reinforced the dependency of the 
territories. Their strategy is: 
111 
"to rely on metropolitan initiative in investment, technology and 
marketing, on continued metropolitan ownership of control of the 
Eric Williams, PNM, "Perspective for the Seventies" The Nation, Vol. 14 
September 5, 1970. 
112 
Lloyd Best, p. 8. 
main means of production and therefore on a (temporary) reinforcement 
of the traditional economic relationships. They reason that this will 
secure them more time and in the end create more auspicious material 
conditions for an ultimate exercise of political independence and for 
the promotion of social eg_uality and social justice. nll.3 
C.L.R. James goes further by stating that while leaders in other nations. 
talk of steel mills, dams and power plants, "the West Indian politicians talk 
about how much money he will get from the British Government or from the 
United States" (and now Canada) _ll4 In essence=theedevelopment policies of 
the government can be described as negative politics. In order to attract 
foreign capital; the governments not only import metropolitan goods, but 
cater for expatriate tastes. Foreign investors receive exclusive living 
conditions, public defence, and assurance of social harmony along with their 
tax exemptions. Attentiveness to the "confidence of metropolitan investors 
restricts Commonwealth Caribbean public policy, discouraging economic reform 
and muting consideration of social needs".ll5 
In summary it can be concluded that the dependency of the territories is the 
result of the economic policy of the governments of the region and planning which 
has been too "growth-orientated" in the belief that once growth takes place 
through the expansion of the activities of the international corporations 
already operating in the country and through the attraction of new branch 
plants in industry and tourism, all the problems of the economy, including 
unemployment, income distribution and local participation, would be 
II • "bl h d" ll6 
automatically solved by the operations of some kind of invisi e an · 
ll3 
Ibid, p. 8. 
ll4 
c.L.R. James as quoted from David Lowenthal, p. 305-306. 
ll5 ·. 
David Lowenthal, p. 246. 
ll6 
William Demas, p. l7. 
CARIFTA AND CARIBBEAl'T DEVELOPMEl'TT BANK 
CARIFTA. 
The national governments are showing particular concern for their 
inability to solve the existing social and economic problems partly because the 
multinational corporations are not making any significant contribution toward 
solving the problems arising from the rapidly expanding population and the 
growth in the labour force •. As a result, they have been.under increasing 
pressure from internal sources, especially from the academics. These pressures 
are directed particularly at government policies which offer advantages to the 
66. 
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multinational corporations. The academic community are demanding a rejection 
of functional dependency - "the dependency that arises as a result of the 
particular policies chosen and can therefore be.avoided if alternative policies 
,, 1i8 
are '.[lursued". 
Recognizing that the present situation was not benefiting.the society as it 
should, government still plagued with the problem of unemployment, foreign 
control of the key sectors of the economies, and internal pressure, commissioned 
a series of studies.for the purpose of regional economic integration. According 
117 
According to l'Tathaniel David, President of Alcan giving evidence to the 
Standing Senate Collllilittee before the nationalization of bauxite, "the 
basic reason why our taxes in Guyana have been relatively lower than our 
taxes in Jamaica in recent years is that we have been running through the 
period of financial incentives granted by the Gµyanese government to assist 
development of many of our recent capital projects including a tax-free 
period. We have received investment allowances, and a five year tax-free 
period.for the alumina' plant·,aana: we have been running through a resulting 
period ·of low tax revenues". Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, No. 3, p. 19, 1969. 
118 
l'Torman Givan, The Development of Dependence in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
I A paper presented for the Conference on External Dependence and Problems of 
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, sponsored by the Latin American 
studies Collllilittee of the University of Toronto, Toronto, April 7, 8, 9, p. 8, 1972, 
to some of the findings, "integration schemes (irrespective of their scope) 
necessarily entail adjustments and development of a set of complementary 
institutions aimed at two principal objectives, defining, interpreting and 
giving concrete existence to the content of national commitments to integration, 
and bringing into existence those mechanisms needed to ensure the subsequent 
smooth functioning of the integrated area. To be successful, the inspiration 
for these institutional changes must flow directly from the strategy of 
integration. 11119 
The studies also pointed out that there are "dynamic gains which are 
likely to accrue from the economic integration of the Caribbean and that 
integration should:not be limited to those conditions which govern the exchange 
of goods, but· should also include in its perspective the integrated production 
of goods."120 On the subject of free trade, the author states that: 
119 
"although opportunities do exist for expanding trade in some 
agricultural and industrial commodities by a system of free trade, 
it is evident that the possible quantity and range of trade which 
could take place at present are limited by the structure of our own 
demand and by the existing narrow production-capacity of West Indian 
economies. The range o~ goods within which trade creation is possible 
is limited immediately by the fact that the area over which internal 
·competition can prevail, is minute. The constituent members' 
production is geared almost entirely to external demand. Similarly, 
their structure of demand is geared almost entirely to external 
production. In effect then, West India;::t economies are neither competitive 
Havelock Brewster and Clive Y. Thomas, The Dynamics of West Indian Economic 
Integration, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the 
West Indies, Jamaica, 1967, p. 29. 
120 
Ibid, p. 19. 
nor complementary. Hence the scope for both short-term trade creation 
and trade-diverting, trade creation through the mechanism of free trade 
121 is extremely narrow" 
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In addition to the Social and Economic Research studies, where, .the types of 
mechanism available for achieving economic integration are studied, and the 
necessary policy measures needed to bring about an appropriate system of 
regional economic integration are outlined, several other important studies 
have demonstrated the potentials available to the Commonwealth Caribbean. The 
studies df Brewster and Thomas, Beckford and Girvan, · demonstrate certain 
developmental possibilities for the region if the institutional form and quality 
of potential decision making are changed. 
McIntyre recognizes·.that '.'the economies of the region are led by export 
demand and that import substitution does not offer promise of substantial long-
term gains in the economic field. He also recognizes that import substitution 
does not result automatically in an equitable distribution of gains and he 
consequently introduces the concept of export substitution. Under this novel 
idea, he proposes that a relatively inefficient exporter in the region could.,., 
with benefit, yield a place in an export market outside the region to a more 
efficient producer of the region in return for a center compensatory advantage. 
The Beckford study demonstrates in particular that there are substantial 
possibilities of gain likely to accrue from cooperation in the pr.eduction and 
export of bananas to markets outside the region. The Brewster/Thomas study 
deals with the problem of regional production complexes which would maximise 
. ,,122 the gains to the region as a result of indigenous production. 
121 
Ibic1', p. 13-14. 
122 
As quoted from Frank Rampersad, The Caribbean Free Trade Association.Regionalism 
and the Commonwealth Caribbean edited by Roy Preiswerk Institute of International 
Relations, University of the West Indies, Trinidad, 1968, p. 78. 
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Accordi.ngly, the governments of the region, undaunted by their earlier 
failure to establish a single federal state, formed the Caribbean ~ree Trade 
Association123 11to fulfill within the shortest possible time the hopes and 
aspirations of the peoples of the Caribbean territories for full employment 
and improved living standards" .124 If nothing else, the territories seemed 
to indicate a·considerable improvement in Commonwealth Caribbean political 
and psyc.hological climate for cooperation in economic matters. It is difficult 
to say whether this improvement reflected a better perception of a regional. 
unity of interests or whether it arose from dissatisfaction with traditional 
economic relations with the outside industrialized world. Nevertheless, the 
territories agreed to bring about closer economic cooperation. 
The removal of tariffs and limited restrictions from trade iUJlong these 
territories was conceived of, and embarked upon as a first step towards closer 
economic cooperation between these territories. Aware that the freei.ng of 
trade would not significantly benefit the weaker members of the Association, 
nor significantly strengthen the regional economy as a whole, the founders of 
CARIFTA provided for special measures to help those territories classified as 
123 
·The Carifta members are Ja.ma-ica, Trinidad and Tobago, Gyyana, Barbados, 
Antigua, Monsterrat, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Grenada, Dominica, St. Kitts. 
Nevis-Anguilla and Belize (Entry of the Dominican Republic has been explored). 
124 
Premable to the Carifta Agreement, p. 5. 
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125 Less Developed members. These measures included the establishment of the 
Caribbean Development.Bank126 whose role was to harmonize "economic growth and 
development of the member countries in the Caribbean having special and urgent 
regard to the needs of the Less Developed Countries, "which do not.g_ualify for 
loans from the international financial institutions. The Bank has an initial 
capital of $50 million of which $20 million would be contributed by Canada 
and the United Kingdom. 
To further the objective of regional economic development, the Agreement 
provides for the pursuit of a Common External .Tariff, the harmonization of 
fiscal incentives to industry and a common approach to foreign investment and 
regional integrated industries. While some measures are being taken to improve 
the position of the Less Developed Countries, nothing has been done on a 
125 
Article 4 sets out the basic principle of the Carifta Agreement the removal 
of all tariffs · (import duties) on trade among member c·ountries. The main 
exception to the principle of the immediate removal of all trade barriers in 
the Reserve List of commodities are tobacco, paints·, radios, T.V. sets, batteries, 
manufactured tobacco except cigars and certain clothing and footwear. In respect 
of goods on the Reserve List, duties will be gradually removed over five-year 
and ten-year periods - five years by More Developed Countries of Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago and ten years by the Less Developed Countries of 
the Leeward and Windward Islands. Carifta and the New Caribbean, p. 21-22. 
126 
The establishment of the bank, to provide finance for private and public development 
in the Caribbean and to promote economic cooperation and integration was one of 
the recommendations of ilhe Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, 
sponsored jointly by the Governments of Canada, U.S. and Britain. One of the 
main conclusions of the survey' s report was that increased regional economic 
cooperation was necessary to achieve maximum growth in the tourist industry and 
in other areas of economic activity. Survey of British and Commonwealth Affairs: 
Prepared for British Information Services by the Central Office of Information, 
London - Vol. 4, No. 4, February 13, 1970, forthnightly, p. 162. 
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regional basis that is likely to lead directly to the fulfillment of the stated 
CARIFTA goal of full employment in the region. In the face of the chronic high 
and apparently rising unemployment rates in the region, there is absolutely 
urgent need for regional perspective planning for employment. Such planning calls 
for the use of techniques and appnoaches to development which would involve the 
combined development and utilization of the resources of the region on a regional 
basis. The pursuit of any such common approach however, calls for the adoption 
of common policies in many other areas, including the important area of foreign 
investment, in which as has been the case so far, different countries adopt 
different policies. 
Since the formation of the association, certain territories (Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana) have benefited substantially from the eJ<pansion 
of both agricultural and industrial production.127 The picture does not appear 
so bright from the point of view of its smaller and less developed members. 
Lacking raw materials, capital and skilled labour, they find it more difficult 
to attract investment and industry. The Less Developed Countries "have claimed 
that CARIFTA has brought them no benefit and they are being exploited through 
it by the more industrialized members". They complain that manufactured goods 
imported from Trinidad, Kingston or Bridgetown cost more than similar items 
. l b ht ' f H K J B ·t · " 128 previous y roug in ram ong ong, apan or even ri ain. 
127 
Jamaica for example, doubled her exports to the area in the first 18 months after 
CARIFTA was established. In 1969, 13 new industries were set up there, and in 
early 1970, she was able to boast of some 1,000 industries, ranging from electronics 
to·matches. By the end of 1968, Trinidad and Tobago had nearly 400 industries, 
including a motor vehicle assembly plant, with another one being planned. As 
quoted from Emmanuel De Kadts, p. 8. 
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Emmanuel De Kadt, Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean, Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, Oxford University Press 1972, p. 8. 
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According to Emmanuel De Kadt, of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, commenti.ng in an article which appeared in a Financial Times article that: 
"the CARIFTA countries must develop stronger links and that the political 
leaders must begin to think in regional terms if CARIFTA is not to break 
up or merely degenerate into a quadripartite trade pact between Jamaica, 
Trinidad, Guyana and .Barbados. That article critizes the widely different 
taxation levels, fi.nancial and monetary policies and above all the rival 
incentive s·ohemes which have resulted in island-hopping by foreign 
investors and revenue losses for the islands and it emphasizes the urgent 
need for CARIFTA politicians to sit do"11 and plan the economic development 
of their islands jointly and selectively".129, 
Politics of Carifta 
The Carifta Agreement does not concern itself with the whole spectrum 
of the region's interest, but limits itself to what happens to trade in the 
area. The main obstacles to integration of the West Indies is the low level 
of political "commitment" to the idea of integration. The traditional political 
response to this problem has been either to waterdown proposals sufficiently to 
make them "politically" acceptable or to concentrate on changing the existing 
130 political structure. James Millete expresses a similar view by pointing out 
that: 
129 
"first of all, Carifta provides the means of adopting, a "simple device 
which least restricts the autonomy of the individual units and of private 
enterprise". In other words, Carifta facilitates the maintenance of the 
Ibid, p.9. 
130 
Havelock Brewster and Clive Thomas, p. 27. 
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status quo in the essential relationships between the states and between 
the groups and classes of persons that compose them. Secondly, Carifta 
provides the possibility and the means of yet.another diversionary tactic 
on the part of the West Indian governments by which they adopt the forms 
of progress without really, seeking its substance. Car·ifta· is just 
that kind of exercise which involves an apparent commitment to the 
en).ig!Ttened political idea of regionalism without involving any inextricable 
involvement at any serious level. A third reason suggests itself, that is, 
that. having commissioned the studies on integration the governments of 
the region, prodded by the vested business interests, then proceeded as 
if the studies had never been written. Just another set of reports for 
another set of pigeon-holesr131 
Caribbean Development Bank 
Partly as a result of the failure of the under-developed countries to 
obtain greater flexibility in the policy of the World Bank, and partly because 
of the desire of these countries to reduce their degree of dependence for long 
term investment on external sources, as well as in view of the need to increase 
the supply of investment resources mobilized from within the region, numerous deve-
loping ine~bef· countries of the World.Bank have, within the last decade, grouped 
themselves to establish regional development Banks. In some cases, such as 
the Asian and African Development Banks, the establisP.ments were created under 
the sponsorship of the United Nations regional economic commissions. The 
Inter-American Development Bank was sponsored by the Organization of American 
States and the Caribbean Development Bank was created under the sponsorship 
of the United Nations development commission. 
131 
James Millette, p. 39. 
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The origin of the idea of a r_egional bank can be traced to .Rapael Rico, 
President of the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, in 1963, in 
discussing the need for institutional development and the role of the Caribbean 
Organization in fostering the advancement of the region. A few years later,. 
William Demas introduced· the idea that, "there should be established a 
Development Bank for the Commonwealth Caribbean working in close association 
with an Institute for Industrial Research and Technology, and charged with 
implementing the regional investment policy designed to prevent polarization 
. 132 
and to permit co~ordinated development". 
At the same time, the Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the 
Eastern Caribbean on April 22, 1966, proposed the formation of a Regional 
Development Agency consisting of two divisions; 
(1) a Technical and Commercial Services Division, and 
(2) a Development Bank Division, which, among other objectives, was to 
"deal with certain international development agencies whose rules at 
present exclude individual islands from consideration on grounds of 
size •.• and to private capital by the issue of appropriate types of 
shares, both overseas and within the islands, thus tapping further 
sources of development finance" .133 
In all the proposals for a development bank for the Caribbean "the idea 
of the inflexibility of the international organizations and their inability 
74. 
to deal with the small economies of the region seems to be one of the motivating 
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William Demas, Planning and the Price Mechanism in the Context of Caribbean 
Economic Integration, "Paper presented at the Third Conference of Caribbean 
Scholars, Georgetown (Guyana) 1966, Puerto.Rico, Institute of Caribbean Studies, 
1967, p. 88. 
133 
. fleuort of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, Her Majesty 
stationery office, London 1966, p. 250. 
l34 factors. 11 The proposals in the Tripartite Survey were conceived only to 
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serve the Eastern Caribbean islands, unlike the Demas proposal, the geographical 
scope of which was the Commonwealth Caribbean. As a result a Conference of 
Caribbean Heads of Government held in Barbados in l966, a paper was presented 
. ' 
entitled "Proposals for a Regional Development Bank" following which a 
· Committee was set up to consider "the effective basis for the establishment 
and functioning of a regional development institution and to prepare proposals 
l35 therefor". Conseg_uently, the Caribbean Development Bank came into being 
formally with the signing of an Agreement in Kingston," Jamaica in October l969,. 
by its eighteen members. 
The main objective of the Bank is to promote economic growth and cooperation 
in the Caribbean, utilizing the resources at its disposal for financing regional 
and national projects and programmes which will contribute most effectively to 
the harmonious economic gro;rth of the region and pay special regard to the needs 
of the smaller areas. Its function is to mobilize additional financial resources 
for development on a regional basis, to finance national projects and programmes 
of high priority for which existing national or international financial mechanisms 
are unavailable or inappropriate, to finance important development projects 
with particular reference.to the special needs of the smaller and less developed 
areas, to finance multinational and other projects for the promotion of intra-
regional cooperation and trade, to promote public and private investment in 
l34 
Fitzgerald Francis,"The Caribbean Development Bank" Regionalism and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, Papers presented at the seminar on the Foreign Policies 
of Caribbean States, April-June, l968, Institute of International Relations 
University of the West Indies, Trinidad, l968, p. 89. 
l35 
Ibid, p. 89. 
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development projects, to provide appropriate technical assistanc_e, specifically 
by undertaking or commissi_oning pre-investment surveys and by ass'isting in the 
'd t'f" t· d t· f · t 1 136 i en i ica ion an prepara ion o proJec proposa s. 
The Bank has a capital of $50 million U.S. subscribed by sixteen regional 
members and tvo non-regional members: Canada ($10 million) and Britain ($10 million). 
These resources are used to finance ordinary operations by lending at commercial 
rates. In addition to its equity capital and other funds, the Bank may borrow 
on capital markets. The Bank has also established a Special Fund to which 
Canada....and. Britain are each c·ontributing $5 -milli.on. U.S.·,. and the United States 
$10 million and an Agricultural Development Fund to which Canada has. contributed 
$2.5 million. (See Chart 2.2 for the capital structure of the Bank). 
The Bank's capital is used primarily to foster infrastructure projects 
connected mainly with agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, mining and trans-
portation, while',the-agn:6°iii.tUJ:aiL • and:, industria.L sectors~have accounted for a 
greater number of loans, infrastructure has been the most important in terms 
of total dollar commitments. Approximately $5.5 million has been allocated 
to this sector out of a total of $10.6 million committed to date (1972y'.37one 
of the most striking features of the Bank is its dependence on non-regional 
sources for financial assistance for its survival. Besides this dependency, 
loans provided by non-regional members are also tied to their goods and services. 
However, "only the Canadian Agricultural Development Fund allows the borrower 
to procure goods and services from any country, regardless of whether or not it 
is affiliated with the Bank11 •138 - In a way, it can be argued, these kinds of 
136 
Caribbean Development Bank, United Nations Develoument Programme, Report of 
the Preparatory Mission, SF/310/Reg.lll New York, 1967, p. Y. 
I • 
137 
Kenneth Dunn, Financing Caribbean Development Canada Commerce, 
No. l. January 1973, p. 9. 
138 IBID p.9 
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CHART 2.2 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF THE BANK 
Jamaica 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Bahamas 
Guyana 
Barbados 
British Honduras 
Grenada 
St. Lucia 
Antigua 
St. Vincent 
Dominica 
St. Kitts~Nevis-Anguilla 
Honsterrat, Turks and Caicos 
Islands, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands 
Non-Kegional Members 
Canada 
Britain 
Special Development Fund 
U.S. Aid Line of Credit 
Canada 
Britain 
Agricultural Fund 
Subscriptions U.S. 
Hillicins of Dollars 
- -
11.2 
7.7 
3.3 
2.4 
1.4 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
.5 
10.0 
10.0 
20.0 
5.0 
5.0 
Canada 2.5 
Source: Canada Commerce: January, 1972, Vol. 136, No.l p.6. 
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stipulations facilitate foreign control of the economies of the territories. 
Non-regional members have a vested interest in encouraging economic 
development in the Commonwealth Caribbean, so long as it follows general 
guidelines consistent with their corporate interest. Sir Arthur Lewis, 
President of the Caribbean Development Bank, points out that "our biggest 
lender, the U.S.A.I.D. demands to see full appraisal for each single loan we 
make with their funds, and reserves the right bf final approval for any 
project costing more than $500,000.139 
Another characteristic of the Bank is the voting procedure which denies 
the region of any meaningful control of even minor policy matters in the Bank, .. 
as not even unanimity of the regional membership would give them the required 
majority vote. Moreover, since the regional members are to be the only bene-
ficiaries from. the services of the Bank, the inordinate use of restrictive 
majorities prevents them from getting the Bank to approve matters of peculiar 
interests to themselves, even when there is complete unanimity within the 
. ·140 
region. 
To put the above in perspective, according to Fitzgerald Francis, "the 
regional group is supposed to control 60% of the votes and the non-regional 
group the remaining 40%. Superifically, this appears to say that as long as 
the countries in the regional_group get together they can always out-vote the 
non-regional countries, and therefore retain control of the policy of the Bank. 
In actual fact this is not so because very considerable use has been made in 
the Charter of the device of qualified majorities. Almost all important matters 
on which voting is required call for 60%_ or _ev:en 75% majority votes for approval. 
139 
Arthur Lewis, Some Constraints On International Banking, The Voice of St. Lucia, 
Saturday, October 28, 1972, p. 8. 
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Fitzgerald Francis, The Caribbean Development, Regionalism and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, edited by Roy Preiswerk, Institute of International Relations, University 
of the West Indies, Trinidad, 1968, p. 99-107. 
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This means that not even perfect unanimity within the region could secure 
approval for such provisions. At least one non-regional member , and there are 
only two of them at this stage, must vote with the regional governments if 
the particular provision is to be accepted on a 60% or 75% majority. Consequently, 
the 60% voting control does not mean very much except for day to. day dec,isions 
of the Bank. Furthermore, the present state of Caribbean unity suggests that 
one is unlikely to find such unanimity within the region as to secure the full 
60% vote. Thus the 60.40%.rui~,on the face of it, may not even secure the 
regional control of day to day operations."141 
The.dependency of the Bank on foreign sources and the nature of the 
voting mechanism make the Bank exceedingly vulnerable to outside influence. 
Moreover, one apparent cost of this dependency is the political and economic 
leverage of the non-regional members over the region. 
141 
Fitzgerald Francis, p. 98. 
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CHAPTER III 
CANADIAN AID TO THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 
Historical Contours of Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Economic Relations 
The Commonwealth Caribbean has been of great interest to Canada since 
the Eighteenth Century. To many this interest has resulted from a shared 
tradition in law, government and ties with the British Crown, as well as the 
economic attractiveness of the Caribbean. "Professor Duncan Fraser amplifies 
this contention when he states that "there exists between Canada and the West 
80 
Indies not only the community of economic interest arising out of traditional 
trading relations but beyond this there is a very real fact, "that as Commonwealth 
partners in the Americas, Canada and the West Indies share common political 
legal, and social traditions and attitudes. The traditions of the British 
Caribbean, like those of Canada are the traditions of British parliamentary 
and responsible government. This is a major and significant common interest, 
for there is in the Canadian-West Indian relationship a common set of political 
and social assumptions which should reveal Canadian-West Indians to one another 
142 
as something much more than mere partners". 
The impetus for closer association was the result of historic links 
between Eastern Canada and the West Indies which dates back to the days of 
the Eighteenth Century mercantile system, when Canadian lumber, flour and salted 
143 fish were exchanged for West Indian sugar, molasses and rum. A century 
later around the time of Confederation, the territories absorbed approximately 
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one third of Nova Scotia's exports of fish and forest products. During the 
same time, Canadian interest in the West Indies developed beyond the export 
of fish and lumber because of the "existence of an unlimited market for 
Canadian manufacturers and products in the West Indies and South America11 • 144 
Consequently, several attempts by private firms to establish a line of steamers 
for the Canada-West Indies run so as to absorb the large market for Canadian 
goods were made.· 
However, banks and insurance companies were more fortunate. They were 
busy exploring the prospects of locating branch operations in the West Indies. 
"Indeed, the Bank of Nova Scotia had branches in the West Indies long before 
81. 
it ventured into the Canadian West 11 • 145 By 1879, The Sun Life Insurance Company 
of Montreal had established a branch office in Barbados, the first outside 
146 Canada, Because of the success of these financial institutions.:intercest 
groups within Canada and the West Indies were pressing for closer political 
relationship. In Canada, the advocates for overseas expansion generated some 
degree of sympathy for their case. The movement was led primarily by the 
"Canada First Movement", a group which advocated Canadian nationalism within 
the Empire. Their main programme included a demand for "closer trade relations 
with the British West Indies Islands, with a view to a closer political 
connection" .147 Meanwhile, in the tlest. Indies the white planter class and 
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merchants because of their dissatisfaction with the constitutional arrangements 
dictated by the Colonial Office were perceiving union with Canada as a means 
of consolidating their status in the islands. 
"The brief flirtation that followed has every appearance of being for 
public display. The Jamaicans wanted to show the Colonial Office that they 
might well seek out other solutions than those so far perinitted to them". l 48 
Nothing c8itlle of the idea because Canada did not interpret the planters dis-
satisfaction with the British Crown as a clear expression from the islands. 
themselves of a desire for union. "Within eighteen months the unionism bubble 
b t " l49 urs . The mood for political union arose again in l908, when many of 
the islands gave special preferences to Canadian goods, and consequently to 
the signing of a Trade Agreement in l9l2. The Canada-West Indies trade 
agreement of that period, confirmed the arrangement of preferential tariffs 
between the two regions .. Many hoped that the unity which prompted the islands 
to agree to tariff arrangements would extend to political union. But this 
was not to be. 
While trade relationships gave rise to the idea of a political union, 
the racial implication· of the idea was always a factor in.the Canadian mind. 
82. 
As early as 1884, Prime Minister Sir John· A. McDonald, in a letter to Sir Francis 
Hincks, pointed out the obstacles of a federation with the region by stating 
that "the commercial union would be valuable, but I dread the political future 
. 150 
which a union opens to us .•• the negro question". In 1929, the idea of 
political union was again raised. William Keith Baldwin, a federal member of 
Parliament argued convincingly for Canada to lay claim to the West Indies by 
l49 
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pointing out that, "if Canada could annex the British West Indies it would be 
a good thing, not only for the British West Indies themselves but for this 
country as well .... sure, their skins are dark, but I am sure no one would 
compare them with the coloured population of the United States" .151 The idea 
once more proved abortive. Canadian businessmen on the other hand realizing 
the Commonwealth Caribbean economic potential continued to press for closer 
"association". They have been successful to the extent that the region today 
represents "a higher degree of penetration for Canadian exports than in any 
other market for Canada except that of the United States. In fact, the 
Caribbean is Canada's third largest area for private investment".1 52 
Giving evidence to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in 
1969, Ken Patrick of Montreal Marigot Investment who has substantial real 
estate holdings in the Eastern Caribbean,states, "that these areas represent 
a project of the right size for Canada"153 and.suggested an ambitious scheme 
whereby "Canada and the smaller West Indian Islands 1'0uld enter into an 
"association". If implemented they would b·ecome part of the Canadian currency 
area, trade barriers would be lowered or dropped altogether, and Canada would 
handle defence and foreign affairs for the Islands. The advantages of such an 
arrangement for Canada, he continued, would be phenomenal. We would be playing 
a positive role in economic development of an underdeveloped area .... Canada could 
retain a high portion of the millions of dollars now spent by Canadians seeking 
the sun in the Winter; the money would remain within the Canadian dollar area. 
Canadian investment in the territories; combined with technical know-how could 
151 
House of Commons Debate, Third Session-Sixteenth Parliament, March 7, 1929, p. 775. 
152 
Canada In The 
January 1972, 
153 
Caribbean; Old Partners In Trade, ··cana:a:;i:-Cofnmerce, Vol. 136; No.l 
p. 3: 
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Respecting 
No. 4, 1969, p.411. 
the 
Caribbean Area. Second Session, Twenty eight Parliament 
rapidly establish year round fruit and vegetable production, and a tropical 
terrain in which to train Canadian troops" .1 54 
Various proposals of this nature have been supported by the Canadian 
government. The Honourable John B. Aird argued Canada's position very lucidly 
before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Respecting the Caribbean, when he 
said "Britain's withdrawal and the apparent disinclination of the United States 
to increase its commitment in the area leaves a neat geographical sphere of 
influence where Canadian effect will not be overshadowed" .155 
Trade Patterns 
Before 1913, Canada had only 8 .6% of Commonwealth Caribbean market, while 
the U.S.A. had 37.2%. By 1925, Canada had increased her share to 17.8% of the 
market while the Americans had retained 31. 3%. Canada's success was due largely 
to the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement of 1925, whose provisions "included 
extension by both parties of a general tariff preference to each other's 
goods, as well as special preferences to important commodities. Canada agreed 
that the tariff on imported goods from the West Indies should not exceed 50% of 
the general tariff 11 • 156 In terms of specific pref8rences, West Indian demands 
and Canadian concessions reflected the nature of Caribbean economies. The 
existence of an agrarian mono-culture economy in the West Indies meant that the 
preferences on sugar, fixed at $1.00 (Canadian) per hundred pounds, would be 
most important for the region. In return the West Indies agreed that duties 
on Canadian goods would not exceed a certain percentage of the most favoured 
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nation rate. These percentages varied from 50% in Trinidad & Tobago, BarbaQos 
and Guyana.? ~o 66 2/3% in the Leeward and Windward Islands, and 75% in Jamaica. 
The 1925 Agreement also included a subsidized Canadian Steamship Service.1 57 
The 1925 Agreement was based on the premise that, the West Indies were 
and would remain exporters of tropical agricultural products with neither the 
capacity nor intention of moving into manufacturing. It has also been argued 
that the 1925 Agreement with its special preferences, "might be regarded as a 
further entrenchment of West Indian dependence as an emerging metropolis" •158 
Professor C. Y. Thomas of the University of the West Indies put the argument 
very succintly when he said that: 
"the 1925 Agreement fundamentally followed the pattern of all 
colonial trade agreements. Canada saw the West Indies as a region 
which was underdeveloped, poor and depending for its livelihood on 
the sale of tropical cash crops. Given Canada's relative industrial-
ization and wealth at the time, it followed logically that Canadian 
policy was to create arrangements whereby it could buy tropical cash 
crops and subsidize their production through a system of preferences" .159 
Between 1922 and 1928, Canada absorbed 18 to 19% of the West Indies 
total exports and in 1933-1935, Canada became the second most important 
recipient of West Indies products. Despite this increase in trade, the 
nature of trade did not change. Over the next twenty years, Canada continued 
to export flour, salt fish and meat products, while the West Indies exported 
raw sugar, rum and a few agricultural products. It was not until the early 
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1950' s that the traditional commodities traded, began undergoi.ng certain 
changes. The changes are reflected in the shift of Canadian interest from 
agricultural products to·bauxite, aluminia and petroleum products. These 
staples plus sugar and their products play a significant role in the economics 
of the region.160 Export to Canada play a more significant role to some 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries than to others. Thus, exports to Canada 
· 161 
· accounted for 4% of Trinidad's total exports trade between 1966-1968 
and 3.5% of Barbados total exports trade in 1970. Dependence on export to 
Canada is highest in the bauxite producing countries of Jamaica, and until 
recently of Guyana, because the industry is largely Canadian owned. Thus, 
exports to Canada amounted to 21% of Guyana's total in 1970 and 16% of 
Jamaica's total in 1969. Table 3.1 shows a complete breakdown of total 
exports by major areas and countries of destination, 1969 to 1970. 
Looking at the Canadian.trade performance to the Commonwealth Caribbean, 
according to Tables 3.2 and 3:.3, the value of Canadian exports has been 
rising, .while imports from the region have been declining. For example, to 
Jamaica, Canadian exports have been rising steadily, experiencing a growth 
.from $28.9 million in 1964 to $46.S million in 1970. On the other. hand 
Canadian imports decreased from $47 .9 million in 1964 to $27. O million in 
1970. The two tables also reveal that the trends in Canada's trade witlrcthe 
other territories are similar to Jamaica; continuous increase of exports and 
a relative decline in imports. 
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TABLE 3.1 ' 
' CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: MA.IN TRADING PARTNERS ' :
. · (PER CENT OF TOTAL TRADE) .. 
EXPORTS IMPORTS 
1969 1970 1969 1970 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
U.S.A. 47.4 46.3 14.6 16.1 
U.K. 9.8 9.6 13.9 13.2 
West Indies 8.7 10.1 5.9 2.3 
Sweden 5.6 6.4 
Venezula 36.0 24.5 
Saudia Arabia 4.5 9.3 
JAMAICA 
. 
u;s .A. 38.2 46 .. 8 41.8 43.3 
U.K. 19.4 17.6 20.9 19.1 
Canada 16.7 8.9 9.5 9.1 
CARIFTA 3.5 3.6 1.3 1.7 
E.E.C. 2.2. 1.5 7.8 8.2 
BARBADOS 1968 1969 1968 1969 
U.K. 39.9 47.3 28.0 28.7 
U.S.A. 17.7 26.4 21.3 22.5 
Canada 4.2 3.5 13.8 11.2 
CARIFTA 1.6 1.4 10.4 9.2 I 
1 
GUYANA 
U.K. 26 16 32 20 
U.S.A. 23 25 21 14 
i Canada 21 14 8 5 : 
ANTIGUA ST.KITTS GRENADA ST.VINCENT DOMINICA ST. LUCIA MONSTERRAT , IMPORTS 1965 1969 1968 1967 1963 1969 
U.K. 37 28 33 31 32 31 
Canada 11 15 10 12 15 12. 
U.S.A. 23 14 10 10 10 10 
West Indies 13 -19 19 21 18 21 
EXPORTS 
U.K. 38 82 64 62 86 86 
U.S.A. 3 4 l l 
Canada 8 10 5 9 2 2 
West Indies 21 5 5 25a 8 16b 
a.1964 b.1966 
-
Source: Quarterly Economic Review, The West Indies, Bahamas, Bermuda, 
British Honduras, Guyana, Annual Supplement, 1972. 
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TABLE 3.2 
CANADIAN EXPORTS TO THE COHl'!ONWEALTH CARIBBEAN, 1964-1970 
(MILLION DOLLARS CANADIAJ.~) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Jamaica 28.8 30.3 33.5 39.1 34.4 40.5 
Trinidad & Tobago 17.8 21.1 23.3 20.1 16.2 19.5 
Guyana 7.1 7.7 9.9 12.1 9.3 8.4 
Barbados 6.9 6.8 8.1 8.4 10.1 8.7 
Leeward & Windward 8.0 8.0 8.8 9.7 8.4 10.4 
Belize 1.0 1.1 .9 1.2 1.3 1. 7 
--· Total 69.6 75.0 84.5 90.6 79.7 99.2 
Source: CIDA Annual Review 1965-1968, 1968-1970 
88. 
1970 
46.5 
21.2 
12.2 
10.9 
14.0 
1. 7 
106.5 
TABLE 3 .3 
CAL'IADI.AN IMPORTS FRO}l .. '.J:HE. COM!'!ONWEALT!l CARIBBEAN, 1964-1970 
(MILLION DOLLARS CANADIAN) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Jamaica 47.9 36.0 37.3 31.9 33.9 45.9 27.0 
Trinidad & Tobago 20.7 16.7 16.0 18.7 19.9 17.7 7.5 
Guyana 35.7 22.5 29.1 30.0 29.4 31.0 28.7 
Barbados 3.9 3.0 2.3 3.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 
Leeward & Windward 1.0 .8 .9 1.4 1.3. 2.4 3.2 
Belize 1.9 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.4 2.5 3.0 
Total 111.1 80.2 87.1 87.0 88.4 101.0 71.0 
Source: CIDA Annual Review 1965-1968, 1968-1970. 
·current Relationship 
Duri.ng the fifties, when the desire for independence began to gain 
strength, the British Govermnent with the cooperation of some of the 
political leaders in the Commonwealth Caribbean began to encourage moves 
90. 
toward unity between various territories in the region. The case for a federal 
union rested in ~art on the assumption that a larger regional economic unit 
would facilitate industrialization and other forms.of economic development. 
Canada responded favourably to the idea of a federated West Indies for a 
variety of reasons, one of which was its preference to negotiate with a single 
unit rather than with thirteen individual territories. Consequently, during 
the period of .the_West Indies Federation, 1958 to 1962, the Canadian govermnent 
extended most of its aid to the FederatiOI\ rather than to the island. ·governments. 
Most of the aid was used for services that were regional in character. Of 
the $10 million five-year commitment of grants which Canada pledged to the 
Federation, $7 million was used to support an inter-island transportation 
system including the provision of two "Federal" ships. 
Not unexpectedly, the collapse of the West Indies Federation i!i·.1962 
caused considerable disappointment in Canada, which made "no overt move to 
intervene lest it be considered unwarranted interference. Another reason 
for the hands-off policy was that a Canadian proposal for retention of a 
162 
modified Federation wol4d -have brollffeiht a request for money". In the 
circumstances, Canada had to revert to the old practice of aiding the 
programmes of the individual islands. 
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Accordingly in April 1964, Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad 
and Tobago, took the initiative and proposed to Lester Pearson, the Prime 
Minister of Canada, the review of Canada-West Indies economic relationships. 
The proposal was called for a variety of reasons. One was the disappointing 
results of the 1925 Trade Agreement. Another was the Commonwealth Immigration 
Act which virtually brought to an end the entry of West Indians in Britain in 
search of work. A third reason was Britain's declared intentions to become 
a member of the European Economic Community. This placed in jeopardy the 
Commonwealth preferential system upon which the disposal of the primary 
products of the West Indies depended. Fourthly, this preferential system was 
further threatened with disruption by the American Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, which initiated the Kennedy Round negotiations. Since Canada had 
always been conditioned towards seeking an American solution first for its 
economic policy, its response to the Act contained implications for the West 
Indies which called for a serious reappraisal of trading relations • 
. The timing of the proposal could not be more opportune. It coincided 
with what has come to be knmm as the Pearsonian era of internationalism ... 
This was Canada's new thrust on the international scene in general and its 
concern for the underdeveloped countries in particular. Canada therefore 
responded positively to the idea and in 1966, a conference was held in Ottawa. 
The Commonwealth Caribbean-Canada Conference of 1966 
The agenda of the Conference included the review of the 1925 West Indies-
Canada Trade Agreement, and a discussion of economic aid, immigration, cultural 
relations, transportation and communication, private investments and tourism. 
In regard to trade, the 1925 Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement was amended 
92. 
by means of a new Protocol to the or_iginal Agreement. The effect of the 
new Protocol is to continue the 1925 Agreement with some changes. The most 
important of these are, first the fixing of margins of preference in absolute 
rather than percentage terms, in order to conform to the GATT rules and, second, 
Canada agreed to waive the direct-shipment provisions and to grant duty free 
entry for Commonwealth Caribbean raw sugar up to the amount imported over the 
last five years. While Canada made major adjustments which were welcomed by 
the Commonwealth leaders, the conference marked Ottawa's reawakening to the 
Caribbean as a potential sphere of interest. 
It soon became evident that the Ottawa Conference was working within 
.·certain limitations. The new sugar deal helped West Indies sugar cane in 
competition with Canadian beet but did not increase the price to that paid 
by the United States or by the United Kingdom. Refined sugar was not 
included. The British and American markets were larger and more important. 
In 1968, Hugh Shearer, Prime Minister of Jamaica, annoyed by the situation, 
said, that his country looked to Canada for "more action and less vague 
platitudes 11 , 163 and sought a better sugar price. One critic, Professor Rudolph 
W. Grant of York University commenting on the 1966 conference, stated that 
"the proposals intended to extend Canadian West Indies cooperation, in fact 
further entrenched West Indian dependency, and in theory, at least, preserved 
the metropolitan satellite relationship". He goes on, "the Trade Agreement 
was not substantially revised it continued in force pending certain 
developments connected with GATT and the Kennedy Round. Nor were any funda-
mental ~uestions raised about the nature of Canadian investment, save that 
163 
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West Indian leaders were profuse in their gratitude about its existence and 
t . 11164 con inuance. 
The failure to arrive at more concrete decisions, pertinent to Caribbean 
development meant that the 1966 Ottawa Conference produced little real progress 
in Canada-West Indies relations. Indeed, these relations suffered a-setback 
when Canada unilaterally altered the sugar rebate payments. Canada proposed 
the establishment of a special $5 million Agricultural Development Fund for 
the Commonwealth Caribbean countries that are recipients of Canadian bilateral 
aid. The unilateral Canadian decision to replace the rebate system caused 
strained relations with the Caribbean countries. According to Dr. George 
Eaton, "at the moment there is strange resentment and hostility to Canada 
as a power than _against any other that I know of in recent years. Much of 
the resentment stemmed from the fact that, the Canadian government had acted 
without full consultation with the Caribbean heads of governments. A further 
likely consideration was the fact that whereas the refund of import duties 
was being paid directly to the governments of the sugar producing territories 
the agricultural development fund would be under regional rather than national 
control" .165 
At the Sixth Conference of Caribbean Heads of Government in Jamaica, a 
resolution which was--passed· 'deprecating Canada I s unilateral termination of the 
1966 Ottawa Agreement, emphasized that they did not consider the pr_oposed 
agricultural development fund an adequate substitute for rebates accruing 
to the benefit of the sugar industry. There was a consensus that a strong 
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protest be levied against Canada, and that a survey be made of Canadian 
exports to the area with a view to assessing the impact which could be 
made on the Canadian ~conomy by retaliatory measures. According to 
Professor Rudolph Grant, "the unilateral Canadian decision to replace the 
rebate system, destroyed two major points of agreement at the Ottawa 
conference. First "the sugar rebate issue and second, the need for 
continuing consultation".166 
Inrm.igration 
Canada's aid to the Caribbean can also be seen in the form of its 
being an outlet for West Indians. The assistance which has been offered 
to the West Indies as compared to some other countries is however limited. 
Racial consideration was always a factor from the outset. "As a matter 
of policy the Canadian government, with apparently the almost complete 
support of the Canadian people, bars or severely limits the immigration 
of Asiatics and other coloured people, not on the basis of individual merits, 
but wholly on the basis of race" .167 
Under the provision of the Immigration Act of 1953 to 1962, the 
· Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was given the power to limit or 
prohibit the entry of immigrants for the following reasons, "nationality, 
citizenship, ethnic group, occupation, class or geographical area of 
origin" •168 In 1956, these categories were enumerated and described in 
Order-in-Council as Section 20 of the Inrm.igration Act .. Among the important 
regulations contained in this Section, one provided.for the entrance.of the 
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following immigrants, "a person who· is a· .British subject by birth or 
by naturalization in the United Kingdom, Austrailia, New Zealand, or 
the Union of South Africa, a citizen of Ireland, a citizen of France ... 
95. 
or a citizen of the United States of America ... or a person who is the son, 
daughter, husband, wife or aged parents of a Canadian citizen" _i69 
According to one critic, "it is evident that these regulations were 
intended to emphasize the fact that Canada wished to attract white immigrants, 
particularly from "white" Commonwealth countries, the United States and 
Europe ... The basic prejudice against coloured immigrants underlying these 
regulations clearly reflected the strong prejudice against wide spread 
coloured immigrants which was and is still.prevalent through Canada 11 • 170 
However, in 1962, "the controversial Section 20 of the regulation, placing 
restriction on the unsponsored admission of non-whites, was superseded by 
an adequate education and skills regulation".l7l 
According to the new regulation, skill was indicated as being the 
prime criterion for admission, and persons from the Caribbean area were 
indicated as being in the widest sponsorship category in terms of degree 
relationship of sponsored relations. However, the skill criterion has 
served to provide Canadian officials with a rationale for largely ignoring 
the real immigration problems and issues when considering assistance and 
aid. The relatively low rates of immigrants from the region before 1962, 
was specifically because, Canadian immigration regulations before that 
date, "were designed for the purpose of attracting European immigrants. 
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Liberal regulations and special incentives aided the flow of European 
immigrants into the country. On the other hand, the only West Indians 
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allowed to enter were those who were sponsored by close relatives. E.xceptions I 
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to this rule required special governments Orders-in-Council. Thus, the 
rule was relaxed to permit the entry of female domestic workers from the 
West Indies" .172 
Beginning with one hundred in 1955, the annual figure had risen to 
280 in 1962. In 1966, Canada agreed to a one hundred per cent increase 
under the domestic scheme, and as a result reached a record high of 
1,197 in 1969 (see Table 3.4 for more details). Ironically, "a considerable 
portion of persons coming to Canada as domestic servants are, in fact civil 
servants and secretaries who could not meet Canada's very stringent immigration 
requirements concerning skill" .173 However, since 1962, West Indians have 
been officially admitted to Canada on the same conditions as Europeans. 
This was fortuitious as the passage of the British regulation drastically 
reduced this outlet. It was in fact hoped by many in the region that 
Canada would replace Britain as the major outlet for the migratory West 
Indian, but Canada showed little interest. Hence the low level of immigrants 
from the region continued its normal trend until 1967. (See Table 3.5 for 
more details). 
In 1966, as the result of the Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Conference 
in Ottawa, the Canadian government announced that "Canada was prepared to 
keep its door open to qualified immigrants from the Commonwealth Caribbean 
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TABLE 3 .4 
Number of Domestic Servants Entering Canada 
From The Commonwealth Caribbean 1964-1971 
YEAR NO. 
1964 347 
1965 412 
1966 475 
1967 1,044 
1968 689 
1969 1,197 
1970 847 
1971 715 
Total 5,726 
Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 
Immigration Statistic 1971. 
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TABLE 3.5 
UJ}!IGRANTS TO CANADA FROM THE COMMON\.JEALTH 
CARIBBEAN,1946 - 1971 
YEAR NO. 
1946 420 
1947 404 
1948 391 
1949 384 
1950 399 
1951 66 
1952 717 
1953 916 
1954 849 
1955 793 
1956 1,058 
1957 1,162 
1958 1,192 
1959 1,196 
1960 1,168 
1961 1,126 
1962 1,480 
1963 2,227 
1964 2,199 
1965 3,655 
1966 3;935 
1967 8,403 
1968 7,563 
1969 13,093 
1970 12,456 
1971 10,843 
Total 79,755 
Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 
Immigration Statistics. 
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on a completely non-discriminatory basis".l74 In Europe meanwhile, a 
lessening desire on the .. ·part of Europeans to migrate to Canada ·because 
of favourable conditions at home, reduced the number of immigrants in l968 
to l83,974 in l969 to l6l,53l, and in l970 to l47,7l3.l75 West Indian 
migration has benefited from the decline of European immigrants and recorded 
its highest figure of l31 093 in l969. The region however, still lags 
behind European countries which are the major source·bf immigrants to Canada. 
The explanation for such relatively low numbers of West Indian immigrants, 
according to Canadian officials is that, "Canada can best absorb only skilled 
immigrants and the West Indies are not in ·the position to supply Canada 
with large numbers of such persons. Second, it was pointed out that it would 
be wrong for Canada to rob the area of its skilled workers, as it would be 
l76 detrimental to the developmental process". 
Regarding the first argument, the immigration regulations emphasizing 
skill seem clear-cut on the surface. However, in practice they are ambiguous 
in the sense that a great deal of discretionary power rests with the selection 
teams. The Immigration Department stipulates that an applicant must possess 
a professional qualification or skill, he must have a good basic education 
and command, to a high degree, the personal qualities necessary for successful 
migration. In the final analysis, therefore, admissibility depends on the 
judgment of the trained selection officer as related to their understanding 
of Canadian conditions.l77 
l74 
Ibid, p.l43. 
l75 
1Immigration and Citizenship, Canada Year Book l972, Statistics Canada, 
Ottawa, l972, p.224. 
l76 
Kari Levitt and McIntyre, p. 95. 
l77 
Ibid, p.95. 
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Let us now examine the charge that the selection procedures discriminate 
against West Indian immigrants. The skill distribution of immigrants from 
ten European countries was selected and compared with that of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean immigrants. Table 3.6 summarizes the findings. Briefly, according 
.to the table, the Caribbean contributed more professional workers than any 
other country, except England. In the other sectors, the region's contri-
• bution was exceptionally higher than most of the other countries, and in some 
cases either contributed the highest or the second highest. As in the case 
of unskilled workers, in spite of all statements about present regulations, 
unskilled labourers from Greece and Italy, far exceeded the Caribbean, even 
though the total number of immigrants from the Caribbean was greater than both 
countries. According to Levitt and McIntyre, "in fact, it seems that procedures 
followed in Canadian Immigration practices result in the selection of the 
West Indian immigrants who are, as a group, more highly qualified than other 
immigrants. This distorted distribution of West Indian immigrants, in 
terms of skills, is we suggest, a direct result of Canadian i.mmigration 
procedures as practiced to date. It is thus, of rather dubious validity 
for Canadian authorities to argue against freer West Indian immigration on 
the grounds that such immigration would rob the region of its skills" .178 
The two authors pointed out that, Canada can undoubtedly assist the 
Caribbean by eliminating all remaining administrative procedures which are 
discriminatory and by admitting more unsk:tlle.d labour ;Erom the. area. Canada 
should propose some suitable international agency to explore the feasibility 
of a general agreement to halt, or severely limit, market competition in 
i78 
Ibid, p.101. 
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Managerial 9 
Professionals 46 
Clerical 17 
Transportation 
Trades 2 
Communication 
Trades 
Commercial 
Sales Workers 12 
Financial 
Sales Workers 1 
Service and 
Recreation 39 
Farmers 1 
Loggers 1 
Fishers, 
Hunters, 
Trappers, 
Construction 
Trades 17 
Manufact.uring 
and Mechanical 73 
Labourers 7 
Mines 1 
Total Workers 236 
Non Workers 
Wives 56 
Children 73 
Others 42 
Total Non-
Workers 17,1 
TABLE 3,6 
IMMIGRATION TO CANADA BY COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN AND INTENDED OCCUPATION 1971 
"' H 
"' I "' ~ I 0 ;'., f:l H ~ al ffi H 
396 96 63 29 47 , 
2,506 608 275 180 191 
1,647 191 149 127 91 
98 3 12 72 27 
31 6 3 1 
280 46 41 41 29 
71 9 7 1 2 
768 285 168 548 230 
106 33 38 15 53 
3 4 2 
1 1 2 1 
528 206 80 279 429 
1,429 235 331 826 889 
50 13 11 471 221 
70 6 15 6 13 
8,101 1,751 1,207 2,955 2,467 
2,408 486 374 835 1,451 
4,056 615 477 637 1,084 
886 114 217 342 788 
7,350 1,215 1,068 1,814 3,323 
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.·37 2- 40 28 
224 92 39 177 
227 32 94 154 
6 7 51 ·2 
1 1 1 
18 13 57 15 
2 2 2 
43 92 330 226 
15 25 599 49 
1 4 5 
5 
36 34 798 33 
65 182 l,ll4 ll9 
3 25 59 6 
3 3 5 
580 531 3,270 818 
88 239 2,175 90 
136 250 3,283 105 
26 112 429 ll 
250 601 5,887 206 
Total 
Immigration 407 15,451 2,966 2,275 4,769 5,790 830 1,132 9,157 1024 
Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration 
Statistics, 1971, 
&l 
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8 
0) 
f,1 
193 
'785 
1,720 
48 
22 
262 
55 
1,087 
41-
345 
1,655 
75 
2 
6,572 
910 
2,598 
763 
4,271 
10,843 
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attracting professional skills from lower income countries. This might 
prove the only alternative to less des.irable measures likely to be proposed 
soon if the "brain drain" continues_ l 79 
Professor Duncan Fraser, expressed a similar view when he pointed 
out that, if Canada is seriously interested in assisting the Commonwealth 
Caribbean, if Canadians are sincere in their protestations of a partnership, 
then the doors must be opened wide and West Indians.of all categories must 
be permitted to enter Canada as settlers. "If Canada does not do this, then 
the claim of Canada as an interested and concerned party in the West Indies 
d 1 t . 1 · t. d t b k · 1 180 eve opmen is unrea is ic an canno eta en serious y. 
A further point worth mentioning is that, following the 1966 Ottawa 
Conference, "the experimental movement of seasonal farm labour to Canada ..• 
was reviewed and Canada indicated that if the experiment proved successful 
and there was a continued demand for outside labour in the future years, 
consideration would be given to broadening the programme.181 Consequently, 
in 1967, 1,077 such workers came forward and in 1968 1,258. However, since 
this form of migration is purely a temporary work-seeking nature, it has 
made little contribution to solving the unemployment problem in the territories. 
Capital Assistance 
Capital assistance supports the creation, expansion and modernization 
of infrastructure, such as roads, ports, power facilities, communication 
facilities, schools and water systems. Most capital assistance is provided 
for specific projects. The borrower may be the government of the aided 
country, or an institution such as a university. Up to 1969, Canada stipulated 
179 
Ibid, p. 101. 
180 
Duncan Fraser, p. 19. 
181 
Levitt and McIntyre, p. 143. 
103. 
that Bo%. of that allocation must be Canadian content. Since then, it has 
been lowered to 66 2/3%. 
Table 3-7 gives a complete breakdown of bilateral allocations from 
the Canadian government to the Commonwealth Caribbean in the period 1958-
1972. The table reveals that the external aid authorized by the Canadian 
government amounted to $153.490 million. Of the total ·contribution more 
than -50% was channelled in the form of loans to three of the four 
independent terri torie·s, (Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad & Tobago) while in 
the Leeward and Windward Islands and Barbados, grants portion far exceeded 
the loan portion. The tables also indicates a steady rise in Canadian aid 
to the region. The largest disbursement took place during the period 1970, 
1971 and 1972, when $24 million was contributed. With acg_uired experience 
·of. the area as a sphere of influence, the emphasis of Canadian aid has 
···1 
shifted from "Federal ships" and miscellaneous projects, to enduring 
institutions and projects, including the Development Bank, education 
curricula in such development related subjects as tourist industry, public 
administration and teachers training and exchange programmes to sustain 
these institutions. 
The sectoral allocation of Canadian aid since 1958 shows that most 
-
of them have been concentrated in three sectors, transportation, education 
and water. Next in importance is assistance to natural resources development 
and agriculture. Finally, but to a lesser extent, assistance to the social 
sectors such as, housing, hospital and other miscellaneous projects. The 
allocation of aid to infrastructure sectors has been as follows; from 1958-
1970, the allocation of aid to water system accounted for $15,669.798 million 
TAllLE 3.7 
CANADIAN BILATERAL AID TO THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 1958-1972 
. 
1958 1961 
to to 
1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
WEST INDIES 
Federation 257 .1 7,092 • .l 
Grants 257.1 7,092.7 
Loans 
JANAICA 4.0 2,982.9 3,375.0 3,500.0 4,000.0 5,350 .o 5,250.0 
Grants 4.0 607.9 500.0 500.0 1,000.0 1,850.0 1,750.0 
Loans 2,375.0 2,875.0 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,500.0 3,500.0 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 3,585.4 2,890.0 3,600.0 4,000.0 5,250.0 5,250 .o 
Grants 585.4 500.0 600.0 1,000.0 1,750.0 1,750.0 
Loans 3,000.0 2,390.0 3,000.0 3,000.0 3,500.0 3,500.0 
!,UYANA 1,126.9 1,000.0 2,205 .o 3,200 .o 4,500.0 4,500.0 
Grants 1,126.9 1,000.0 2,205.0 1,200.0 2,000.0 2,000.0 
Loans 1,000.0 2,000.0 2,500.0 2,500.0 
BRITISH hONUURAS. 
BARBADOS, :. n 
LITTLE SEVEN 3,131.0 2,500.0 3,880.0 5,050.0 6,010.0 8,000.0 
Grants 3,131.0 2,500.0 3,630.0 5,050.0 6,010.0 7,000.0 
Loans 250.0 1,000.0 
UNIVERSITY OF 
THE WEST INDIES 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 
Grants 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 1,000.0 
Total Allocations 261.1 17,918.9 9,765.0 14,185.0 17,250.0 22,110.0 
. 24,000.0 
1 and 2 material was not available detailing the breakdo'Wll in terms of grants and loans 
Sourc~: Foreign Policy Review,Canadian Policies in the Field of Inter~ational Developnent 1969 
CIDA·Annual Review 1970-1971 
.. , 
- • - • 
I I I .. II • 
19711 
24,000.0 
19722 
7,349.8 
7.349.8 
24,461.9 
6,211.9 
18,250.0 
24,575.4 
6,185.4 
18,390.0 
16,531.9 
8,531.9 
8,000.0 
28,571.0 
27,321.0 
1,250.0 
4,000.0 
.. 4,000,0 
24,aaa.a 153,49.Q.O 
a : rs n 
of the total sectoral credits authorized. In 1969 and 1970, that sector 
experienced its highest total which amounted to $11 million. The trans-
portation sector has been the most privileged sector in the allocation of 
Canadian aid during that same period, maintaining its considerable 
importance with over $22.5 million in the period 1958-1970, and showing 
no fluctuation. Education, because of the crucial importance of that 
sector for development has been promising. Of the total funds authorized 
in the period 1958-1970, that sector's allocation was over $11.5 million. 
In 1969, and 1970, that sector experienced its highest total when over 
$6 million was allocated. 
As for the main trend of assistance to natural resources development, 
there was an upturn in the contribution to that sector which accounted 
105. 
for a mere $340 thousand between 1964-1965 and 1968-1969, but in 1969-1970 
total assistance increased to $5,998. million. The agricultural sector 
has not been getting specific attention. During the period 1958-1970 
a total of only $3.5 million has been contributed. With the establisbment 
of the Caribbean Development Bank in 1969, Canada pledged $2.5 million for 
an Agricultural Development Fund. Most important in the miscellaneous 
sector are government departments (fire fighting, public works, radio) 
and hospitals followed by housing and fishing industry. The funds assigned 
to government departments $1.488·.millio, the hospital sector $1.186 million 
and finally that of fishing industry $528 thousand. For more information 
see Table 3.8 which gives the breakdown of bilateral disbursement 1958-
1970 by field of economic activity. For further information see Appendix 
2 which further breaks down the economic activity in terms of country and 
.. 
Transportation 
F.ducation 
Water Sector 
Energy Sector 
Natural Resources 
Agriculture 
Miscellaneous 
Transportation 
Education 
Water Sector 
Agriculture 
Energy Sector 
Natural Resources 
Miscellaneous 
II • • I • llt 
TABLE 3.8 
CANADIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: BREAKDOWN OF BILATERAL DISBURSEMENT 
BY FIELO OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1958-1970 
(JAMAICA, GUYANA AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO) 
West Indies Federation Post- ederation Period 
1958-1959 to 1961-1962 1962-1963 to 1963-1964 1964-1965 to 1968-1969 1969 to 1970 
7,158,500.76 100,000.00 2,939,357.35 5,065,000.00 
725,925.60 1,339,740.03 211,080.57 3,920,000.00 
417,384.93 150,414.04 6,470,000.00 
650,000.00 1,266,000.00 
340,000.00 5,998,000.00 
900,000.00 1,710,000.00 
44,717.34 92,830.70 277,203.14 4,974,000.00 
. LEEWARD; WINDWARD . ISLANDS j · BARBADOS AND . BRITISH · HONDURAS 
1965-1966 to 1966-1967 ' ' ·, ' 1967-1968 to 1968-1969 to 1969-1970 
1,034,852.00 5,917,000.00 
2,720,148.26 2,800,000.00 
1,050,000.00 7,582,000.00 
250,000.00 728,980.33 
322,997.15 610,000.00 
TOTAL 
15,262,858.11 
6,196,750.20 
7,037,698.97 
1,916,000.00 
6,338,000.00 
.2,610,000.00 
5,388,751.11 
TOTAL 
6,951,852.00 
5,520,048.26 
8,632,000.00 
978,980.33 
942,997.15 
Source: Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Respecting the Caribbean Area, No.l, 1969, and· 
No.5 1969, - Canadian International Development Agency: Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance 
~ogram, 1969-1970. 
.... 
0 
0\ 
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projects for the same period. 
It is interesting to examine the allocation of resources by country. 
Table 3.7 shows the total value of aid authorized by country, in absolute 
and relative terms between 1958-1970. Thus, the Leeward and Windward 
Islands, Barbados and British Honduras, with the lowest per capita income 
received by far the largest proportion of aid allocated which amounted to 
over $28.5 million. Of that total, over 95% was in the form of grants 
and the remaining 5% in the form of loan. Trinidad and Jamaica with 
the highest per capita income received $24.49 and $24.35 million respectively. 
Of that total, the loans portion was 75% and the remainder 25% was in the 
form of grants. Finally, Guyana received $16.5 million and the distribution 
between grants and loans was e~ual. On a-per capita basis, the Leeward 
and Windward Islands, Barbados and British Honduras, received $7.33 in 
the fiscal year of 1969/70, one of the highest rates provided any recipient 
country in the world. This distribution pattern also refers to the wider 
Caribbean (see Table 3.9 for more details). 
Technical Assistance 
The provision here is for teachers, advisors and experts to serve 
in many capacities in various educational and governmental projects. It 
also provides for the granting of scholarships to West Indians for graduate 
studies in many fields in Canada. The aim of the exchange is to provide 
the know-how for more effective resource development,modernization of all 
sectors of the economy, and training in managerial and professional skills. 
Deeply involved in such projects are organizations such as Canadian 
University Service Overseas (CUSO) and Canadian Executive Service Overseas 
(CESO). Both these organizations specialize in the placement in underdeveloped 
TABLE 3.9 
COMPARISON OF PER CAPITA RECEIPTS OF CANADIAt'l BILATERAL 
AID TO THE COMMON1•iEALTH CARIBBEAl'l: 1969/1970 
Population in G.N.P. Per Capita Per 
Thousand ($ U.S.) 
Jamaica 
- 1,839 460 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 995 630 
Guyana 662 300 
Leeward & 
Windward Islands, 
Barbados·& 
British Honduras 834 275 
Source: CIDA Annual Review 1970 - 1971. 
.Foreign Policy Review, Canadian Policies in 
the Field of International Development Assistance, 
1969. 
108 
Capita Receipts 
($U.S.) 
1.35 
i 
1.00 
3.00 
7.33 
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countries of ~ualified personnel in an advisory,administrative and educational 
capacity for l:im.ited periods of t:im.e, the object being to set up, modify, 
update and train people to run necessary institutions. In short, to guide 
the "developmental" process from within. 
Technical assistance accounted for approximately 2% of total Canadian 
bilateral aid committed in fiscal year 1958-59 to 1961/62. However, the 
introduction of an expanded aid programme in the 1964-1965 fiscal year made 
possible a substantially increased technical assistance programme for the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. During that same period to 1968-1969, a total of 
$4.35 million was allocated to Jamaica, and for the fiscal year 1969-1970, 
a total of $1.05 million. Disbursement for Trinidad for the same period 
was $4.35 million, and for the fiscal year 1969-1970, $855,000 thousand. 
In the Leeward and Windward Islands and Barbados, "technical assistance 
has been an expanding component of the Canadian aid programmes. In 1966-
1967 fiscal year, total disbursement for technical assistance amounted to 
$1.2 million, compared to a total for the previous three years of $1.5 
million. In 1967 .. 1968 a total of $1.4 million was disbursed for technical 
assistance, a level maintained in 1968-1969.182 In 1969-1970, a total 
of $1.6 million was disbursed. 
In addition to funds, the many programmes of Canadian International 
Development .Agency (CIDA) have brought a flood of Canadian "experts" into 
advisory and administrative positions in agricultural programmes, community 
development, development projects of all kinds and finally, in the military 
and police training. The result has been a strong Canadian penetration 
in the political, social and economic life of the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
182 
Ibid, p.1-32. 
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In 1971, the number of personnel exchanged under the Co=onwealth 
Caribbean Technical Assistance Programme, amounted to twenty-nine Canadian 
advisers and one hundred educators to the territories, three hundred and 
fifty nine students and trainees in Canada. For breakdown of personnel 
exchanged for the fiscal year 1970 and 1971, see Table 3.10. Finally, 
despite these attractive figures in capital and technical assistance, the 
use of most of the aid received by the Commonwealth Caribbean is currently 
restricted to payment for imports from Canada. Thus Canada has used 
aid-tying as an instrument of expanding its export trade. This policy tends 
to reduce the real value of a fixed amount of aid because project costs 
are usually greater than they would be in free competition. According to 
the Canadian rule, purchases of specific materials must come from the donor 
country, even if sources elsewhere are cheaper. 
The Consequences of Aid-Tying 
The Pearson Report, published in 1969, argued that, "of' all of the 
limitations on the flexibility of aid, the tying of aid to purchases in 
the aid-giving country is the most serious. Such tying has spread in a 
contagious fashion ..•.. and untied.aid is now-the_exception rather than 
the rule. The stringency of tying has been greatly increased by the narrow 
limits of the goods or projects on which aid must be spent. These have 
often been specifically designed to ensure that goods bought with aid are 
"additional" to normal imports from the donor. Aid-tying imposes many 
different costs on aid-receiving countries. It requires them to purchase 
goods from donors at prices often substantially above those in competitive 
world markets" .183 
183 
Pearson Report, p. 172. 
TABLE 3.10 
CANADIAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
JANUARY 1970 TO JANUARY 1971 
Advisors:- - Educators-
1970 1971 1970 1971 
·Antigua 6 4 
·Bahamas 
·. Barbados 3 2 2 2 
Belize 3 1 
-',·Bermuda. 
---British Virg±n Islands 
~ ·Dominica 1 2 2 
- '"Grenada 1 1 4 5 
Guyana 4 5 6 5 
Jamaica 10 15 25 33 
Monsterrat 2 2 
St. Kitts 3 4 
St. Lucia 1 5 9 
St. Vincent 5 7 
Trinidad & Tobago 3 2 17 10 
University of the 13 17 West Indies 
Others 
Total 24 28 90 100 
Source: CIDA Annual Review 1970 - 1971 
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Students 
& 
Trainees 
1970 1971 
17 23 
30 31 
29 25 
11 12 
16 19 
51 62 
48 55 
7 9 
8 9 
10 16 
30. 22 
33 48 
25 28 
315 359 
I 
f 
The growth of tying aid is often closely linked to the use of aid 
for the purpose of export promotion in increasingly competitive markets, 
or for preserving export market from erosion because of tying by others. 
But the principal objective for certain donors has been to protect their 
112. 
balance of payments. The general existence of tied aid procedures causes 
significant difficulties for recipient countries and constitutes a sizable 
reduction in the aid component of external financing received by the Common-
wealth Caribbean countries. Aid which is tied im~9ses extra cost to the 
recipient, often prevents him from procuring the exact resources that he 
needs and can even divert his economy from the most promising lines of 
economic development. 
The most compelling circumstances in the increasing trend toward 
countries tying of aid is the balance-of-payment problem of the U.S, the 
largest donor, which has led to the application of this practice in its 
development assistance since 1959. Other principal donors have shown no 
disposition to move toward an untying of aid so long as there is little 
chance that aid funds made available bilaterally by the U.S. will be spent 
outside of this country. In this they assert they are protecting their 
balance of payment, helping export industries and finally contributing to 
domestic employment. According to the Honourable J.M. Macdonnell in 1961, 
"Canada's aid is not represented by barrels of dollars shipped abroad, but· 
by Canadian goods and services".184 The Canadian Secretary of State for 
External Affairs on November 14th, 1963, explained it more clearly by saying, 
"our aid programmes are catered to provide a stimulus to the domestic economy 
184 
House of Commons Debate, September 11, 1961, p.8187. 
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and contribute to a betterment of employment conditions, since the main 
part of our funds is spent in Canada to purchase Canadian goods and 
services" .185 
The conditions governing Canadian aid to the Commonwealth Caribbean 
is provided for the purchase of materials, goods, equipment, machinery 
and the services of consulting firms for projects having a Canadian content 
of 66 2/3% and require the costs of the project to be met by the region. 
As the result of the specified Canadian content, a large number of Canadian 
suppliers and engineering firms participate in these projects, thereby 
eliminating local participation on a more wider scale. According to the 
Report of the Senate Committee, "undoubtedly the tying of Canadian aid 
has substantially reduced the effective impact of the resources involved. 
It requires increased delays and administrative expenditure at both donor 
and recipient ends; results in a distortion of development priorities in 
project-design and selection and sometimes involves the purchasing of 
I . II 186 inferior and or over-priced goods and services 
Another controversial condition by donor countries is the stipulation 
that "aid be used to finance only the foreign-exchange cost of development 
projects, with all local costs being the responsibility of the recipient 
government. This often had the effect of putting worthwhile projects 
beyond the means of recipient countries 11 •187 As the result of this 
stipulation, Caribbean leaders sought changes in this aspect of the aid. 
185 
House of Commons Debate, November 14, 1963, p. 4718. 
186 
Report of the Senate··.Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1969, p.29. 
187 
Ibid, p.29. 
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Canada responsed by allowing up to.25% o:f Canadian contribution to a 
development project to :finance local costs, and under special circumstances 
:for such items as local labour and materials .. 
Despite this concession "the local cost requirements imposes a severe 
limitation on the capacity o:f several o:f the Commonwealth Caribbean 
governments to absorb and e:f:fectively utilize development assistance. One 
reason is that the ·requirement :fails to account :for "indirect :foreign 
exchange costs," ( that is, the cost o:f imported materials which are used 
in the provision o:f support services, e.g. gasoline, vehicles and spare 
parts, lumber and building tools, etc.) These added costs can be substantial 
:for countries with narrow industrial and resource bases. The other main 
problem results :from the inclusion o:f the shipping costs o:f aid materials 
as a local cost •. Since much o:f the material received by these countries 
is bulky, the shipping expense alone can sometimes take up a larger part 
o:f .the 25% margin" .188 
To illustrate the characteristics and relative magnitude o:f tied 
aid and :financing :for economic development, I will briefly outline eight 
case studies. Each case corresponds to loans granted by the Canadian 
government through Canadian International Development Agency. The purpose 
o:f this brie:f outline is to identify, and specify the amount o:f each loan, 
and the e:f:fect o:f conditioning such loan upon certain special goods and 
services o:f aid-tying. 
··1. In 1970, a $8,000.00 loan to the Jamaica Telephone Company 
Limited in Kingston, by the Federal Export Development Corporation. 
188 
Ibid, p. 29-30. 
The loan covered the cost of purchasing switching eg_uiprnent 
and related services from Canada. Northern Electric Company 
Limited of Montreal supplied the eg_uiprnent and services including 
training and personnel. Repayment of the loan is to be made over 
10 years after two year's grace. 
2. In 1969, a $300,000 loan to Jamaica, to finance the purchase of 
Canadian materials to be incorporated in the construction of six 
bri.dges. The loan. was :provided to the Jamaican government for a 
50 year term with no interest charge and an initial lO year 
period of grace on principal repayment. 
ll5. 
3. In 1968, a $2,500.000 loan to Trinidad and Tobago for the purchase 
of Canadian materials which included the hiring of consultants 
for the programme of rural electrification. A second loan of 
$500,000 interest free to the same government, to acg_uire 
3,000 head of Holstein Freiesian dairy cattle for its dairy 
industry development. 
In 1970, another loan of $345,000 to Trinidad and Tobago, to 
pay for the services of M.M. Dillion Ltd of London, Ontario 
for surveying the country's natural resources. 
4. In 1970, ·a $3.l million loan to Guyana to finance Canadian air 
surveyors for the intensive mapping of the country's unexplored 
interior region. 
In 1970, a $2.4 million to Guyana's government for the purchase 
of two new De Havill and Caribou aircrafts, spares and ground 
handling eg_uipment. 
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5. In 1969, a $2.8 million grant to the following Islands 
(Barbados-3, Grenada-3, St. Lucia-3, Dominica-3, St. Vincent-3, 
Antigua-2, St. Kitts-2, Monsterrat-1) to purchase Canadian 
equipment and services in the construction of twenty prefab 
primary schools. 
6. In 1969, a $1.8 million grant to Monsterrat for distribution 
systems. Canada will provide materials and installation of the 
systems. The programme was prepared by Keith Consultants of 
R.egina. 
7. In 1969, a grant of $2.3 million to St. Lucia to purchase Canadian 
equipment, advisers, services and construction company (Seroc Ltee 
of Sherbrooke) for the expansion of Beane Field airport. The 
des.ign was undertaken by the Department of Transport. 
8. In 1969, a grant of $1.4 ~illion to Antigua was awarded to 
Dunanceau Stee of Montreal for the expansion of Collidge Field 
runway airport. Design for the extension was undertaken by the 
Department of Transport. 
The story of Canadian assistance to the Commonwealth Caribbean is an 
endless one. All "aid" so far has made provisions for Canadian content. 
However, this provision is not peculiar to Canadian aid alone. The United 
States aid programmes, which typically are extended in the form of credits 
for imports from the United States (90% of U.S. aid are tied) transported 
in U.S. ships, are geared to the promotion of American exports of multinational 
corporations in particular. The question to pose is whether Canadian 
disbursements are primarily intended to "aid" the recipient or to "facilitate" 
117. 
the financing of Canadian exports (Subsidy for businessmen) to the region? 
An article compiled by the Fraser Group of the University of British 
Columbia states that: 
"the general requirements to buy in Canada subject to Canadian content 
provisions,reduced the real value of the aid to recipients in two ways 
relative to what its value would be if it were untied. First, to the 
extent that Canadian prices are higher than world prices, Canadian aid 
colllillands smaller volumes of goods and services than it it were untied. 
Secondly, the dual constraint imposed on aid recipients reduces their 
range of choice in allocating aid funds. Moreover there is a substitution 
effect arising from differences in relative prices domestically, in 
Canada, and internationally. The limitation on choice together with 
this substitution effect may distort demand away from the pattern of 
aid purchases, that would be preferable if allocations were governed 
solely by development criterion. In essence, we determine what form 
development in the Third World should take.' Willy-nilly, aware or 
unaware (our government) serves as the advance guard for voracious 
private pillaging of the Third World. We are thus revealed the 
noveau nee-colonialists of the Western World 
of our illustrious teachers, France, Britain 
following in the footsteps 
and the United States".189 
Canadian aid progralllilles raise certain questions which worry West Indian 
leaders. Apa.rt from aFgU:ing .that tied· aid~leads to inflexibilcity~ --'inefficient 
use of resources and distortion of development plans, restriction on freedom 
of choice and inability to buy in the cheapest market, these leaders point 
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out frustrations are caused by "Canadian supervision and the tyi_ng of aid 
to a Canadian content to make it politically palatable in Canada, which 
allegedly makes it more advantageous to the donor than the recipient. 
There is concern lest aid should lead to interference or paternalism, and 
a conviction that West Indians, not Canadians, know best what is needed" .190 
The Relationship Between Canadian Government 
Assistance to Private Investment in the Region 
The Commonwealth Caribbean has been and is now considered an important 
area for profit-making by Canadian investors. According to the Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs Respecting Canadian West Indian Relations, 
"Canadian investment forms one of the oldest links with the Caribbean area. 
The flow of capital has been very considerable and has undoubtedly con-
tributed a great deal to the aggregate output of the local economies".191 
Traditionally, Canadian investments in the region have been located 
primarily in the fields of banking and insurance. At the turn of the 
century, Canadian investors soon branched out in bauxite-alumina production 
utilities, real estate, tourism and secondary manufacturing. This investment 
is heavily concentrated in Jamaica and until recently in Guyana, by far 
the largest share going into bauxite. However, since the early 1960 1 s 
Canadian investment has-also been increasing in Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados 
and the Leeward and Windward Islands. By 1967, the book value of Canadian 
investment had reached a total of $600 million in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
It is interesting to see how the $600 million of Canadian investment was 
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distributed in l967 .l92 More than 50%. is concentrated in the bauxite industry. 
About 25% in the field_of banking, insurance, hotels and real .estate and 
manufacturing, approximately l5%_in public utilities, such as electric power 
and transportation, and the remainder of ·10% divided .. amorig trade, agriculture 
and other activities. 
The above figures leave no doubt as to the relative importance of 
Canadian capital in bauxite industry. The Aluminium. Company of Canada in 
1967 estimated its investment in Jamaica to be worth $179 million, with 
a planned future expansion of $37 million in the near future. In Guyana 
before nationalization in 1970, Alcan's investment was approximately 
$12l million. Besides mining facilities, alumina plants and rented port 
installations, Alcan Jamaica Limited, is engaged in an "extensive agri-
cultural and re-afforestation programme on its 48,000 acres of property'.. 
The company's activities include raising of beef cattle, pasture improvement, 
citrus production and timber planting. The company leases out 20,000 
acres at low rent to about 4,300 farmers". 193 
192 
Breakdown in Canadian investment as follows: 
$310 million in bauxite - alumina (Jamaica and Guyana) 
$lOO million in mortgages, government securities loans and 
other assets held by banking and insurance companies. 
$20 million in electric and other utilities. 
$lo million in cultivation and manufacture of sugar and citrus products. 
$5-lO million in secondary manufacturing. 
$lOO million in hotels and various enterprises. Canada-West Indies 
Economic Relations, McGill University, Montreal l967, p. 24. 
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Canad.ian interest in the banking business is overwhelmi.ng in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. Canada has shown interest in this field since 
1889, when the Bank of Nova Scotia opened its first branch outside of 
Nova Scotia and Canada in Jamaica. Since then, other Canadian banks have 
grown to the point of having two hundred and eleven branches and doing 
more than half of the region's business. Table 3.11 gives a breakdown 
of the total number of banks in the region. The economic implications 
of these large number of Canadian branches in the region are signi~ 
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·f.icant because · as long as these institutions· are controlled from abroad 
and export their earnings, they do not really contribute to sound economic 
development of the region as a whole. There is no doubt that the banks 
encourage "exploitation of r'esources by foreign investors rather than the 
development of a native entrepreneurial class, and also counsel investors 
to extract superprofits to compensate for the risk. The Canadian banks 
have worked closely with island governments in attracting North American 
investment through tax incentives and condoning profit repartriation, leaving 
no money in the islands econo~y except inside the minister's pockets 11 • 194 
The principal criticisms which may be levelled against the banks is 
that they leak investment funds from the region by methods of profit 
transfer .and do not grant credit in accordance with the national priorities. 
They reduce government control on the economy and contribute to social 
inequity. Economic growth requires long term investment in hardware and 
fixed capital and it would seem logical to expect that this should be one 
of the functions of a banking system to provide for such investments .. 
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TABLE 3.11 
NUMBER OF CANADIAN BANKS IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 1972 
Antigua 
Bahamas 
Grenada 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Barbados 
St. Lucia 
Guyana 
British Honduras 
,St. Vincent 
Jamaica 
Monsterrat 
Bank of 
Nova Scotia 
1 
12 
2 
23 
3 
2 
1 
4 
40 
St. Kitts, Nevis -
St. Christopher 
Total 88 
·Imperial Bank 
of Commerce 
1 
7 
2 
7 
4 
1 
1 
14 
37 
Royal Bank 
of Canada 
1 
31 
2 
15 
4 
2 
13 
3 
1 
12 
1 
1 
86 
121. 
Total 
3 
50 
6 
45 
11 
5 
14 
7 
2 
66 
1 
1 
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Source: Canada Year Book 1970-71, Dominion Bureau of Statistics Ottawa 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 
Commercial banks tend to typically supply short term capital, Le. working 
capital for financing inventories. In the territories, this tendency is 
compounded by the fact that the Banks are foreign owned, ·and like all other 
foreign owned enterprises, tends to take foreign risks than they would in 
the metropolitan.· 
· Another Canadian institution of great magnitude·· is life insurance. 
According to Levitt and Mcintyre,about half of the twenty-four (1967) 
life insurance companies in the region are of Canadian or.igin. They 
122. 
receive some 70% of the business and potentially could be important factors 
in mobilizing domestic savi.ngs for long-term investment in the Caribbean .195 
Like the commercial banks, all policy and decisions are made overseas, 
and as a result, the insurance companies make minute or insignificant 
contribution to the economic development of the region. 
In the manufacturing sector, one of the Caribbean's prime attraction 
to industry is that of a large and relatively cheap labour force. This 
has been admitted by many Canadian industrialists as one of the deciding 
factors in locating in the area. Low wages in themselves are not to be 
construed as negative. Economically,. they are desirable if they are 
scaled to the standard of living and if the secondary benefits from such 
low wages accrue to the economy. This is decidedly not the case in the 
Caribbean. Added to the benefits of low wages are such things as "approved 
status" which carry benefits such as tax holidays as long as ten years 
and import tax exemptions. This amounts to the loss of a prime source of potential 
195 
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national income in the form of wages, taxes and profits. In the actual 
manufacturing process itself there is a high preponderance of goods that 
are not usable in the area and for which most of the material must be 
imported, for example, hockey equipment, optics, whisky, christmas cards, 
flour and shoes. Foreign investments of this nature normally take the 
form of the importation of machinery and equipment by multinational 
corporations into the recipient country. Consequently, foreign capital 
retain entire control of the subsidiary or firm established. 
The bulk of Canadian investment in manufacturing is located in 
Jamaica. The firms of particular concern are the following:- Distillers 
Corporation-Seagrams Limited, a substantial producer of rum for bulk 
exports; Shirriffs (Jamaica) Ltd, which manufactures jelly powder and 
packs tea; Bata Shoe Company of Canada Ltd, Colgate Palmolive (Ja,~aica) 
Ltd; Brandram-Handerson (West Indies) Ltd, a subsidiary of C.I.L., Winnwell 
Manufacturing Company, which makes work gloves, hockey gloves and baseball 
mitts for export to the United States; Waterman Leather Products; Trueform 
Industries Ltd, which manufactures ballpoint pens; Jamaica Fibre Glass Ltd, 
which manufactures office and school furniture and pleasure craft; Polycello 
Packaging Ltd; Univex (Jamaica) Ltd; which assembles electrical components; 
and Federated Plumbing, Heating and Ventilating Ltd. 
Canada's manufacturing investment in Trinidad is less substantial. 
Canadian-controlled companies include Imperial Optical; Samton Metal 
(Caribbean) Ltd, which produces metal furniture, Caribbean Milling 
(Trinidad), which operates a split-pea mill; Jaymore (West Indies) Ltd, 
which manufactures neckties and undergarments. There is also a Canadian 
124. 
owned lime-juice plant, a cark and seal plant and a manufacturer of flavouring 
196 
essences. 
In the field of electric and public utilities, Canadian interest is 
also significant. A Canadian concern holds a 40% share of Jamaica's 
Public Service Limited, which controls the electricity-generating activity 
on the island. Recently, Air Ct;Lnada has gone into partnership with Air · 
Jamaica taking 45% interest in the new company. In Barbados, the International 
Power Company, a Canadian incorporated public utility holding company, fully 
owns Barbados Light and Power Company Limited, which supp].ies all the 
electricity on the island. Canadian investments. in the-tou:cist·industry aTe 
also substantial, especially in Barbados and the smaller states. Over 
70% of' tourism industry in the smaller islands are Canadian-owned. In Jamaica 
and Trinidad the industry is controlled by .Americans, while the Canadian 
share is not altogether absent. 
Paralleling the regional tourist industry, Canadian real estate developers 
have capitalized on the Caribbean's sun and sea by buying up almost every 
piece of beach land available and selling it to eager North 
Americans looking for a tropical paradise. The key institution in the new 
wave of foreign investment however, is'the giant multinational corporation 
controlled from North America. Because of the vertical (corporate) rather 
than horizontal (regional) integration of these institutions, the local 
economy tends to lag behind or stagnate. On the other hand, s.ectors where 
these corporations are involved continue to grow. 
Consequently, the gi,oss effect has been a psychological underdevelopment 
on the part of both government and the �opulation into believing that the 
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future development of the economy does not lie in their jurisdiction, but 
essentially with that of the multinational corporation. One obvious result 
of this psychological dependence is the failure of the society to develop 
dynamic and resourceful entrepreneurs who Sir Arthur Lewis argued, "would 
have learnt the job, built up their savings, and in one or two generations, 
go right inn .
197 Instead, national businessmen ·have integrated into a
dependent relationship with foreign industrial and financial capital, and 
consequently do not identify with the goals of the nation. 
The consequence of the upsurge and pattern of Canadian investment in 
the region is a trend toward decaribbeanization of the economy and society. 
The Report of the Senate Committee observed this decaribbeanization by 
stating that 11it is vital that Canadian investors recognize and accept 
the growing local interest in ownership of Caribbean resources and industry. 
It will be increasingly important for these companies to 11Caribbeanize 11 
their operations. They will also be required to meet growing demands that 
their activities be closely geared to the development of the Caribbean 
II 198 
communities. 
The foregoing analysis was undertaken because, it is only against s 
such a background of overwhelming investment that Canadian aid to the 
Commonwealth Caribbean can be put in its proper perspective. The question 
now is, what then is the nature of aid programmes by which the Canadian 
·Govermnent hopes to establish their influence in the affairs of the
Caribbean since the Tripartite Economic Survey and the Canada-Cormnonwealth
Conference in Ottawa in 1966?
197
Arthur Lewis as �uoted from Frank McDonald, p.139. 
198 
Report of the Senate Committee, p.40. 
126. 
In the Eastern Caribbean, Canadian investment in basic infrastructure 
is quite noticable. This investment is the result of the Tripartite Economic 
Survey of 1966, which was conceived jo.intly by Britain, United States and 
Canada. The Survey in analyzing the. islands so as to formulate a strategy 
for development, found that, 
"the islands are densely populated and the rate of increase of 
population is one of the highest in the world; land, capital 
and skills are short in supply, and the economies are all heavily 
export orientated and dominated by export agriculture. The prospects 
for expanding markets for the two main export products are poor. 
Neither can compete in the world market and the protected U.K. market 
is limited. The other traditional export crops taken as a whole 
appear to have limited prospects for expansion. All the islands are 
heavily dependent on imports of both capital and consumer goods" .199 
Given this situation, the Report continues, "growth industries must 
need little land to be able to attract capital and skills from abroad and 
be a major foreign exchange earner. The possibilities of developing 
manufacturing industries are limited, but they possess natural advantages 
for tourist development, with their climate beaches, scenery, and proximity 
to the North American market". ·200 
Consequently, if the islands are to approach any level of self-
sufficiency, the tourist industry must be developed as the leading growth 
sector. The Commission went on to conclude in a very faint note, that 
199 
Tripartite Economic Survey, p.9. 
200 
Ibid, p.9. 
they "are not very optllllistic about spontaneous growth prospects in the 
11201 islands, with the possible exception of the tourist industry. 
l2T. 
As a result, the Commission went on to devise a programme totally 
tourist orientated for the development of the islands. The recommendations 
emphasized investment in basic infrastructure in the private sector, which 
would in particular pave the way for the well conceived tourist industry. 
The survey also stressed that development efforts on the islands must be 
integrated and recommended that a Regional Development Agency be established 
for this purpose. It was significant that the Tripartite Commission, 
neither included West Indian economists in such a vital examination nor 
sought to set up any kind of forum. As always, a tendency was to make 
an "expert". (which is invariably foreign) assessment of the problems of 
the region and to determine needs, set priorities and finally the decision 
on the volume and administration of the forthcoming assistance. 
As it turned out, the Commission followed "a path which, whatever 
might have been the exigencies, highlighted the fragmentary approach to 
development which is diametrically oppossed even to current political 
thinking in the area, let alone to dispassionate economic and historical 
analysis. By adopting a naive concept of social and economic development 
it achieved a recategorization of traditional approaches which, as its 
· cardinal rule, asserted the role of tourism and dismissed, with absolutely 
no empirical evidence, the prospects of industry and failed to come to 
, II 202 grips with the problem of rationalizing agriculture .. 
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As a result of the foregoing report and the Canada-Colillllonwealth 
Caribbean Conference of·l966, a programme was developed concentrating 
l28. 
"on investment in basic infrastructure (transportation, schools and water 
supply) to support the growth of income generating activities in the 
private sector, and particularly to prepare for a growing stream of 
tourists 11 • 203 This is the basic rationale for CIDA's present concentration 
in the sectors of air transport, water resources and education, with 
lesser emphasis on agriculture. 204 
Since l966, there has been a large increase in the Canadian aid 
received by these islands. Canada's intensified activities has however, 
11 raised apprehensions outside official circles, about the nature of 
Canada's interest and motives. In some quarters, Canada has been accused 
of paternalism and. neo-colonialism". 205 
Total Canadian aid to the islands from l958-to l97l, has amounted 
to over $28 million. Since l966, Canadian_ aid programmes have been co!Illilitted 
for specific projects, namely transportation, education and water sector 
which accounted for an overwhelming portion to be specific, over 90%. 
Transportation alone accounted for over $7 million, education $6.6 million 
and water sector $6.5 million. The balance is distributed along miscellaneous 
projects such as housing, hospital equipment and finally, to the agricultural 
sector. See Table 3.l2 for sectoral allocation of Canadian Bilateral 
Disbursement 1958-l970, and Appendix 3 further breaks down the sectoral 
allocation in terms of projects in each island. 
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1958/59 to 1961/62 
Transportation 1,290,000.00 
Education 29,499.91 
Water Sector 417,384.93 
Agriculture 
Miscellaneous 34,717,34 
TABLE 3,12 
LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS, SECTORAL ALLOCATION 
OF CANADIAN ·BILATERAL AID 1958. to. 1970 
1963-1964 1965/66 to 1966/67 1967-1968 1966-1967 
100,000.00 422,852,00 22,000.00 
1,339,740.03 2,640,000,00 
900,000.00 250,000.00 
i 78,980,03 I 
87,997.15 I 235,000.00 
,, . 
I 
1967/68 to 1969/70 
5,312,000.00 
2,800,000.00 
4,982,000.00 
450,000.00 
Source: Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, No.I, and No.5, 1969. 
Canadian International Development Agency: Commonwealth Caribbean' 
Assistance Program 1969/1970, 
TOTAL 
7,146,852.00 
6,809,239.94 
6,549,384.93 
78,980.03 
807,714.49 
I 
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The table and the Appendix reveal that over 90% of assistance committed 
to the islands by Canada· has been in the form of grants. Secondly, that 
total grant allocation have been mostly for public infrastructure, including 
transportation, water system, sewage, education and technical assistance 
projects. Appendix "3. also reveals that $200,000 grant was allocated for 
Regional Development,Agency in 1969/1970 fiscal year. The table also 
. reveals that the most heavily concentration of assistance to these islands, 
took place following the Tripartite Survey in 1966. 
As the result of this massive concentration on tourism for the economic 
development, the islands have become increasingly dependent on tourism 
as a source of development. It has also become in recent years a factor 
of increasing significance to Canada's trade relations with the region. 
The tourist industry has created a high foreign demand of goods for everything 
ranging from apples to canned fruits to artificial snow and christmas trees. 
It has also become an important source of foreign exchange to the staggering 
economies and is considered as important as any export from the region. 
However, the development of tourist facilities, calls for an infusion of 
capital from investors. As the result of these investors being Canadians, 
naturally much of the trade resulting from these investments goes to 
Canadian investors. 
The foreign ownership of the tourist industry has contributed very 
little to the economic development of the Commonwealth Caribbean. In the 
first place, profits are accrued primarily to. the. owners of -hotels ·and 
other tourist affiliated businesses, and secondly, the profits do not 
remain in the territories, but are repatriated back to metropolitan countries. 
I 
r 
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A steady "outward flow of tourist dollars is also g_uickened", .because the 
regional states must import most of the food and other commodit·ies consumed 
by the visitors". 206Profits in the form of transportation sector _are limited 
since most of it are returned to North American investors. A recent study 
of Caribbean tourism completed by Zinder Associates in Washington finds 
that for every $1 spent in the Commonwealth Caribbean states, $.77 returns 
in some form to the metropolitan centers. 207 
In ~oncentrating on the development of the infrastructure of the economy, 
the Canadian aid provides a "point of entry" for foreign firms, which are 
conducted either by the Canadians or the recipient go~ernment to undertake 
the feasibility studies and actual infrastructure operations. 208 
In Guyana, for the Canadian businessmen, "the development prospects 
will be largely dependent upon the extent to which the interior of the 
country can be developed 11 • 209 Conseg_uently, "CIDA has been assisting the 
development of the interior by preparing topographical maps. During 1970 
approval was given for an aerial magnetic survey to indentify possible 
mineral deposits in two regions that have shown the greatest potential. 
A major civil aviation programme for the development of the.interior was 
also provided by CIDA, as well as extensive communications and air navigation 
. 210 
eg_uipment and a team of advisers to assist in the overall programme". 
The impact of these external assistance progranimes is significant 
not so much for their positive value, but for the negative effect they have 
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had on the Caribbean economies. Essentially, the result of most of the aid 
programmes in the past-has been to make the need for more aid 'inevitable, 
that is, instead of assisting the Commonwealth Caribbean countries achieve 
greater economic development and independence, the aid programme has in 
- 211 
effect increased Caribbean dependency upon Canada. Aid seeking has also 
been narrowly insular and competitive between unit territories. Moreover, 
it has not been the Caribbean peoples who have chiefiy benefited from the 
millions of dollars that Canada has poured into the region, but Canadian 
businessmen in the form of subsidies and investment assistance and the 
provision of the infrastructural prerequisite; 
Besides assisting Canadian investors with a-more sophisticated 
infrastructure, Canadian investment abroad has received incentive from 
the foreign investment insurance program of the Export Development Corporation. 
Through this programme CIDA provides the recipient country with a loan to 
acquire the services of a Canadian firm or contractor to undertake a 
feasibility study, or under "the starter study programme assistance of 
up to $2,500 can be offered for allowable expenses incurred by a firm in 
making initial investigations of an investment opportunity. If the starter 
study determines that investment conditions are favourable, CIDA provides 
for reimbursement of up to 50% of approved allowable cost of a full-scale 
feasibility study. 11212 
The study is undertaken to eliminate fruitless investments. Consequently, 
most of the risk of investment in the Commonwealth Caribbean is eliminated. If 
after the study.the proj_ect proves to be uneconomic, the report -is made available 
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to other potential Canadian investors thro.ugh CIDA in cooperation with 
the Trade Co=issioner. Service of the Department of Industry, 'Trade and 
Co=erce, the Division that keeps in touch with opportunities for investment 
in developing countries around the world. If the feasibility proves to 
be an investment potential CIDA provides the capital necessary to the 
recipient country. Provision is then made whereby, the recipient country 
is restricted to Canadian content for the implementation of the programme. 
By so doing, Canadian foreign aid creates advantages for Canadian 
firms over local business. As the result of not making funds available 
to local firms which might compete with Canadian firms, CIDA and other 
alligned agencies provide Canadian companies with reliable information, 
that is not available to local firms and lastly, specifying that loan or 
grant contracts for construction, administration and supervision must be 
implemented by a Canadian firm with Canadian content, thereby eliminating 
small local firms from participating in specific projects of vital importance 
to the country. 
As if the advantages were not sufficient, Canada further minimizes 
the risks factors by the use of the insurance facility available from the 
Canadian Export Development Corporation (formerly Export Credits Insurance 
Corporation). The Canadian scheme is similar to the investment guarantee 
programmes of the United States government, which insure the investor 
against losses arising from expropriation, war, revolution or insurrection. 
Canada's Export Development Corporation is for "the insurance of Canadian 
private investment in less-developed countries ·against broad non-co=ercial, 
risks of loss from expropriation or confiscation, war or revolution or 
111 
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the inability to repatriate capital or earni_ngs". 213 
Fundamentally, the Export Development Corporation is development-
orientated. Its primary function is clearly to promote Canadian investment. 
Since thi.s programme was enacted more investment in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean has been covered by this form of insurance than in any other 
area. ~pecific clauses of the Export Development Corporation have 
larger implications, for example, in order to be eligible, "the programme 
is available to Canadian business and industry defined as individuals, 
proprietorships, partnerships and limited companies being Canadian 
· t · 11214 th · C d · h. d t 1 f . t t ci izens us encouraging ana ian owners ip an con ro o new inves men. 
Under another section of the programme in accord with its major goals 
of promoti_ng Canadian expansion and corporate profits "the programme provides 
for the reimbursement of 50% of the approved allowable costs of.a study 
with a maximum CIDA contribution of $25,000. This grant is available whether 
or not the applicant proceeds with an investment. 11215 
Among the criteria governing the insurance scheme is the stipulation 
that, the investment "will either provide economic advantages to Canada or 
contribute to the economic growth and development of the country in which 
216 they are made". Similarly, "the insurer also has a definite interest 
in the good corporate citizenship and good community relations of the 
investor insured". 217 Thus, aside from the economic effects which accrue to 
Canadian firms, Canadian aid also affects political decisions in the region. 
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This is the result of sendi.ng advisers or "experts" to supervise, 
advise and in some casep, directly administer aid programmes from within 
ministeries. Through those advisers, Canadian interests acquire increasing 
.control over policy formation and developmental processes. The aid programmes 
also have an impact upon the socialization and training of certain sectors 
of the masses in the region. 
Recent Political Reaction in the Region 
The 1966 Ottawa Conference promised greater collaboration, a better 
partnership, a clearer purpose between Canada and the Caribbean, and a 
better coherence-in assistance. aid in the latter's. development·. Yet we 
· -sa~~· r'.anada' s unilateral decision to s11spend the sugar rebate left. little room~ 
for West Indian· satisfaction and comfort in the relationship. This 
dissatisfaction was revealed in the same year in another fashion. In one 
of the major territories Trinidad and Tobago during the "February Revolution'' 
a wave of violent events and confrontation occurred in protest against existing 
economic, social and political conditions. These incidents were directed 
primarily at Canadian investments, in support of West Indian students 
involved in the Sir George Williams University affair. The protest almost 
led to the overthrow of that country's government and'.was followed by a 
national emergency, and consequently to the arrest of several nationals, 
including members of the armed forces and finally to Public Order Legislation. 
The economic impact of that crisis is of immediate concern. The 
Trinidad and Tobago turmoil shattered the traditional complacency of 
political and economic power~structures in the region and produced in quick 
response a tremendous awakening to and anxieties over socio-economic problems. 
The environment became permeated with an accentuated urgency for economic 
l36 
reconstruction and a hasty scr8lllble as it were, to find answers,and solutions 
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to ailments of the society ensued. In the wake of the turmoil, for 
example, in a broadcast apparently designed to answer Black Power demands 
for more economic independency, Prime Minister Eric Willi8llls announced 
a number of measures which observers interpreted as a step toward placating 
the militant mood of the demonstrators. These measures included the 
Trinidad's government taking over the building of the Bank of London and 
Montreal and using it as the headquarters of the country's proposed National 
Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. The government also passed an admendment to 
the Alien Landholders Act, restricting transactions in local property by 
aliens without consent of the government. The government also announced 
plans for the creation of some 2,500 jobs through a Special Works Programme 
which was to be financed by a new 5% levy on all companies paying corporation 
tax and all banks and insurance companies. 
Three months later, and despite the existence of a Five Year Development 
l"lan which had already completed its first year of operation, a new plan· 
for national reconstruction was initiated, followed by.the publication of 
a revised People's Charter described as "Perspectives for the New Society". 
From various "other quarters and in other Caribbean territories came a plethora 
of proposals for political and economic reforms. Guyana's seven year 
Development Programme, having barely passed its half way mark of intended 
duration, came in for fundamental revision':219 Concomitant with this drastic 
urgency for national reconstruction have been fundamental changes also in 
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development strat.egies. The past year saw a significant trend that r·adica1Iy 
transferred some assets of the region from foreign to local and _national 
ownership. 
In Trinidad 51% share of the largest sugar producer on the island,. 
Caroni Sugar Ltd, one of the two Radio Corporations television services 
external connnunications, water-front operations and commercial banking 
_and insurances, all came under national control and ownership·- some fully, 
other partially but with controlling interests. In Jamaica where Canadian 
investments are more conspicuous than in the other territories, was announced 
the establishment of the Royal Bank of. Jamaica from the local branch of 
the Royal Bank of Canada. 
The government of the one-year Old Republic of Guyana announced its 
decision to nationalize by negotiation the Demerara Bauxite Company, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of Canada. Similarly, other 
Caribbean governments "with the same objective in mind of drastically 
reducing foreign economic domination in the region, have initiated action 
of one kind or another, particularly in the related fields of banking and 
insurance, with new financial institutions being established both regionally 
and territorially". 220 
In their ''desperate search for a rapid transformation in the economic 
order with less foreign domination of the economic process, both Trinidad 
and Tobago and Guyana have launched massive campaigns for the promotion 
of cooperative business undertakings. The Government of Guyana has officially 
endorsed the cooperative form of business as the model upon which economic 
reconstruction of the new Republic is to be structured, while 1971 has been 
1· 
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designated "Cooperative Year" in Trinidad and Tobago and in both countries 
several new cooperative ventures have already been established. In the 
138 
case of Trinidad and Tobago, there is the added dimension of a "People's 
Economic Sector" separate and apart from the traditional public or nationalised 
sector, which is to be.created through the promotion of small business 
enterprises organised on indiv.idual, family, and partnership basis. 
That these new dimensions to and the considerably accentuated drive 
upon economic reconstruction came about largely because of the recent 
escalation of black-power sentiments in the Caribbean region is hardly 
refutable. In several respects the phenomenon was indeed an ill-wind but 
not without its proverbial good for the crisis which it precipitated had 
an instant impact which may properly be described as dramatic. It brought 
the former British Caribbean territories, at least some of them, into their 
'full flow' as Friedrich Engles in his correspondence with Karl Marx once 
described Germany in the late nineteenth century; or to apply the more 
striking and well known Shakespearean metaphor, it hastened the Caribbean 
tide to its flood. 221 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing chapters we noted that while dependency has 
remained constant throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean's history, its 
form has changed drastically over a period of time. In the region, 
dependency has been closely linked to the export sector of the economy 
·. from gold to s.ugar and finally to bauxite, petroleum and bananas, but 
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the change is in the shift of the dependency.from Europe which controlled 
the s.ugar economy, to North America which controls the most_ important 
sector of the economy such as mining, manufacturing and tourist industry. 
Recently, the region has witnessed a fairly high per capita income 
ranging from $200. U.S. to $600. U.S., and also a fairly rapid rate of 
growth in the mining, manufacturing, tourism and government service sectors. 
The apparently respectable rates of economic growth are largely illusory. 
Where the growth has occurred it frequently has been due to rapid expansion 
of foreign demand for primary exports, particularly in the bauxite and 
petroleum industry, and the lion's share of the benefits go to foreign 
interests. Similarly, in the tourist industry, profits accrue almost 
exclusively to the.metropolis. 
In the manufacturing sector, much of the industrialization in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean has been largely. fortutious, in the sense that it 
has not been due pr.imarily to the initiative of local entrepreneurs, but 
on the contrary, to foreign investment. The rapid expansion on the government 
"service" sectors however is largely a sponge which absorbs the excess 
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population of rural areas and its "growth" in fact represents little 
increase in economic welfare. That is, expansion of this sector is a 
mere reflection of the rapid rate of growth of the population, increasing 
inability of the rural sector to provide employment, limited opportunities 
for the active agricultural labor force, and finally the pronounced 
internal migration from rural to urban areas. 
The external direction of the economy maintains the Connnonwealth 
Caribbean in technological and industrial backwardness. It creates a 
psychological atmosphere in which the export sector is regarded as the 
sole contributor to the national well-being, and as a result entitled to 
monopolize capital and technology and to determine political and economic 
policy •. 
These conditions highlighted the governments of the region embarking 
upon the development of regional and extra-regional links to help solve 
some of the problems. In fact, the new orientation is the desire to devise 
a foreign policy that will promote the general well-being of the population 
by opening markets capable of absorbing indigenous products by finding 
supplies at most advantageous terms, and by obtaining financial and technical 
support for economic d~velopment. It was the threat of Britain's entry 
into the European Economic Connnunity under terms unfavourable to the 
Connnonwealth which sparked off search for economic partners. Consequently, 
the Caribbean turned to Canada- for such assistance, 
Canadian aid is a bold attempt to establish a new political and 
economic relationship between Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean countries. 
It is one of the most significant political and economic experiments and 
will certainly have a prominent place in the history of international 
relations, irrespective of its immediate outcome. For Canada, it is 
the most important development in its relations with the Commonwealth 
Caribbean since the 1925 Trade Agreement. Its implications go far 
beyond the solution of the immediate problem that led to the signing 
of ·the 1966 Canada-Commonwealth Caribbean Conference in Ottawa and the 
Tripartite Survey in the same year. 
As we analyzed in the preceding chapters, Canadian aid programmes 
to the Connnonwealth Caribbean consist of a wide assortment of assistance. 
Since 1958, the region has received approximately $150 million in the 
form of grants and loans, the bulk of which has been concentrated on the 
investment in basic infrastructure, transportation, education and water 
system, to support the tourist industry. Besides capital assistance, 
technical assistance is also provided, Under this provision, we observed 
Canadian experts are brought into advisory and administrative positions 
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to implement projects undertaken through the capital assistance. It also 
makes provision for the training of West Indians in managerial personnel and 
skilled labor for loc·al branch plants of the multinational corporations. 
As our exercise pointed out, Canada, despite being a haven.for 
innnigrants from Europe and besides being a member of the Commonwealth, 
has not completely opened her arms to West Indian migrants. Where Canada 
has shown a willingness to admit West Indians, skill has always been 
emphasized which in turn has resulted in a very serious problem of "brain 
drain" from the West Indies. 
To stimulate its own economy, Canada stipulates that 66 2/3% of all 
allocation must be Canadian content. The· tied aid procedures here has 
significantly reduced the aid component of those credits, and therefore 
their effective contribution to development of the Caribbean countries. 
Although from the standpoint of Canada, the tied aid method has provided 
help to its exports, for the territories it is necessary to find ways 
of eliminating such tying. All in all, these diverse activities are 
undertaken primarily in Canada's interest. First, they provide freedom 
of access to raw materials for Canadian business. Second, they ensure 
that such economic development that does take place in the region, is 
firmly rooted in Canadian interests. Third, they obtain imrnediate 
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economic gains for Canadian businessmen seeking trade and investment 
opportunities. Finally, we noted, development loans received by the 
territories increasingly shackle them with service and interest payments 
scheduled well into the future, prohibiting the present or future accumulation 
of investment capital for national development. "There is fear that within 
forty years, the burden of national debt incurred by the loans will become 
an intolerable proportion of national budgets and will lead either to 
· - d. . .,222 
neo-colonialism or to repu 1at1on. 
Given these adverse effects of aid on the region, the question is, how 
can Canadian aid contribute to the sound economic development of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean? The Commonwealth Caribbean needs assistance in·· 
the development of key industries, stabilisation of currency and prices, 
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expansion of economic ties> elimination of restrictions in international 
trade and better immigration policies. Given favourable conditions, this 
assistance can considerably step up the rate of development of the 
territories and thus accelerate the process of independence from foreig~ 
capital. Foreign aid can also substantially supplement the internal 
source of capital accUlllulation. However, it depends on the conditions upon 
which it is granted, the aims it pursues, whether it is genuine aid or 
merely an instrument for influence or control. 
However, many West Indian academics have proposed a united front 
on the part of the region to alleviate its dependency. Foremost amongst 
them is William Demas, who points out that, "the Commonwealth Caribbean 
governments must ask themselves, what is the way forward? shall we continue 
to wait for manna falling from heaven, dispensed by a mysterious deity 
called "foreign capital" whom we have to placate on bended knees? or shall 
we actively seek our own salvation, regarding foreign direct investment 
as subsidiary and complementary to our own international efforts 11 • 223 
Thus he proposed an appropriate development strategy, which would 
include machinery designed to ensure that the decisions of the la.rge 
international corporations are harmonized with the national interests. 
According to Lloyd Best, "the primary planning task in both time and 
importance is to create a framework within which the Caribbean economy 
would be able to make effective decisions about development. In terins of 
action, this means a transformation of the character of the corporations 
223 
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and a drastic revision of the terms of their participation. In this 
connection measures for nationalization or even expropriation cannot be 
arbitrarily ruled out. "224 
The fore.ign aid sector has also been given similar attention. It 
is argued that foreign aid must also be utilized in the efforts toward 
integration, which can only be done on the basis of some regional concept 
of development and regionally concerted decisions. According to Eric St. 
Cyr, "a regional pr.ogramme of development including a clear order of 
priorities based on. a lo.ng-,-term view of the future of the region must be 
drawn up. All foreign aid must fit this order. It must be unified, 
I 
' I 
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centralized and administered within the framework of the 
! 
225' 
r.egional pr.ogramme". r 
Eric Williams expresses a similar view by pointing out that "aid can serve 
to promote the objective of Commonwealth Caribbean economic integration, if 
such assistance is directed toward unifying the region and making it 
ultimately more independent economically. On the other hand, aid designed 
to protect metropolitan, political, diplomatic or commercial interests in 
the region will not only be a divisive factor but will serve to perpetuate 
226 the present pattern of dependence". 
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Canada should reappraise and revise its aid policy in the region, 
increasing its aid for regional integration purposes even if this means 
sacrificing its aid to individual countries. The success of new aid 
policies would depend not only on the amount of integration-supporting aid, 
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but on the connnitment of continuing aid for the entire period of transition. 
Such aid must be administered by institutions in which the Commonwealth 
Caribbean would have a strong voice. Furthermore, official aid activities 
must be coordinated with the flow of international and private financial 
resources to the region, otherwise the efforts of one agency to aid 
integration might be offset by another's aid for strictly national development. 
Indirect external aid would also be needed for the promotion of 
Commonwealth Caribbean trade with. the rest of the world. Such assistance 
would require the advanced countries to eliminate the most onerous restrictions 
against exports of the region and to facilitate access of goods to the 
developed markets by granting trade preferences. Just as the European 
countries in a drive· to regain their self-confidence clamoured for 
"trade not aid" after the first few years of the Marshall Plan, so now the 
region must emphasize more favourable trade conditions from Canada. 
The establishment of the. CARIFTA and of the Regional Secretariat on 
the one hand, and the creation of a Caribbean Development Bank and new 
Regional Common Services on the other hand, contain a certain degree of 
hope that the region can achieve progress in unity despite the failure 
of the colonial administration to introduce effective and lasting federal 
structures of government. Despite this progress, a new concept of 
development must be formulated. It should entail a structural transformation 
I 
of the relationship with the metropolitan countries so as:. to enable. the. 
resources of the region to be put primarily to the service of its people. 
In respect of this transformation should be the release of the region 
from the psychological dependence on the culture and "superiority" of the 
advanced countries, alo.ng with the blossoming in the population as a whole 
' of self-confidence, self-reliance and independence in thro.ught and action. 
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APPENDIX l 
GUYANA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CURRENT FACTOR COST 
BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1966-1970 
Hillions of Guyana Dollars Percentage of Total Annual Growth Rates 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Agriculture 63.5 69.3 70.5 79.0 82.0 18.3 18.3 17.1 17,7 17,2 7,3 9.1 1. 7 12.1 3,8 
Fishing and Forestry 15.6 14.5 15. 3 15.9 16.8 4,5 3.8 3,7 3.6 3,5 20.0 7,1 5,5 3,9 5,7 
Mining and quarrying 58.9 66.5 79.4 86.7 94.2 17.0 17. 6 19.3 19.4 19 .8 9.1 12,9 19.4 9.2 8,7 
Manufacturing 42.4 46.7 49.7 53.0 55. 2 12.2 12.3 12.1 11.9 11.6 0.8 10.1 6.4 6.6 4.2 
Transport and 
Communications 23.7 24.6 25. 9 27.6 28.7 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.2 6.0 11.2 3.7 5,3 6.6 4.0 
Construction 21.8 25.3 30.0 35.4 41.6 6.3 6.7 7.3 7.9 8.7 27.4 16.0 18.6 18.0 17,5 
Commerce 42.1 44.7 51.3 52.9 55 .2 12.1 11.8 12.4 11.8 11.6 6.8 6.1 14.8 3,1 4.3 
Ownership of dwellings). 35.3 36.8 38.3 39.7 41. 7 10.2 9.7 9.3 8,9 8.8 9.9 A.2 4.1 3,7 5.0 
) 
Financial and . ) 
other services ), 
, 
Government 43.7 50.1 51.9 56.8 60.3 12.6 13.2 12.6 12.7 12.7 _J8_. 14.6 3,6 9.4 6.2 
-- -- --
Total 1347.0 378.5 412.3 447.0 475.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.6 9.1 8.9 8.4 6.4 
--· 
·---- --
--· ----· 
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"' ..... 
1966 
l\griculture 43 .4 
Sugar 32.0 
Other Agricultural 
Commodities 
I 
11.4 
Manufacturing and 
Mining 17.3 
Cons true tion 15.3 
Distribution 37.3 
Transport and 
Public Utilities 
I 
10.3 
Ownership of 
dwellings 6.8 
Services 17.9 
Government I 21,3 
Total I 196 .6 
BARBADOS: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR 
OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1966-1970 
Millions of East Caribbean Percentage of Total Dollars at Current Prices 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
47.8 41. 7 39,1 43 .8 25.6 25. 3 19.2 16.7 16.8 
35.1 28.6 25.0 28 .4 18.9 18.6 13 ,2 . 10.7 10.9 
12.7 13 .1 14.1 15.4 6.7 6.7 6.0 6.0 5.9 
18.6 21.0 22.8 24.8 10.2 9,8 9.7 9.8 9.5 
16.4 20.0 21.4 23,5 9.0 8,7 9.2 9.2 9,0 
39.2 so. 0 54.4 58.2 22.0 20.7 23.1 23,3 22.3 
14. 6 18.2 21.3 24.1 6.1 7,7 8,4 9.1 9.2 
7.3 8.0 8.4 8.9 4.0 3.9 3.4 3.6 3.4 
19.5 27,8 31. 7 36.4 10.6 10.3 12.8 13 .6 12.8 
25.8 30.0 34.5 41,4 12.6 13.6 13.8 14.8 13.8 
--
189.2 216.7 233.6 261.1 100.0 100, 0 100.0 100.0 100,0 
1966 
5.3 
1. 6 
15. 2 
6.8 
2,7 
4.8 
11.4 
. ' 
4.6 
5.3 
21.0 
--
7,2 
.... 
.0-
co 
Annual Growth Rates 
1967 1968 1969 1970 
10.1 12.8 6.2 12,0 
9.7 18.5 12.6 13 .6 
11.4 3.1 7,6 9.2 
7,5 12.9 8.6 8.8 
7,2 22.0 7,0 9.8 
5.1 27.6 8.8 7.0 
41. 7 24,7 17.0 13,1 
7,4 9.6 s.o 6.0 
8.9 42.6 14.0 14.8 
21.1 16.3 15.0 20.0 
-- -
11.6 14.5 7.8 11.8 
Sectors 
. 
Agriculture 
Mining and petroleum 
extraction and refining 
Construction 
Government 
Transport and Communications 
Commerce 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water 
Financial Institutions 
o,mership of Dwellings 
Others 
Total 
JAMAICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CURRENT FACTOR 
COST, BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Millions of Jamaica Dollars Percentage of Total 
1966 1968 1969 1970 1966 1968 1969 1970 1967 
75.1 77,5 74,7 75.1 11.6 10.3 9.0 8.2 3.6 
-
-
62.0 72.4 95,9 126.1 9,6 9.6 11.6 13.8 4.8 
" 
69 .2 94.9 107 .o 119.9 10.7. 12.5 12.9 13.l 4.1 
50.3 69,7 77 .2 85.3 7.8 9.2 9.3 9.3 5.3 
48.5 57.8 61.1 64.1 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.0 1.1 
91.2 102.3 112.5 122.6 14.1 13.5 13.6 13.4 9,9 
99.2 115.3 121.l 128.7 15.4 15,3 14.6 14.1 3,2 
9.0 10.0 11.1 12.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 .ll. 3. 10.5 
29.5 35.0 38. 7 41. 7 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7 1.8 
21.9 22.8 24.9 21,.6 3.4 .3.0 3.0 3.0 20.7 
90.1 99,1 103,9 109.1 13.9 12.6 12.6 12.0 4.9 
--
646.o 756,9 .828.2 912.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.1 
--· 
Annual Growth Rates 
1968 1969 1970 
0.5 3.6 0.5 
11.4 32,5 31. 5 
11.6 5.0 6.3 
30.2 12.8 12.1 
11.0 11.0 10.8 
8.6 5,7 12.9 
8.7 10.0 9.0 
·7.0 10.6 7,8 
1.8 9.2 10.8 
15.0 10.8 10.5 
5.0 4.8 5,0 
. 
-- -- --
10.4 9.4 10.2 
-- --·· >-" 
..,.. 
'° 
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TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST 
Millions of Trinidad and T·obago Percent age Share 
Dollars at Current Prices 
1960 -
1960 1967 1968 1969 1970 1960 1969 1970 1967 
Agriculture and quarrying 108.4 111,6 127.0 126,9 128.5 12,5 8,0 7,7 0,4 
Mining and extraction and 
refining of petroleum 263.4 350.4 366,0 373,0 350.6 30.4 23,5 21.l 4.2 
Manufacturing 108.2 218.6 260.0 293.0 313 .8 12.5 18,5 18. 9 10. 6 
Construction 40.6 53.2 65.0 63.5 73,5 4.7 4.0 4.4 3.9 
Transport and distribution 149.6 240.8 273.0 277 .5 304.8 17,2 17,5 18.3 7,0 
-
Public Utilities 40.6 72.5 89.0 81.0 87.2 4.7 5.1 5.2 8,6 
Government 82.5 ll,9. 6 162.0 173.0 188.2 9.5 10.9 11.3 8.9 
Ownership of dwellings 16.8 53.7 55.5 58. 7 60.5 1.9 3,7 3.6 18.0 
Banking and finance 20.0 47.3 47.0 50.8 56.2 2.3 3.2 3,4 13.1 
Other services 34.9 80.2 79.0 89.0 98. 5_ ..i,_Q_ ~ -1.,2_. 12:6 
Total 865.0 1377.9 1523.5J1586.0 1661.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 6.9 
--
·----- --,-----~-- ~ 
Annual Growth Rates 
1968 1969 1970 
13,8 - - 1.3 
4.5 1.9 6.0 
18,9 12,7 7,1 
22.2 2.3 15 .1 
13.4 1.6 9.8 
22.8 9.0 7,7 
8.3 6.8 8.8 
3.4 5.8 3.1 
0.6 8.1 10.6 
~ . .11.:1. 10.7 
10.6 4.1 4.8 
-- -- --
..... 
"' 0 
LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS G.D.P. BY SECTOR OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Millions of Caribbean Dollars 
-
.. 
Percentage of Total 
l962 l967 l968 l969 l970 l962 l967 l968 
Export Agriculture 28.5 34.ol l8.9 l6. 6 ) 
) 55.7 ) 25 .6 
Other Agriculture 23.0 20. 7) l5.2 lO.l) 
Mining and Manufacturing 5.l 8.7 l0.3 3.4 4.3 4.7 
Construction l6.3 26.4 3l.0 l0.8 l2.9 l4.2 
Distribution 2l.9 28.5 3l.0 l4.5 l3.9 l4.2 
Transport, storage 
and Communication 3.9 7.6 7.2 2.6 3.7 3.0 
- ) Services l2.9 24.l) 8.5 ll.8) 
) ) Ownership of Dwellings l2.7 l5.9) 83.5 8.4 7.8) 38.3 
) ) Government 26.8 38 .6) l7.7 l8.9) 
-- --
Total l5l.l 204.5 2l8.7 237·• 260·• lOO.O lOO.O l00.0 
-- -- --
* ECLA Estimates .. 
Source: Economic Survey of Latin America l970, United Nations, New York, l972. ""' V, 
""' 
APPENDIX 2 
Note; All projects were financed by grant funds unless indentified as 
loan financing by an (L) preceding the name of the project. 
CURRENT CAPITAL PROJECTS-
JAMAICA 
Transportation Sector 
L (1) Material for five bridges 
L (2) Transportation Survey 
Education Sector 
L, (1) Primary P-e-fab Schools 
Water Sector 
L (1) Harbour View Sewage System 
L (2) Kingston-St. Andrew Sewage Study 
L (3) Eastern St. Mary's Water System 
L (4) Water Resource Development 
L '. ( 5) Minor Rural Water Supplies 
L ( 6) Port Antonio Water System 
Miscellaneous 
L (1) UHF Radio Telephone 
L ( 2) Public Works Eg_uipment 
L (3) Material for House Construction 
L (li) Hospital Eg_uipment 
L (5) Jamaica Development Bank 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 
Natural Resources DeveloJ2ment 
L (1) Aerial Survey 
L (2) Fea·sibility Studies 
L (3) Fisheries Eg_uipment 
300,000 
500,000 
800,000 
1,550,000 
825,000 
180,000 
1,200,000 
1,250,000 
200,000 
500,000 
4,155,000 
769,000 
670,000 
575,000 
735,000 
1,300,000 
4,049,000 
1,500,000 
548,000 
250,000 
2,298,000 
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TRINIDAD & TOBAGO (Cont I d) 
Energy Sector 
L (1) Rural Electrification 
Agriculture 
L (1) Dairy Development 
Miscellaneous 
L (1) Lumber for Low Cost Housing 
L (2) Factory Shells for Industry 
L (3) Hospital Equipment 
GUYANA 
Transportation Sector 
G (1) Aviation Communication Equipment 
G (2) _Highway Feasibility Studies and Design 
L (3) Aircraft for Guyana Airways Corporation 
G (4) Hangar and Equipment for Guyana Airways 
Corporation 
G (5) Equipment for Department of Civil Aviation 
Education Sector 
G (1) New Amsterdam Technical Institute 
G (2) University of Guyana 
Natural Resource Development 
L (1) Aerial Survey and Mapping 
L (2) Aerial Mining Resource Survey 
Water Sector 
G (1) Water Distribution System for 
Mackenzie, Wisman and Christianburg 
1,266,000 
1,710,000 
400,000 
800,000 
486,ooo 
1,686,000 
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165,000 
300,000 
2,400,000 
400,000 
1,000,000 
4,265,000 
1,170,000 
1,200,000 
2,370,000 
3,100,000 
600,000 
3,700,000 
2,315,000 
guYANA (Cont'd) 
Miscellaneous 
G (1) New Armsterdam. Fish Plant 
BARBADOS 
Agriculture 
L (1) Dairy Development 
G (2) Animal Feed Study 
Water Sector 
L (1) Material and Equipment for 
Water Distribution System 
Miscellaneous 
G (1) Map Compilation for Taxation 
BRITISH HONDURAS 
Transpor_t_ation 
LEEWARD & WINDWARD ISLANDS 
Tripartite Survey Programme Beginning 
1967/68 to 1969/70 
Transportation Sector .(Airfields) 
G (1) Beane Field Runway Extension - St. 
G (2) Air Terminal Building - St. Lucia 
Lucia 
G (3) Coolidge Field Runway Extension - Antigua 
G (4) Runway Rehabilitation - Dominica 
G ( 5) Feasibility Survey of Sites - Dominica 
G (6) Newcastle Field Runway Surfacing - Nevis 
239,000 
250,000 
650,000 
900,000 
2,600,000 
160,000 
605,000 
2,382,000 
50,000 
1,460,000 
1,000,000 
200,000 
220,000 
5,312,000 
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LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS (Cont'd) 
Education Sector 
G (1) Twenty Pre-fab Primary Schools 
Water Sector 
2,800,000 
G (l·) Distribution System - Dominica 347,000 
G (2) Distribution System - St. Lucia 1,250,000 
G (3) Support for Central Water Authority - St. Lucia 15,000 
G (4) Distribution System - Monsterrat 1,810,000 
G (5) Storage Reservoir - Antigua 260,000 
G (6) Well-Drilling Rigand Operator - St. Kitts 100,000 
G (7) Resource Survey and Distribution Survey - St. Vincent 425,000 
G (8) Distribution System - Grenada 775,000 
Miscellaneous 
G (1) Regional Development Agency 
G (2) Vieux Fort Resource Survey - St. Lucia 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES 
G (1) Student Residence, Six Islands and Faculty Club 
G (2) Library at Mona Campus 
REGIONAL 
Caribbean Development Fund 
Special Development 
Agricultural Fund 
4,982,000 
200,000 
250,000 
450,000 
1,731,000 
800,000 
2,531,000 
10,000,000 
5,000,000 
.2,500,000 
17,500,000 
Source: CIDA: Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program 1969/70 
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Commiteee on Foreign 
Affairs, Respecting the Caribbean Area, No.l, November 
4, 1969, No.5, March 18, 1969. 
APPENDIX 3 156 
Sectoral Allocation in Terms of Projects in the 
Leeward and Windward Islands 1958 to 1970 
Note: All projects were financed by grant funds unless identified as 
loan financing by an (L) preceding the name of the project. 
COMPLETED CAPITAL PROJECTS 
. WEST INDIES FEDERATION 1958/59 to 1961/62 
Transportation Sector 
(1) St. Vincent Dock 
(2) Dock and Habour Equipment for Various Islands 
Education Sector 
(1) Vocational School Equipment - St. Kitts 
Water Sector 
(1) Water Development - Monsterrat 
(2) Water Development - St. Kitts 
(3) Kingstown Water System - St. Vincent 
Miscellaneous 
(1) Resource Study - Dominica 
POST-FEDERATION PERIOD - 1962/63 and 1963/64 
Transportation Sector 
(1) Two Warehouses - St. Kitts and St. Lucia 
Education Sector 
(1) Four Schools - Antigua, Dominica, and Grenada(2) 
PRE-TRIPARTITE SURVEY PROGRAMME - 1965/66 and 1966/67 
Transportation Sector 
(1) Habour Luanches - Antigua, Dominica and St. Vincent 
(2) Air Terminal Building and Cold Storage facilities-
Monsterrat 
$1,005,364.01 
285,044.44 
1,290,408.45 
29,499.91 
30,000.00 
371,053.88 
16,331.05 
417,384.93 
34,717.34 
100,000.00 
1,339,000.00 
105,852.00 
317 ,ooo. 00 
442,852.00 
Water Sector 
(1) Distribution System - St. Lucia 
(2) Survey of Resources - Monsterrat 
(3) Storage Facilities - St. Kitts 
Miscellaneous 
(1) Study of Banana Industry - St.Lucia 
(2) Transportation of Hospital Supplies 
TRIPARTITE SURVEY PERIOD BEGINNING 1967/68 
Agriculture 
(1) Fertilizer - St. Vincent and St. Lucia 
(2) Cattle - Dominica 
CURRENT CAPITAL PROJECTS 
l'RE-TRIPARTITE SURVEY PROGRAMME 1965/66 and 1966/67 
Transportation 
(1) Construction of Be~uia Jetty - St, Vincent 
Education Sector 
(1) Grand Bay School - Dominica 
(2) Pares Village School - Antigua 
(3) Technical School - St. Lucia 
Water Sector 
(1) Survey of Possible Dam Site - Antigua 
Miscellaneous 
(1) Fish Storage Plant - Grenada 
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350,000.00 
352,000.00 
198,000.00 
900,000.00 
50,000.00 
37,997.15 
87,997.00 
53,490.05 
25,490.28 
78,980.33 
22,000.00 
850,000.00 
790,000.00 
1,000,000.00 
2,640,000.00 
250,000.00 
235,000.00 
TRIPARTITE SURVEY PROGRAMME BEGINNING 1967/68 and 1969/70 
Transportation Sector 
(1) Beane Field Runway Extension - St. Lucia 
(2) Air Terminal Building - St. Lucia 
(3) Collidge Field Runway Extension - Antigua 
(4) Runway Rehabilitation - Dominica 
(5) Feas'ibility - Dominica 
(6) Newcastle Field Runway Surfacing - Nevis 
Education Sector 
(:I,) Twenty Pre-fab Primary Schools 
Water Sector 
(1) Distribution System Dominica· 
(2) Distribution System - St. Lucia 
(3) Support for Central Water Authority - St. Lucia 
(4) Distribution System - Monsterrat 
(5) Storage Reservoir - Antigua 
(6) Well Drilling Rigand Operator - St .Kitts 
2,382,000.00 
50,000.00 
1,460,000.00 
'l,000,000.00 
200,000.00 
220,000.00 
5,312,000.00 
2,800,000.00 
347,000.00 
1,250,000.00 
15,000.00 
(7) Resource Survey and Distribution Survey - St. Vincent 
(8) Distribution System - Grenada 
1,810,000.00 
260,000.00 
100,000.00 
425,000.00 
775,000.00 
Miscellaneous 
(1) Regional Development Agency 
(2) Vieux Fort Resource Survey - St. Lucia 
4,982,000.00 
200,000.00 
250 ,ODO .OD 
450,000.00 
Source: CIDA: Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program 1969/70 
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Respecting the Caribbean Area, No. 1. November 4, 1969 
and No. 5, March 18, 1969. 
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